@article{yaesoubi_roberts_2011, title={Payment contracts in a preventive health care system: A perspective from Operations Management}, volume={30}, ISSN={["0167-6296"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.08.009}, abstractNote={We consider a health care system consisting of two noncooperative parties: a health purchaser (payer) and a health provider, where the interaction between the two parties is governed by a payment contract. We determine the contracts that coordinate the health purchaser-health provider relationship; i.e. the contracts that maximize the population's welfare while allowing each entity to optimize its own objective function. We show that under certain conditions (1) when the number of customers for a preventive medical intervention is verifiable, there exists a gate-keeping contract and a set of concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system, and (2) when the number of customers is not verifiable, there exists a contract of bounded linear form and a set of incentive-feasible concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system.}, number={6}, journal={JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS}, author={Yaesoubi, Reza and Roberts, Stephen D.}, year={2011}, month={Dec}, pages={1188–1196} }
 @article{yaesoubi_roberts_2008, title={HOW MUCH IS A HEALTH INSURER WILLING TO PAY FOR COLORECTAL CANCER SCREENING TESTS?}, ISBN={["978-1-4244-2707-9"]}, DOI={10.1109/wsc.2008.4736246}, abstractNote={Colorectal Cancer (CRC) screening tests have proven to be cost-effective in preventing cancer incidence. Yet, as recent studies have shown, CRC screening tests are noticeably underutilized. Among the factors influencing CRC screening test utilization, the role of health insurers has gained considerable attention in recent studies. In this paper, we propose an analytical model for the market of CRC screening tests and show how the insurer can benefit from a computer simulation model to cope with the problem of incomplete and asymmetric information inherent in this market. Our estimates reveal that promoting CRC screening tests is not necessarily economically attractive to the insurer, unless the insurer¿s valuation of life is greater than a certain limit. We use the proposed model to estimate such a threshold - the insurer¿s willingness-to-pay to acquire one additional life year by covering the CRC screening tests.}, journal={2008 WINTER SIMULATION CONFERENCE, VOLS 1-5}, author={Yaesoubi, Reza and Roberts, Stephen D.}, year={2008}, pages={1624–1631} }