Thayer Morrill

Manjunath, V., & Morrill, T. (2023). Interview hoarding. THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 18(2), 503–527. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4866

Dur, U., Morrill, T., & Phan, W. (2022). Family ties: School assignment with siblings. THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 17(1), 89–120. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4086

Bichler, M., Hammerl, A., Morrill, T., & Waldherr, S. (2021). How to Assign Scarce Resources Without Money: Designing Information Systems that Are Efficient, Truthful, and (Pretty) Fair. INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH, 32(2), 335–355. https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2020.0959

Ehlers, L., & Morrill, T. (2020). (Il)legal Assignments in School Choice. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 87(4), 1837–1875. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz041

Troyan, P., & Morrill, T. (2020). Obvious manipulations. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 185. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104970

Troyan, P., & Morrill, T. (2019). Obvious Manipulations. ACM EC '19: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, pp. 865–865. https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329640

Dur, U., Hammond, R. G., & Morrill, T. (2019). The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 22(4), 918–953. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9594-z

Dur, U., & Morrill, T. (2018). Competitive equilibria in school assignment. Games and Economic Behavior, 108, 269–274. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.003

Dur, U., Hammond, R. G., & Morrill, T. (2018). Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY, 10(1), 187–213. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20160132

Baranov, O., Aperjis, C., Ausubel, L. M., & Morrill, T. (2017). Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS, 9(3), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160087

Hammond, R. G., & Morrill, T. (2016). Personality traits and bidding behavior in competing auctions. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 57, 39–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2016.08.005

Morrill, T. (2016). Petty Envy When Assigning Objects. EC'16: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, pp. 761–761. https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940718

Morrill, T. (2015). Making just school assignments. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 92, 18–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.004

Morrill, T. (2015). Two simple variations of top trading cycles. ECONOMIC THEORY, 60(1), 123–140. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0820-4

Hammond, R. G., & Morrill, T. (2014). STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST-VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 52(3), 1219–1230. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12078

Ausubel, L. M., & Morrill, T. (2014). Sequential Kidney Exchange. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS, 6(3), 265–285. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.3.265

Morrill, T. (2013). An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 42(1), 19–28. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0311-9

Morrill, T. (2013). An alternative characterization of top trading cycles. ECONOMIC THEORY, 54(1), 181–197. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0713-3

Morrill, M. S., & Morrill, T. (2013). Intergenerational links in female labor force participation. LABOUR ECONOMICS, 20, 38–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2012.10.002

Morrill, T. (2011). Network formation under negative degree-based externalities. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 40(2), 367–385. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0256-4

Morrill, T. (2010). The roommates problem revisited. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 145(5), 1739–1756. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.003