@article{taylor_2024, title={Trump and the Art of Presidential Deal Making}, volume={3}, ISSN={["1944-1053"]}, DOI={10.1080/07343469.2024.2329939}, abstractNote={Donald Trump's professional background is unique among presidents. I glean basic principles of negotiation from his professional life, presented largely in his book The Art of the Deal, but also other writing, media interviews, and social media posts. I argue the success of his approach is dependent for the most part upon three factors: the nature of his counterpart, the expected frequency of future deals with this counterpart, and the position of the status quo and reversion points in the negotiation. In the bargaining contexts I present, Trump's approach, I hypothesize, is most likely to bring about success—a deal—in foreign policy and least likely in regular lawmaking. I find some evidence consistent with this. The study illustrates scholars should do more to understand how pre-tenure careers affect presidential behavior.}, journal={CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY-A JOURNAL OF CAPITAL STUDIES}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2024}, month={Mar} }
 @article{taylor_cobb_2020, title={The Individual-Level Origins of Congressional Corruption Scandals}, volume={48}, ISBN={1552-3373}, DOI={10.1177/1532673X19850093}, abstractNote={ To date, the literature on corruption scandals in Congress focuses exclusively on their consequences. Using theory that directs analyses of the causes of corruption scandals at the jurisdictional level in the American states and other countries, we test a variety of hypotheses about which kinds of members of the House are more likely to be caught in these episodes. We derive our hypotheses from three basic propositions about individual-level corruption—opportunity, culture, and target. There is evidence to support them all. Members with cultivated relationships, in positions of power, and elected from districts with traditions of or perceived tolerance for corruption are disproportionately scandalous. So, interestingly, are some potentially marginalized legislators, particularly racial minorities. We explore the finding that Black members are frequently associated with corruption scandals. }, number={4}, journal={AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH}, author={Taylor, Andrew J. and Cobb, Michael D.}, year={2020}, month={Jul}, pages={442–454} }
 @article{taylor_2020, title={The Polarizers: Postwar Architects of Our Partisan Era}, volume={26}, ISSN={["1460-3683"]}, DOI={10.1177/1354068819894536}, number={2}, journal={PARTY POLITICS}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2020}, month={Mar}, pages={264–265} }
 @article{taylor_2019, title={Legislative Seniority in the Partisan Congress}, volume={100}, ISSN={["1540-6237"]}, DOI={10.1111/ssqu.12616}, abstractNote={ObjectiveDespite the formal seniority system's demise, long‐serving members of the U.S. House of Representatives continue to demonstrate disproportionate legislative effectiveness in what scholars universally consider a strong‐party era. I test a bonding model of the continued utility of legislative seniority in an effort to understand the causal mechanism.}, number={4}, journal={SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2019}, month={Jun}, pages={1297–1307} }
 @article{atkeson_taylor_2019, title={Partisan Affiliation in Political Science: Insights from Florida and North Carolina}, volume={52}, ISSN={["1537-5935"]}, DOI={10.1017/S1049096519000647}, abstractNote={© American Political Science Association, 2019 doi:10.1017/S1049096519000647 ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................}, number={4}, journal={PS-POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS}, author={Atkeson, Lonna Rae and Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2019}, month={Oct}, pages={706–710} }
 @article{taylor_2019, title={Politics over Process: Partisan Conflict and Post-Passage Processes in the US Congress}, volume={46}, ISSN={["1944-1053"]}, DOI={10.1080/07343469.2019.1603933}, abstractNote={"Park, Hong Min, Steven S. Smith, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen. Politics over Process: Partisan Conflict and Post-Passage Processes in the U.S. Congress." Congress & the Presidency, 46(2), pp. 344–345}, number={2}, journal={CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY-A JOURNAL OF CAPITAL STUDIES}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2019}, month={May}, pages={344–345} }
