2011 journal article
Payment contracts in a preventive health care system: A perspective from Operations Management
JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 30(6), 1188–1196.
author keywords: Health care payment system; Coordinating contracts; Welfare; Mechanism design; Principal-agent model; Preventive care
MeSH headings : Colorectal Neoplasms / diagnosis; Colorectal Neoplasms / economics; Colorectal Neoplasms / prevention & control; Contract Services / organization & administration; Contracts / economics; Delivery of Health Care / organization & administration; Health Services Needs and Demand / economics; Humans; Insurance, Health / economics; Mass Screening; Models, Statistical; Preventive Health Services / economics
TL;DR:
It is shown that under certain conditions, when the number of customers for a preventive medical intervention is verifiable, there exists a gate-keeping contract and a set of concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system.
(via Semantic Scholar)
UN Sustainable Development Goal Categories
3. Good Health and Well-being
(Web of Science)
Source: Web Of Science
Added: August 6, 2018
We consider a health care system consisting of two noncooperative parties: a health purchaser (payer) and a health provider, where the interaction between the two parties is governed by a payment contract. We determine the contracts that coordinate the health purchaser-health provider relationship; i.e. the contracts that maximize the population's welfare while allowing each entity to optimize its own objective function. We show that under certain conditions (1) when the number of customers for a preventive medical intervention is verifiable, there exists a gate-keeping contract and a set of concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system, and (2) when the number of customers is not verifiable, there exists a contract of bounded linear form and a set of incentive-feasible concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system.