@article{kenchington_shoh_smith_white_2022, title={Do sin tax hikes spur cheating in interpersonal exchange?}, volume={96}, ISSN={["1873-6289"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.aos.2021.101281}, abstractNote={We study the New York City taxi market to examine whether an excise tax hike on cigarettes corresponds to smoker taxi drivers more frequently cheating their customers. Increased cheating could be motivated by both financial pressures and as a reaction to unfair treatment (as surveyed smokers view cigarette tax hikes as quite unfair). We examine this question using detailed ride-level data where we can identify a rare but fraudulent overcharging technique (cheating) and a subsample of taxi drivers who smoke (affected taxpayers, identified via tickets for smoking in a cab). In difference-in-differences regressions we find that following a cigarette tax hike, taxi drivers who smoke are approximately 1.5 times more likely to cheat customers than other drivers. Our findings are strongest in the subsample of smokers with consistently low earnings.}, journal={ACCOUNTING ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY}, author={Kenchington, David G. G. and Shoh, Thomas D. D. and Smith, Jared D. D. and White, Roger M. M.}, year={2022}, month={Jan} }
 @article{greene_smith_2021, title={How Does Acquisition Experience Affect Managerial Career Outcomes?}, volume={56}, ISSN={["1756-6916"]}, DOI={10.1017/S0022109020000411}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS}, author={Greene, Daniel and Smith, Jared}, year={2021}, month={Jun}, pages={1381–1407} }
 @article{greene_smith_2021, title={Timing CEO turnovers: Evidence from delegation in mergers and acquisitions(star)}, volume={126}, ISSN={["1872-6372"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106095}, abstractNote={We examine the role of delegation in predicting CEO successions. Using a novel proxy for delegation in mergers and acquisitions, we find that overall CEO turnover rates are about one third higher following deals where the CEO delegates to a senior manager versus deals with no observable delegation. The delegation-turnover relation is strongest when deals are delegated to heirs apparent, the CEO is older, or the delegation decision is unexpected. Voluntary turnovers are more frequent following delegated deals than non-delegated deals, consistent with delegation signaling an orderly succession. The delegation-turnover relation fades over time while other predictors of turnover such as profitability, CEO age, and the presence of an heir apparent in the corporate hierarchy continue to remain significant up to five years after the deal. Our findings suggest that delegation is unique among our predictors of turnover in the sense that it captures near term orderly successions.}, journal={JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE}, author={Greene, Daniel and Smith, Jared}, year={2021}, month={May} }
 @article{jha_kulchania_smith_2021, title={US Political Corruption and Audit Fees}, volume={96}, ISSN={["1558-7967"]}, DOI={10.2308/tar-2017-0331}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT}, number={1}, journal={ACCOUNTING REVIEW}, author={Jha, Anand and Kulchania, Manoj and Smith, Jared}, year={2021}, month={Jan}, pages={299–324} }
 @article{ellis_smith_white_2020, title={Corruption and Corporate Innovation}, volume={55}, ISSN={["1756-6916"]}, DOI={10.1017/S0022109019000735}, abstractNote={We examine whether political corruption impedes innovation. Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. firms, we find that corruption has a substantial, negative relation with the quantity and quality of innovation. These results are robust to using various fixed effects, proxies for corruption and innovation, and subsamples. To establish causality, we employ 2 instruments for corruption: local ethnic diversity and the corruption of the state a firm’s founder grew up in. Corruption appears to reduce innovation output both on average and for the most innovative firms. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the notion that corruption reduces social welfare by impeding innovation.}, number={7}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS}, author={Ellis, Jesse and Smith, Jared and White, Roger}, year={2020}, month={Nov}, pages={2124–2149} }
 @article{panayides_shohfi_smith_2019, title={Bulk volume classification and information detection}, volume={103}, ISSN={0378-4266}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.04.001}, DOI={10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.04.001}, abstractNote={Using European stock data from two different venues and time periods for which we can identify each trade's aggressor, we test the performance of the bulk volume classification (Easley et al. (2016); BVC) algorithm. BVC is data efficient, but may identify trade aggressors less accurately than "bulk" versions of traditional trade-level algorithms. BVC-estimated trade flow is the only algorithm related to proxies of informed trading, however. This is because traditional algorithms are designed to find individual trade aggressors, but we find that trade aggressor no longer captures information. Finally, we find that after calibrating BVC to trading characteristics in out-of-sample data, it is better able to detect information and to identify trade aggressors. In the new era of fast trading, sophisticated investors, and smart order execution, BVC appears to be the most versatile algorithm.}, journal={Journal of Banking & Finance}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Panayides, Marios A. and Shohfi, Thomas D. and Smith, Jared D.}, year={2019}, month={Jun}, pages={113–129} }
 @article{brown_smith_white_zutter_2019, title={Political Corruption and Firm Value in the U.S.: Do Rents and Monitoring Matter?}, volume={168}, ISSN={0167-4544 1573-0697}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04181-0}, DOI={10.1007/s10551-019-04181-0}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Business Ethics}, publisher={Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, author={Brown, Nerissa C. and Smith, Jared D. and White, Roger M. and Zutter, Chad J.}, year={2019}, month={May}, pages={335–351} }
 @article{smith_2016, title={US political corruption and firm financial policies}, volume={121}, ISSN={0304-405X}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.08.021}, DOI={10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.08.021}, abstractNote={Using US Department of Justice data on local political corruption, I find that firms in more corrupt areas hold less cash and have greater leverage than firms in less corrupt areas. The results are robust to including a range of controls and to using an instrumental variable approach, two alternative survey measures of corruption, and propensity score matching. Further, the association between corruption and leverage is largest among firms that operate primarily around their headquarters. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that firms manage liquidity downward and debt obligations upward to limit expropriation by corrupt local officials.}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Financial Economics}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Smith, Jared D.}, year={2016}, month={Aug}, pages={350–367} }
 @article{bargeron_lehn_smith_2015, title={Employee–management trust and M&A activity}, volume={35}, ISSN={0929-1199}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.012}, DOI={10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.012}, abstractNote={We examine the relation between the trust that employees have in management and the M&A activity of firms. We measure this trust by using rankings compiled by the Great Place to Work Institute (GPWI) from 1998 to 2011. Although the volume of M&A activity is not significantly different for firms with strong cultures of trust ("SCT firms") versus other firms, the relative size of acquisitions announced by SCT firms is significantly smaller than the size of acquisitions announced by other firms. Furthermore, when SCT firms announce relatively large acquisitions, bidder returns and the percent change in the combined values of bidders and targets are lower than the corresponding returns for other firms. Finally, when SCT firms make large acquisitions, they are significantly more likely to suffer a loss in their GPWI ranking as compared with other SCT firms. Overall, the results are consistent with the conclusion that the M&A policies of firms are influenced by a culture of trust between employees and management.}, journal={Journal of Corporate Finance}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Bargeron, Leonce and Lehn, Kenneth and Smith, Jared}, year={2015}, month={Dec}, pages={389–406} }