 @article{taylor_parcel_2019, title={Proximity and the principle-policy gap in white racial attitudes: Insight from views of student assignment policies in Wake County, North Carolina}, volume={78}, ISSN={["1096-0317"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.ssresearch.2018.12.014}, abstractNote={We use a survey of residents of Wake County, North Carolina to test a proximity explanation for what scholars call the “principle-policy gap” in whites' views of government action on race. The derived hypothesis is confirmed when underlying broad views of race are represented by ideology. We show that whereas liberals are materially more supportive of racial diversity in student bodies than are moderates and conservatives, this difference is reduced to statistical insignificance as respondents’ personal situations are more directly affected by the policy—a condition denoted by having a child of school age. Liberals with school-aged children are particularly wary of racial integration when they are asked to support the diversification of classrooms as opposed to schools. Having a school-aged child has no material conditioning effect on views of diversity when attitudes are represented by a more explicit measure of racial views.}, journal={SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH}, author={Taylor, Andrew J. and Parcel, Toby L.}, year={2019}, month={Feb}, pages={95–103} }
 @article{taylor_2019, title={The revolution in federal procurement, 1980-present}, volume={21}, ISSN={["1469-3569"]}, DOI={10.1017/bap.2018.9}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={1}, journal={BUSINESS AND POLITICS}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2019}, month={Mar}, pages={27–52} }
 @article{taylor_2017, title={Which U.S. House Members Present Their Legislative Records? Models of Electoral Accountability and the Content of Press Releases}, volume={44}, ISSN={0734-3469 1944-1053}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2016.1263978}, DOI={10.1080/07343469.2016.1263978}, abstractNote={This article tests competing theories of legislators' understanding of electoral accountability by examining which members of the House of Representatives convey their legislative records to the public most frequently. Using data derived from lawmakers' descriptions of their floor votes and other legislative activity in more than 50,000 press releases issued during 2010 and 2012, I detect some behavior consistent with representatives' beliefs that voters assess their policy positions without a party frame. Members whose record is incongruous with their constituents' policy preferences tend to avoid mentions of their personal legislative behavior, for example. For the most part, however, the article provides strong evidence that members subscribe to a partisan model and particularly a version in which voters care appreciably more about the actions of the majority than the minority.}, number={1}, journal={Congress & the Presidency}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2017}, month={Jan}, pages={102–119} }
 @misc{taylor_2016, title={Legislating in the Dark: Information and Power in the House of Representatives.}, volume={43}, ISSN={0734-3469 1944-1053}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2016.1214502}, DOI={10.1080/07343469.2016.1214502}, abstractNote={In the final chapters Professor Goldstein examines vice presidential succession issues, how former vice presidents and vice presidential candidates fare politically, and problems with a transformed vice presidency. These challenges include continued frustration with the job and the fact that, in a very real sense, an active vice presidency operates in constitutional limbo. There is no question that the Mondale vice presidency was a critical juncture in the evolution of the office. That said, the author’s focus on Mondale throughout the book seems to subtly imply that the transformation of the office was the result of punctuated institutional equilibrium. This has the effect of undervaluing to some extent other developments and factors that had incrementally brought the vice presidency to the point where Carter and Mondale’s vision was even possible. To be fair, the question of focus is an analyst’s prerogative, but Professor Goldstein’s previous book was more balanced in this regard. This very minor shortcoming does not detract from the fact that the book is exceptionally well thought out, researched, and written. It is a true tour de force analysis of a once largely neglected institution, a fine addition to the literature on the presidency and absolutely essential to the study of the vice presidency.}, number={3}, journal={Congress & the Presidency}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2016}, month={Sep}, pages={401–403} }
 @article{cobb_taylor_2015, title={An Absence of Malice: The Limited Utility of Campaigning Against Party Corruption}, volume={43}, ISSN={["1552-3373"]}, DOI={10.1177/1532673x15570470}, abstractNote={ We examine whether repeated scandals within one party generate collective sanctions for fellow partisans. Do voters punish a party’s candidates because of multiple corruption scandals? Our data come from a unique survey conducted prior to the 2010 legislative elections in North Carolina, a state that had recently seen a number of high-profile corruption scandals involving Democrats exclusively. Although Republicans campaigned energetically against “the party of corruption,” we find the impact of that campaign was muted. Respondents who accurately identified at least one scandal rated the Democratic Party less favorably and thought Republicans would do better at responding to corruption. Nevertheless, vote choice was unrelated to knowledge of corruption scandals, and Republicans did not benefit from any effects on voter turnout. Importantly, respondents’ partisanship only sometimes mediated attitudes and did not affect behavior. We conclude that voters might in theory prefer “clean” parties, but their political actions are uninfluenced by that preference, a finding that has unfortunate implications for democracy. }, number={6}, journal={AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH}, author={Cobb, Michael D. and Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2015}, month={Nov}, pages={923–951} }
