@article{gorski_andow_nadkarni_manandhar_enck_bodden_bartel_2019, title={ACMiner: Extraction and Analysis of Authorization Checks in Android's Middleware}, DOI={10.1145/3292006.3300023}, abstractNote={Billions of users rely on the security of the Android platform to protect phones, tablets, and many different types of consumer electronics. While Android's permission model is well studied, the enforcement of the protection policy has received relatively little attention. Much of this enforcement is spread across system services, taking the form of hard-coded checks within their implementations. In this paper, we propose Authorization Check Miner (ACMiner), a framework for evaluating the correctness of Android's access control enforcement through consistency analysis of authorization checks. ACMiner combines program and text analysis techniques to generate a rich set of authorization checks, mines the corresponding protection policy for each service entry point, and uses association rule mining at a service granularity to identify inconsistencies that may correspond to vulnerabilities. We used ACMiner to study the AOSP version of Android 7.1.1 to identify 28 vulnerabilities relating to missing authorization checks. In doing so, we demonstrate ACMiner's ability to help domain experts process thousands of authorization checks scattered across millions of lines of code.}, journal={PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH ACM CONFERENCE ON DATA AND APPLICATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY (CODASPY '19)}, author={Gorski, Sigmund Albert, III and Andow, Benjamin and Nadkarni, Adwait and Manandhar, Sunil and Enck, William and Bodden, Eric and Bartel, Alexandre}, year={2019}, pages={25–36} } @article{andow_nadkarni_bassett_enck_xie_2016, title={A Study of Grayware on Google Play}, DOI={10.1109/spw.2016.40}, abstractNote={While there have been various studies identifying and classifying Android malware, there is limited discussion of the broader class of apps that fall in a gray area. Mobile grayware is distinct from PC grayware due to differences in operating system properties. Due to mobile grayware's subjective nature, it is difficult to identify mobile grayware via program analysis alone. Instead, we hypothesize enhancing analysis with text analytics can effectively reduce human effort when triaging grayware. In this paper, we design and implement heuristics for seven main categories of grayware. We then use these heuristics to simulate grayware triage on a large set of apps from Google Play. We then present the results of our empirical study, demonstrating a clear problem of grayware. In doing so, we show how even relatively simple heuristics can quickly triage apps that take advantage of users in an undesirable way.}, journal={2016 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY WORKSHOPS (SPW 2016)}, author={Andow, Benjamin and Nadkarni, Adwait and Bassett, Blake and Enck, William and Xie, Tao}, year={2016}, pages={224–233} } @article{shu_wang_gorski_andow_nadkarni_deshotels_gionta_enck_gu_2016, title={A Study of Security Isolation Techniques}, volume={49}, ISSN={["1557-7341"]}, DOI={10.1145/2988545}, abstractNote={Security isolation is a foundation of computing systems that enables resilience to different forms of attacks. This article seeks to understand existing security isolation techniques by systematically classifying different approaches and analyzing their properties. We provide a hierarchical classification structure for grouping different security isolation techniques. At the top level, we consider two principal aspects: mechanism and policy. Each aspect is broken down into salient dimensions that describe key properties. We break the mechanism into two dimensions, enforcement location and isolation granularity, and break the policy aspect down into three dimensions: policy generation, policy configurability, and policy lifetime. We apply our classification to a set of representative articles that cover a breadth of security isolation techniques and discuss tradeoffs among different design choices and limitations of existing approaches.}, number={3}, journal={ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS}, publisher={ACM}, author={Shu, Rui and Wang, Peipei and Gorski, Sigmund A. and Andow, Benjamin and Nadkarni, Adwait and Deshotels, Luke and Gionta, Jason and Enck, William and Gu, Xiaohui}, year={2016}, month={Dec} } @inproceedings{nadkarni_andow_enck_jha_2016, title={Practical DIFC enforcement on android}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security Symposium}, author={Nadkarni, A. and Andow, B. and Enck, W. and Jha, S.}, year={2016}, pages={1119–1136} }