@article{tsoulouhas_knoeber_agrawal_2007, title={Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps}, volume={30}, ISSN={["0938-2259"]}, DOI={10.1007/s00199-005-0060-8}, number={2}, journal={ECONOMIC THEORY}, author={Tsoulouhas, Theofanis and Knoeber, Charles R. and Agrawal, Anup}, year={2007}, month={Feb}, pages={195–221} }
 @article{agrawal_knoeber_2001, title={Do some outside directors play a political role?}, volume={44}, ISSN={["0022-2186"]}, DOI={10.1086/320271}, abstractNote={If outside directors with backgrounds in politics and in law play a political role, they will be more important on the boards of firms for which politics matters more. We conduct three tests. First, for a sample of manufacturing firms, we find that politically experienced directors are more prevalent in firms where sales to government, exports, and lobbying are greater; lawyer‐directors are more prevalent in firms where costs of environmental regulation are higher; and both are more prevalent in larger firms. Second, for a sample of electric utilities during the 1990s, when the advent of retail competition made politics more important, we find increased incidence of politically experienced directors. Finally, we explore whether a governmental taste for diversity creates a political role for women directors. Although we document increased incidence of women directors over time, we find little evidence that women directors play a political role.}, number={1}, journal={JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS}, author={Agrawal, A and Knoeber, CR}, year={2001}, month={Apr}, pages={179–198} }
 @article{agrawal_knoeber_1998, title={Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover}, volume={47}, ISSN={["0304-405X"]}, DOI={10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00044-5}, abstractNote={A greater threat of takeover has two opposing effects on managerial compensation. The competition effect in the market for managers reduces compensation. The risk effect increases compensation by making managers' implicitly deferred compensation and firm-specific human capital less secure. Using a sample of about 450 large firms, we find that an increase in the threat of takeover from the first to the third quartile reduces a typical CEO's salary and bonus by $22,800–211,600 due to the competition effect, but raises salary and bonus by $41,500–255,300 due to the risk effect. The net effect is an increase of $18,700–43,700.}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS}, author={Agrawal, A and Knoeber, CR}, year={1998}, month={Feb}, pages={219–239} }
 @article{agrawal_knoeber_1996, title={Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders}, volume={31}, ISSN={["0022-1090"]}, DOI={10.2307/2331397}, abstractNote={Abstract This paper examines the use of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. These mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders; use of outside directors; debt policy; the managerial labor market; and the market for corporate control. We present direct empirical evidence of interdependence among these mechanisms in a large sample of firms. This finding suggests that crosssectional OLS regressions of firm performance on single mechanisms may be misleading. Indeed, we find relationships between firm performance and four of the mechanisms when each is included in a separate OLS regression. These are insider shareholdings, outside directors, debt, and corporate control activity. Importantly, the effect of insider shareholdings disappears when all of the mechanisms are included in a single OLS regression, and the effects of debt and corporate control activity also disappear when estimations are made in a simultaneous systems framework. Together, these findings are consistent with optimal use of each control mechanism except outside directors.}, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS}, author={Agrawal, A and Knoeber, CR}, year={1996}, month={Sep}, pages={377–397} }