@article{wurman_romano_2016, title={Amazon Picking Challenge 2015}, volume={37}, number={2}, journal={AI Magazine}, author={Wurman, P. R. and Romano, J. M.}, year={2016}, pages={97–98} }
 @article{wurman_d'andrea_mountz_2008, title={Coordinating hundreds of cooperative, autonomous vehicles in warehouses}, volume={29}, number={1}, journal={AI Magazine}, author={Wurman, P. R. and D'Andrea, R. and Mountz, M.}, year={2008}, pages={9–19} }
 @article{cai_wurman_2005, title={Monte Carlo approximation in incomplete information, sequential auction games}, volume={39}, DOI={10.1016/j.das.2003.10.004}, number={2}, journal={Decision Support Systems}, author={Cai, G. and Wurman, P. R.}, year={2005}, pages={153–168} }
 @inbook{shah_joshi_sureka_wurman_2003, title={Mining eBay: Bidding strategies and shill detection}, volume={2703}, ISBN={3540203044}, booktitle={WEBKDD 2002: Mining Web data for discovering usage patterns and profiles: 4th international workshop, Edmonton, Canada, July 23, 2002: Revised papers}, publisher={Berlin; New York: Springer}, author={Shah, H. S. and Joshi, N. R. and Sureka, A. and Wurman, P. R.}, year={2003}, pages={17–34} }
 @inbook{sureka_wurman_2002, title={Applying the Generalized Vickrey Auction to pricing reliable multicasts}, volume={2511}, ISBN={3540443568}, booktitle={Burkhard Stiller ...[et al.] (Eds.), From QoS provisioning to QoS charging: Third COST 263 International Workshop on Quality of Future Internet Services, QofIS 2002 and second International Workshop on Internet Charging and QoS Technologies, ICQT 2002, Zurich, Switzerland, October 16-18, 2002}, publisher={Berlin; New York: Springer}, author={Sureka, A. and Wurman, P. R.}, year={2002}, pages={283–292} }
 @article{wurman_wellman_walsh_2002, title={Specifying rules for electronic auctions}, volume={23}, number={3}, journal={AI Magazine}, author={Wurman, P. R. and Wellman, M. P. and Walsh, W. E.}, year={2002}, pages={15–23} }
 @article{wurman_wellman_walsh_2001, title={A parametrization of the auction design space}, volume={35}, ISSN={["1090-2473"]}, DOI={10.1006/game.2000.0828}, abstractNote={Abstract We present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and differences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies. This parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify work within the field and uncovers parameter combinations corresponding to novel mechanisms. The structured characterization of auction rules can be exploited for the modular design of configurable auction servers. It also facilitates the communication of auction rules to software agents, enabling the automation of flexible market-based negotiation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, D44.}, number={1-2}, journal={GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR}, author={Wurman, PR and Wellman, MP and Walsh, WE}, year={2001}, pages={304–338} }
 @article{wellman_walsh_wurman_mackie-mason_2001, title={Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling}, volume={35}, ISSN={["1090-2473"]}, DOI={10.1006/game.2000.0822}, abstractNote={Scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternate possible uses over designated periods of time. Several have proposed (and some have tried) market-based approaches to decentralized versions of the problem, where the competing uses are represented by autonomous agents. Market mechanisms use prices derived through distributed bidding protocols to determine an allocation, and thus solve the scheduling problem. To analyze the behavior of market schemes, we formalize decentralized scheduling as a discrete resource allocation problem, and bring to bear some relevant economic concepts. Drawing on results from the literature, we discuss the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, and the quality of equilibrium solutions. To remedy the potential nonexistence of price equilibria due to complementarities in preference, we introduce additional markets in combinations of basic goods. We present some auction mechanisms and bidding protocols corresponding to the two market structures, and analyze their computational and economic properties. Finally, we consider direct revelation mechanisms, and compare to the market-based approach.}, number={1-2}, journal={GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR}, author={Wellman, MP and Walsh, WE and Wurman, PR and MacKie-Mason, JK}, year={2001}, pages={271–303} }
 @article{wellman_wurman_o'malley_bangera_lin_reeves_walsh_2001, title={Designing the market game for a trading agent competition}, volume={5}, number={2}, journal={IEEE Internet Computing}, author={Wellman, M. P. and Wurman, P. R. and O'Malley, K. and Bangera, R. and Lin, S. D. and Reeves, D. and Walsh, W. E.}, year={2001}, pages={43–51} }
 @article{wurman_2001, title={Dynamic pricing in the virtual marketplace}, volume={5}, number={2}, journal={IEEE Internet Computing}, author={Wurman, P. R.}, year={2001}, pages={36–42} }