@article{vukina_zheng_marra_levy_2008, title={Do farmers value the environment? Evidence from a conservation reserve program auction}, volume={26}, ISSN={["0167-7187"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.01.001}, abstractNote={The paper uses data from one Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auction to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove chosen plots of land from agricultural production and put them to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of this auction is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. Using decision theoretic approach to model this auction we show that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they value environmental benefits, especially those that increase future soil productivity of their land.}, number={6}, journal={INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Zheng, Xiaoyong and Marra, Michele and Levy, Amando}, year={2008}, month={Nov}, pages={1323–1332} }
 @article{levy_vukina_2004, title={The league composition effect in tournaments with heterogeneous players: An empirical analysis of broiler contracts}, volume={22}, ISSN={["1537-5307"]}, DOI={10.1086/381253}, abstractNote={We compare welfare effects of tournaments and piece rates in contracts with heterogeneous ability agents and demonstrate that tournaments that mix players of unequal abilities create a league composition effect. When leagues are fixed and the time horizon sufficiently long, piece rates improve welfare over tournaments. Using contract production data for broiler chickens, we estimate the variances of growers’ abilities, common production shock, and grower’s idiosyncratic shock. Growers' abilities are heterogeneous, and common production shocks are significant. Leagues in broiler tournaments disintegrate rapidly over time, suggesting that tournament contracts offer more welfare than piece rates.}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS}, author={Levy, A and Vukina, T}, year={2004}, month={Apr}, pages={353–377} }
 @article{levy_vukina_2002, title={Optimal linear contracts with heterogeneous agents}, volume={29}, ISSN={["0165-1587"]}, DOI={10.1093/eurrag/29.2.205}, abstractNote={This paper examines the class of linear contracts in a simple principal--agent model in which agents are heterogeneous in their abilities to perform a task for the principal. We show that in the absence of transaction costs, the optimal linear contract is a set of individualised contracts. The fact that individualised contracts are rarely observed may be explained by the presence of transaction costs. The equilibrium that emerges depends on the costs of screening relative to the heterogeneity in agents' abilities. In the monopsony case, the dynamic incentives of the agents preclude individualised contracts even if transaction costs are not significant. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.}, number={2}, journal={EUROPEAN REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Levy, A and Vukina, T}, year={2002}, month={Jun}, pages={205–217} }
 @article{wareham_levy_2002, title={Who will be the adopters of 3G mobile computing devices? A probit estimation of mobile telecom diffusion}, volume={12}, ISSN={["1091-9392"]}, DOI={10.1207/S15327744JOCE1202_04}, abstractNote={We characterize the role of the diffusion of information in the demand (adoption) of mobile telephones in the United States. Different strategies for identification of the parameters of the diffusion process are discussed. Using survey data from 1994 and 1998 and a probit model of mobile phone adoption, we estimate the rate of diffusion and bounds for the long-run market shares for specific socioeconomic market segments. Implications for the diffusion of 3G mobile computing devices are explored.}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMPUTING AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE}, author={Wareham, J and Levy, A}, year={2002}, pages={161–174} }