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2021 journal article
School Choice with Hybrid Schedules
By: M. Afacan, U. Dur & W. Harris
Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE.
By: M. Afacan & U. Dur
2020 journal article
Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 187.
By: U. Dur, P. Pathak & T. Sonmez
2019 journal article
School choice under partial fairness
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 14(4), 1309–1346.
By: U. Dur, A. Gitmez & O. Yilmaz
School choice with neighbors
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 83, 101–109.
By: U. Dur & T. Wiseman
Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
ECONOMIC THEORY, 68(2), 251–283.
By: U. Dur & O. Kesten
The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 22(4), 918–953.
By: U. Dur, R. Hammond & T. Morrill
The modified Boston mechanism
MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 101, 31–40.
By: U. Dur
Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 127(3), 1156–1177.
By: U. Dur & M. Unver
2018 journal article
Competitive equilibria in school assignment
Games and Economic Behavior, 108, 269–274.
By: U. Dur & T. Morrill
First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms
ACM EC'18: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, pp. 251–268.
By: U. Dur, T. Mennle & S. Seuken
Identifying the harm of manipulable school-choice mechanisms
American Economic Journal-Economic Policy, 10(1), 187–213.
Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston's Walk Zones
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 126(6), 2457–2479.
By: U. Dur, S. Kominers, P. Pathak & T. Sonmez
2017 journal article
Incompatibility between stability and consistency
Economics Letters, 150, 135–137.
When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 72, 16–24.
2016 journal article
Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
Economics Letters, 144, 123–126.
By: U. Dur & D. Ikizler
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