@article{yaesoubi_roberts_2011, title={Payment contracts in a preventive health care system: A perspective from Operations Management}, volume={30}, ISSN={["0167-6296"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.08.009}, abstractNote={We consider a health care system consisting of two noncooperative parties: a health purchaser (payer) and a health provider, where the interaction between the two parties is governed by a payment contract. We determine the contracts that coordinate the health purchaser-health provider relationship; i.e. the contracts that maximize the population's welfare while allowing each entity to optimize its own objective function. We show that under certain conditions (1) when the number of customers for a preventive medical intervention is verifiable, there exists a gate-keeping contract and a set of concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system, and (2) when the number of customers is not verifiable, there exists a contract of bounded linear form and a set of incentive-feasible concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system.}, number={6}, journal={JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS}, author={Yaesoubi, Reza and Roberts, Stephen D.}, year={2011}, month={Dec}, pages={1188–1196} }
 @article{yaesoubi_roberts_2008, title={HOW MUCH IS A HEALTH INSURER WILLING TO PAY FOR COLORECTAL CANCER SCREENING TESTS?}, ISBN={["978-1-4244-2707-9"]}, DOI={10.1109/wsc.2008.4736246}, journal={2008 WINTER SIMULATION CONFERENCE, VOLS 1-5}, author={Yaesoubi, Reza and Roberts, Stephen D.}, year={2008}, pages={1624–1631} }