 @article{taylor_2015, title={Seeking a new majority: The republican party and American politics, 1960-1980}, volume={21}, ISSN={["1460-3683"]}, DOI={10.1177/1354068815574370}, abstractNote={European party governments (and most certainly not the US party system). Both the authors and their critics oscillate in their analysis between a focus on individual parties and an attempt to identify the appearance of a new party system. Resorting to the same categories utilized by Mair in order to define party change, one may legitimately ask how many types of cartel parties exist and how many cartel parties are necessary to give birth to a cartel party system. Finally, I have always been particularly and pleasantly struck by Mair’s willingness to look for what I will call ‘‘countertrend’’, that is, by the possibility/probability that the existence of a cartel party system will produce a strong reaction. Populist parties stressing the need for a truly popular democracy and anti-system parties challenging the cartel party system may, indeed (and there are plenty of instances within the member states of the European Union), oppose and try to undermine cartel parties and the system in which and out of which they thrive. As a tendency, the cartel party system has had ups and downs and nowhere does it appear fully consolidated. Nevertheless, Mair and Katz have provided the scholars interested in party activities and transformations with a powerful analytical tool. For very many good reasons then, the intellectual conversation with Peter Mair is most certainly not over.}, number={3}, journal={PARTY POLITICS}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2015}, month={May}, pages={494–495} }
 @misc{taylor_2015, title={The Senate Syndrome: The Evolution of Procedural Warfare in the Modern U.S. Senate. By Steven S. Smith. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014. 410p. $34.95.}, volume={13}, ISSN={1537-5927 1541-0986}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592715002753}, DOI={10.1017/S1537592715002753}, abstractNote={An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.}, number={4}, journal={Perspectives on Politics}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2015}, month={Dec}, pages={1168–1169} }
 @article{taylor_2014, title={Bill Passage Speed in the US House: A Test of a Vote Buying Model of the Legislative Process}, volume={20}, ISSN={1357-2334 1743-9337}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2014.897022}, DOI={10.1080/13572334.2014.897022}, abstractNote={This article constitutes a test of central tenets of vote buying theories using data on the number of days it takes to pass important bills in the US House. Survival analyses of a model of bill passage length provide confirmatory evidence of vote buying by presidents and the congressional leadership. Bills that attract buyers of votes to maintain the status quo are shown to pass more quickly than those that do not. Bills on the president's agenda and those that are relatively close to members' ideal points also pass quickly. The analyses furnish some interesting insights into possible efforts to make the legislative process quicker.}, number={3}, journal={The Journal of Legislative Studies}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2014}, month={May}, pages={285–304} }
 @article{cobb_taylor_2014, title={Paging Congressional Democrats: It Was the Immorality, Stupid}, volume={47}, ISSN={["1537-5935"]}, DOI={10.1017/s1049096514000201}, abstractNote={Political scandals have important implications in democracies, especially if they involve corruption. When politicians are accused of, or caught, enriching themselves at the expense of the public good, cynicism is fostered and trust reduced (Bowler and Karp 2004). If undeterred, repeated corruption scandals threaten to undermine the legitimacy of elections (Caillier 2010; Stockemer, LaMontagne, and Scruggs 2011; Villoria, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2012). Surprisingly, the evidence from past studies is mixed as to whether politicians are punished more severely for corruption than other types of scandals (Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2011). To be sure, corruption scandals are on average damaging to politicians (Basinger 2013; Hirano and Snyder 2012). Yet, at the congressional level, where the bulk of research occurs, moral scandals tend to matter as much if not more than those about corruption (Brown 2006; Peters