@article{knoeber_tsoulouhas_2013, title={Introduction to the Special Issue on Tournaments and Contests}, volume={31}, ISSN={["0167-7187"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.04.001}, abstractNote={The papers in this special issue represent several of the directions taken by current research on tournaments and contests. Two surveys provide useful insight into promotion contests and into contest functions. Other papers analyze the implications of limited liability, incomplete information, cross-shareholding, and non-binding side payments. And two papers investigate dynamic incentives and momentum.}, number={3}, journal={INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION}, author={Knoeber, Charles and Tsoulouhas, Theofanis}, year={2013}, month={May}, pages={195–197} }
 @article{marinakis_tsoulouhas_2012, title={A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents}, volume={105}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Economics (Vienna, Austria)}, author={Marinakis, K. and Tsoulouhas, T.}, year={2012}, pages={161–190} }
 @article{tsoulouhas_2010, title={Introduction to the Symposium on tournaments, contests, and relative performance evaluation}, volume={19}, number={3}, journal={Journal of Economics & Management Strategy}, author={Tsoulouhas, T.}, year={2010}, pages={635–641} }
 @article{holthausen_tsoulouhas_2008, title={The good, the bad and the ugly: agent behavior and efficiency in open and closed organizations}, volume={35}, ISSN={["0938-2259"]}, DOI={10.1007/s00199-007-0216-9}, number={1}, journal={ECONOMIC THEORY}, author={Holthausen, Duncan M. and Tsoulouhas, Theofanis}, year={2008}, month={Apr}, pages={73–97} }
 @article{tsoulouhas_knoeber_agrawal_2007, title={Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps}, volume={30}, ISSN={["0938-2259"]}, DOI={10.1007/s00199-005-0060-8}, number={2}, journal={ECONOMIC THEORY}, author={Tsoulouhas, Theofanis and Knoeber, Charles R. and Agrawal, Anup}, year={2007}, month={Feb}, pages={195–221} }
 @article{agrawal_knoeber_tsoulouhas_2006, title={Are outsiders handicapped in CEO successions?}, volume={12}, ISSN={["0929-1199"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.04.005}, abstractNote={We argue that outsiders are handicapped (chosen only if markedly better than the best insider) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) successions to strengthen the incentive that the contest to become CEO provides inside candidates. Handicapping implies are that a firm will be more likely to choose an insider to succeed to the CEO position where insiders are more comparable to each other, where outsiders are less comparable to insiders, and where there are more inside candidates. We assess these predictions using a data set containing more than 1,000 observations on CEO succession in large U.S. firms over the period 1974–1995 and a novel measure of the comparability of insiders that identifies those firms with a product or line of business organizational structure. Our evidence is consistent with each prediction. We also explore more carefully our organizational structure variable. We find that where firms switch to a product or line of business structure (making insiders more comparable) the likelihood of outsider succession falls. And we consider the possibility that managers from firms with a product or line of business structure may be more likely to be chosen CEO because their experience as divisional head better prepares them for a CEO's duties. Two tests suggest that this is not the source of our finding that these firms are more likely to promote insiders to be CEO. The first test finds that controlling for prior experience managing a business (a division or a firm) among inside candidates to be CEO, those firms organized along product lines remain more likely to promote from within. The second test finds that when outsiders are chosen CEO, these outsiders do not come disproportionately from firms with a product or line of business structure.}, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE}, author={Agrawal, A and Knoeber, CR and Tsoulouhas, T}, year={2006}, month={Jun}, pages={619–644} }
 @article{tsoulouhas_vukina_2001, title={Regulating broiler contracts: Tournaments versus fixed performance standards}, volume={83}, ISSN={["0002-9092"]}, DOI={10.1111/0002-9092.00230}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={4}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Tsoulouhas, T and Vukina, T}, year={2001}, month={Nov}, pages={1062–1073} }
 @article{mezzetti_tsoulouhas_2000, title={Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal}, volume={18}, ISSN={["0167-7187"]}, DOI={10.1016/S0167-7187(98)00040-X}, abstractNote={We show that precontractual gathering of information by the uninformed party in a transaction benefits the favorable types of the informed party by allowing them to separate from the unfavorable types. Complete separation of types can only occur if the informed party is able to revise her initial contract offer when the uninformed party detects an unfavorable type. Paradoxically, the uninformed party would benefit if the informed party was constrained to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer.}, number={4}, journal={INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION}, author={Mezzetti, C and Tsoulouhas, T}, year={2000}, month={May}, pages={667–689} }
 @article{tsoulouhas_1999, title={Do tournaments solve the two-sided moral hazard problem?}, volume={40}, ISSN={["0167-2681"]}, DOI={10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00068-2}, abstractNote={The paper analyzes the optimality of relative performance evaluation via two-part piece rate tournaments in incentive contracting with multiple agents and two-sided moral hazard. If the agents are risk-averse, it is shown that a tournament is optimal only when the following conditions hold: (i) there is common uncertainty inflicted on the activities of the agents that is not contingent on their actions, but can be contingent on the principal’s action; (ii) the principal sufficiently saves in transaction costs by employing a tournament; (iii) the number of agents is sufficiently large. Then the feedback effect of using a tournament to monitor the agents is that the principal’s moral hazard problem is relaxed when the principal takes a single action. It can also be relaxed when the principal can vary her actions with the agents but there are economies of scale in her activity. Absent common uncertainty, the optimum scheme is shown to be a fixed performance standard, rather than a tournament, but if the agents are risk-neutral, a tournament can still be optimal provided that (ii) and (iii) hold.}, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION}, author={Tsoulouhas, T}, year={1999}, month={Nov}, pages={275–294} }
 @article{tsoulouhas_vukina_1999, title={Integrator contracts with many agents and bankruptcy}, volume={81}, ISSN={["0002-9092"]}, DOI={10.2307/1244450}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={1}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Tsoulouhas, T and Vukina, T}, year={1999}, month={Feb}, pages={61–74} }
 @article{tsoulouhas_1999, title={Renegotiation-proof labour and credit contracts with worker mobility}, volume={66}, number={264}, journal={Economica (London, England)}, author={Tsoulouhas, T.}, year={1999}, pages={433–454} }
 @article{kahn_tsoulouhas_1999, title={Strategic transmission of information and short-term commitment}, volume={14}, ISSN={["0938-2259"]}, DOI={10.1007/s001990050285}, number={1}, journal={ECONOMIC THEORY}, author={Kahn, CM and Tsoulouhas, T}, year={1999}, month={Jul}, pages={131–153} }