TY - JOUR TI - Unionization and Productivity in Office Building and School Construction AU - Allen, Steven G. T2 - Industrial and Labor Relations Review AB - This paper examines the difference in productivity between union and nonunion contractors in the construction industry over a sample of 83 commercial office buildings and another sample of 68 elementary and secondary schools. The popular belief that the building trades unions reduce productivity in the industry is soundly rejected in both samples. Square footage per man hour is 38 percent higher in office buildings built predominantly by union labor, controlling for differences in capital-labor ratios, observable labor quality, region, and building characteristics. Estimates of the union-nonunion productivity difference in the school sample range from zero (when output is measured in physical units) to 20 percent greater for union contractors (when output is measured as value added deflatedby regional price differences), controlling for the same factors. Possible sources of higher union productivity in the office building sample are explored. A lower ratio of supervision to production worker hours and use of technologies and materials that economize on labor account for as much as 25 percent of the higher productivity observed in the union sample. The remainder is probably attributable to apprenticeship training, unobserved labor quality, economies of recruiting and screening, and improved manangement. DA - 1986/1// PY - 1986/1// DO - 10.2307/2523458 VL - 39 IS - 2 SP - 187 J2 - Industrial and Labor Relations Review OP - SN - 0019-7939 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2523458 DB - Crossref ER - TY - JOUR TI - Unions, Pension Wealth, and Age-Compensation Profiles AU - Allen, Steven G. AU - Clark, Robert L. T2 - Industrial and Labor Relations Review AB - This paper examines the effect of unions on both the magnitude and distribution of pension benefits. Our empirical results show that beneficiaries in collectively bargained plans receive larger benefits when they retire, receive larger increases in their benefits after they retire, and retire at an earlier age than beneficiaries in other pension plans. As a result, the pension wealth of union beneficiaries is 50 to 109 percent greater than that of nonunion beneficiaries. Just as wage differentials within and across establishments are smaller among union workers, benefit differentials within and across cohorts of retirees are smaller among union beneficiaries. This results from the smaller weight given to salary average in determining initial benefits and the larger percentage increases given to those who have been retired the longest under post-retirement increases. The more compressed benefit structure under unionism causes the union-nonunion compensation (wages plus pension contributions) differential to decline more quickly than the union-nonunion wage differential over the life cycle. DA - 1986/7// PY - 1986/7// DO - 10.2307/2523243 VL - 39 IS - 4 SP - 502 J2 - Industrial and Labor Relations Review OP - SN - 0019-7939 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2523243 DB - Crossref ER - TY - JOUR TI - Union Work Rules and Efficiency in the Building Trades AU - Allen, Steven G. T2 - Journal of Labor Economics AB - This paper estimates the effect of union work rules in the building trades on employment and costs by comparing factor demand elasticities for union and nonunion contractors and subcontractors over micro data from two different types of construction. The results show that the elasticities of substitution between labor and nonlabor inputs and own-price elasticities for nonlabor inputs are about the same for union and nonunion contractors. In contrast, the elasticities of substitution among different skill categories of labor and the own-price elasticities for each category are much lower under unionism. DA - 1986/4// PY - 1986/4// DO - 10.1086/298101 VL - 4 IS - 2 SP - 212-242 J2 - Journal of Labor Economics LA - en OP - SN - 0734-306X 1537-5307 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/298101 DB - Crossref ER - TY - JOUR TI - Postretirement Adjustments of Pension Benefits AU - Allen, Steven G. AU - Clark, Robert L. AU - Sumner, Daniel A. T2 - The Journal of Human Resources AB - This paper examines why pension plans increased their liabflities by giving benefit increases to persons no longer working even though almost al lof them were not required to do so by any legally enforceable contract. In our model workers and firms have implicit contracts under which post-retirement increases in benefits are purchased by workers through lower wages or initial benefits. Such arrangements permit both plans and workersto share the risk of uncertain rates of return. They also allow beneficiaries to invest at a higher net rate of return than they could obtain elsewhere because of tax advantages and, in large plans, economies of scale. We also discuss how post-retirement adjustments can be used to influence turnover. Some empirical implications of the model are tested over a sample of beneficiaries of defined benefit plans. The major empirical findings are:(1) There is strong evidence of compensating differentials in final salary and initial pension benefits for beneficiaries receiving post-retirement adjustments.(2) Regardless of how the size of pension plans is measured(beneficiaries, participants, amount of benefits paid), large pension plans provide larger post-retirement benefit increases.(3) Beneficiaries of collectively bargained plans are more likelyto receive benefit increases and, among those receiving benefit increases, receive larger increases.(4) Benefit increases are larger in percentage terms for those who have been retired the longest and for those with the most years of service. DA - 1986/// PY - 1986/// DO - 10.2307/145960 VL - 21 IS - 1 SP - 118 J2 - The Journal of Human Resources OP - SN - 0022-166X UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/145960 DB - Crossref ER - TY - JOUR TI - The effect of unionism on productivity in privately and publicly owned hospitals and nursing homes AU - Allen, S.G. T2 - Journal of Labor Research AB - This paper examines the effect of unions on productivity within a sample of publicly and privately owned hospitals and nursing homes to determine whether public ownership influences union behavior. The results show that the productivity of union contractors is much greater in private than in public projects. Within the sample of private projects, the estimates of the union-nonunion productivity difference are generally positive but very imprecise. DA - 1986/// PY - 1986/// DO - 10.1007/BF02685300 VL - 7 IS - 1 SP - 59-68 UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-0039964329&partnerID=MN8TOARS ER - TY - JOUR TI - Reasons for Changes in Meat Consumption Composition AU - Thurman, Walter N. AU - Standaert, James E. T2 - Tar Heel Economist DA - 1986/2// PY - 1986/2// VL - 2 N1 - newspaper article RN - newspaper article ER - TY - SOUND TI - Have Meat Price and Income Elasticities Changed? Their Connection with Changes in Marketing Channels AU - Thurman, Walter N. DA - 1986/10// PY - 1986/10// N1 - Sponsored by The Southern Regional Research Committee (S-165) and the Board of Agriculture of the National Research Council RN - Sponsored by The Southern Regional Research Committee (S-165) and the Board of Agriculture of the National Research Council ER - TY - JOUR TI - Endogeneity Testing in a Supply and Demand Framework AU - Thurman, Walter N. T2 - The Review of Economics and Statistics AB - The powers of Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests are related to the normalization d ecision in estimating demand equations. Power is not invariant to the choice bet ween quantity and price as the dependent variable. A theoretical result due to N akamura and Nakamura_(1984) is used to explore the dependence of power on parame ters of the supply and demand system. The theoretical result is corroborated wit h a Monte Carlo experiment. The power results are used to analyze the U.S. deman d for poultry meat wherein price, but not quantity, is found to be predetermined Copyright 1986 by MIT Press. DA - 1986/11// PY - 1986/11// DO - 10.2307/1924523 VL - 68 IS - 4 SP - 638 ER -