and Welch 1980; Welch and Hibbing 1997).1 Whatever the reasons, the data do not unequivocally support the belief that politicians caught in corruption scandals are doomed to lose their seats.2 The inconsistent and tempered eff ects of corruption scandals pose a challenge to one interpretation about how Democrats regained control of Congress after the 2006 midterm elections. Recall that prior to that election multiple Republicans were involved in corruption, including members implicated in the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal. Members of both parties responded by calling for reforms, suggesting Republican Party leaders were concerned about the possible ramifi cations (Dancey 2014). Although few Republicans caught up directly in these matters were on the ballot, Democrats campaigned broadly against Republicans’ “culture of corruption.” Media pundits (Bacon, Cox, and Tumulty 2006; Smith 2006) and political strategists afterwards cited this strategy as a signifi cant reason for Democratic success. As reported by Robert Novak, Karl Rove told congressional Republicans that 2006 was the result of corruption (Novak July 28, 2007). Likewise, Best, Ladewig, and Wong (2013) argue that Democrats successfully parleyed the Abramoff scandal into vote shares. In short, voters are thought to have deliberately retaliated against other Republican candidates for the corrupt activities, purported or actual, of a few of its members. Given the mixed fi ndings in the literature about the importance of corruption to voters, that claim is questionable. It is also deserving of additional scrutiny because few studies suggest collective partisan accountability can arise from individual scandals (but see, Slomczynski and Shabad 2011), particularly in a two-party system where attachments to party within the public are relatively weak. Therefore, we reexamine this assumption by analyzing exit-polling data from the 2006 elections. These data allow us to compare voter reactions to a moral scandal that we believe had greater potential to infl uence the outcome. In late September, Mark Foley (R-FL) was reported to have engaged in salacious behavior toward young male pages. As this scandal unfolded Republican Party leaders were accused of failing to intervene despite knowing about Foley’s actions, possibly as a result of electoral considerations (Hulse and Hernandez 2006; Weisman 2006). This last characteristic is the abuse of offi ce, a mediating variable found to increase the relevance of moral scandals (Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2011).}, number={2}, journal={PS-POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS}, author={Cobb, Michael D. and Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2014}, month={Apr}, pages={351–356} }
 @article{taylor_2014, title={The Challenge of Congressional Representation.}, volume={12}, ISSN={["1541-0986"]}, DOI={10.1017/s1537592714001169}, abstractNote={Richard Fenno’s seminal work on Congress has covered such areas of the field as committees and the appropriations process. But it is with the study of “home style” that the renowned Rochester political scientist has made his biggest contribution. As he did in Congressional Travels: Places, Connections, and Authenticity (2007), Fenno revisits the subject of legislators in their constituencies in The Challenge of Congressional Representation. Here, he takes his trademark sociological, even anthropological, “soaking and poking” or “travel and talk” (p. 14) approach to study five House members in their home districts from the early 1970s to the early 2000s. In doing so, he rescues Barber Conable, Jim Greenwood, Zoe Lofgren, Glenn Poshard, and Karen Thurman from anonymity and their inevitable “burial in large data collections” (p. 1). The goal is to direct congressional scholarship’s attention away from Washington and bills, votes, procedures, and rules to members’ behavior off of the Hill. This, in turn, should provide a better understanding of the ways in which modern federal lawmakers represent their constituents. Fenno’s five members are certainly diverse. Two are women, two Republicans. Their districts are scattered all over the country, from Lofgren’s in Silicon Valley to Conable’s in western New York. Poshard’s is largely rural, Greenwood’s is suburban, and Lofgren’s urban. Superimposed on a sprawling part of northwestern Florida, Thurman’s district is not easy to categorize. This variation results in rich and very personal representational styles. Conable emphasizes his deep roots in the rural areas and small towns of his district. He is comfortable with people and believes human relationships guide what he does in Washington. We learn that Conable’s understanding of constituency helped Fenno construct the famous concentric-circle approach to the subject in Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (1978). Poshard’s folksy nature gives him an unusual sensitivity to constituents’ personal problems, and he believes that casework is important. As a result, he spends a great deal of time at home and assigns significant staff resources to the district. He also has a rather romantic understanding of representative democracy and talks repeatedly about the integrity of the legislative process and his obligation to understand House procedure and vote on all measures, whether large or small. Thurman is much more interested in public policy and the substance of the congressional agenda. Her nondescript district forces her to create a sense of community among her constituents. She provides us with insight into the relentless need to raise money and how excruciating that task can be. Representing a suburban Philadelphia district, Greenwood works hard to present himself as a pro-business, pro-environment moderate. He is focused on advancement in the House Republican conference and spends as many hours at home fending off internal party attacks from the Right as he does meeting with the public. Lofgren is friendly, but businesslike and a little aloof. An unabashed liberal from a liberal district, she readily understands the needs of her constituents. Lofgren’s biggest challenge is educating high-tech companies around San Jose about the importance and ways of Congress. Alone, these portraits make engaging reading. Together, they allow some patterns to form, even if they are a little sketchy. We gain a greater appreciation for the heterogeneity of House districts. Fenno shows us the considerable representational challenges posed by redistricting. He even describes how critical the support of family is to lawmakers. The behavior of the members he studies toward the end of his project demonstrates how partisanship and polarization shape home styles. The district was formerly a different world fromWashington, filled with parochial concerns and practical problems. Today, legislators spend their time there debating national issues, explaining votes and bill sponsorship, bolstering the party brand, and talking about the president’s recent decisions. Fenno’s is an explicitly case-study method, and for a body that has had about 2,000 members since the early 1970s—when he began his observation of Conable—its five examples cannot be used to generate systematic findings in which we can have a great deal of confidence. Indeed, the book’s findings are suggestive. We might conclude that representational activities, presumably as a result of the country’s great heterogeneity, are tremendously varied and that, for better or worse, they consume a great deal of time and effort. That really is about it. Quantitative and large-n studies will more immediately advance our understanding of this realm of congressional studies. There is, for example, a significant amount of recent and important research using press releases and correspondence, sometimes in innovative field experiments reminiscent of the Fenno style. Much of it exploits data sets containing many thousands of discrete interactions between members and their constituents. The work of people like Daniel Butler and Justin Grimmer comes to mind. The author is well aware of this. That his goals are limited is made quite explicit. His first objective is to place “connection politics” (p. 9) on the research agenda because he thinks that they are neglected but critical to any broad understanding of representative democracy. In this way, the five cases constitute “flavorful vehicles through which to make an argument in support of constituency-centric research on theUnited States Congress” (p. 2). Themembers chosen are interesting people doing important things. Fenno obviously enjoyed writing the book. It is hard to think of}, number={2}, journal={PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2014}, month={Jun}, pages={490–491} }
 @book{taylor_2013, title={Congress: A performance appraisal}, publisher={Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press}, author={Taylor, A. J.}, year={2013} }
 @article{crotty_gerring_stonecash_taylor_walsh_wayne_milkis_2012, title={Howard L. Reiter}, volume={45}, number={3}, journal={Political Science & Politics}, author={Crotty, W. and Gerring, J. and Stonecash, J. and Taylor, A. J. and Walsh, J. and Wayne, S. J. and Milkis, S. M.}, year={2012}, pages={555–557} }
 @book{taylor_2012, title={The floor in Congressional life}, publisher={Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2012} }
 @article{taylor_2012, title={When Congress Asserts Itself: Examining Legislative Challenges to Executive Power}, volume={10}, ISSN={["1540-8884"]}, DOI={10.1515/1540-8884.1487}, abstractNote={Abstract This article presents a unique dataset of 72 cases from across American history in which Congress asserts itself in its relationship with the executive. Patterns suggest that assertiveness occurs in clusters pulled together by a unifying theme, such as Congress’ response to the Civil War and Cold War. Much of this is in direct response to executive antagonism and perceived abuse of power. The House tends to be the more assertive body in the early part of American history, the Senate more so today. Quantitative analyses show divided party control to best explain House assertiveness. By contrast, the Senate is generally assertive when member policy preferences are homogeneous and turnover is low. It also frequently pushes back against popular presidents. Both bodies assert themselves when their legislative workload is high.}, number={2}, journal={FORUM-A JOURNAL OF APPLIED RESEARCH IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2012}, month={Jul} }
 @article{taylor_2010, title={Does Presidential Primary and Caucus Order Affect Policy? Evidence from Federal Procurement Spending}, volume={63}, ISSN={["1938-274X"]}, DOI={10.1177/1065912908328783}, abstractNote={This article examines the contention that states with early presidential primaries or caucuses receive disproportionate distributive policy benefits. The basic theory is that presidential candidates pledge more federal spending per capita to these states because doing well in their contests is critical to capturing the nomination. Candidates then deliver on these promises if they win the White House. Using by-state procurement per capita data from 1984 to 2004, four conditional hypotheses derived from this thinking are tested. The results show that primary or caucus order matters only during competitive nominations when the ultimately victorious presidential candidate won the state’s contest.}, number={2}, journal={POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2010}, month={Jun}, pages={398–409} }
 @article{taylor_2008, title={Strategic intercameral behavior and the sequence of congressional lawmaking}, volume={36}, ISSN={["1552-3373"]}, DOI={10.1177/1532673X07308513}, abstractNote={In the vein of some fledgling theoretical work on Congress, I look for evidence of strategic intercameral behavior in the chamber sequence of the passage of 950 bills from 1955 to 2002. Specifically, I construct and test a semiformal model in which communication is assumed to take place between congressional majority party leaders capable of choreographing bill passage using their agenda control powers. These leaders allow the chamber with the majority whose ideal point is furthest from the president's to pass its version of the bill first. The empirical analysis corroborates the model.}, number={3}, journal={AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2008}, month={May}, pages={451–474} }
 @misc{taylor_2008, title={The Right Talk: How Conservatives Transformed the Great Society into the Economic Society. By Mark A. Smith. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 267p. $29.95.}, volume={6}, ISSN={1537-5927 1541-0986}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592708081528}, DOI={10.1017/S1537592708081528}, abstractNote={An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.}, number={3}, journal={Perspectives on Politics}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2008}, month={Aug}, pages={611–612} }
 @article{taylor_2006, title={Size, power, and electoral systems: Exogenous determinants of legislative procedural choice}, volume={31}, ISSN={["1939-9162"]}, DOI={10.3162/036298006x201832}, abstractNote={I tested hypotheses about the relationship between exogenous institutions and legislative procedural choice using a unique cross‐sectional approach and a dataset gleaned from 55 legislative bodies from around the world. I focused on three entrenched characteristics of legislative bodies that we have theoretical reason to think will shape procedures: size, the relative power of the chamber, and the method by which its members are selected. Relatively small and powerful bodies generally have decentralized procedures. To a lesser extent, we can say the same of chambers that have electoral systems that incentivize the personal vote.}, number={3}, journal={LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY}, author={Taylor, Andrew J.}, year={2006}, month={Aug}, pages={323–345} }
 @book{taylor_2005, title={Elephant's edge: The Republicans as a ruling party}, ISBN={0275985369}, publisher={Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers}, author={Taylor, A. J.}, year={2005} }
 @article{taylor_boatright_2005, title={The The personal and the political in repeat congressional candidacies}, volume={58}, DOI={10.2307/3595645}, number={4}, journal={Political Research Quarterly}, author={Taylor, Andrew and Boatright, R. G.}, year={2005}, pages={599–607} }
 @article{jeydel_taylor_2003, title={Are women legislators less effective? Evidence from the US House in the 103rd-105th Congress}, volume={56}, ISSN={["1938-274X"]}, DOI={10.1177/106591290305600102}, abstractNote={We compare the ability of female and male members of the House of Representatives to turn policy preferences into law—something we label “legislative effectiveness.” The existing literature on women in American legislatures is opaque, with some scholars suggesting women are less effective than their male colleagues and others arguing they are just as effective. Utilizing data from the 103rd-105th Congresses—specifically, data on bill and amendment sponsorship and Stein and Bickers’ data on the distribution of federal domestic spending—we argue women House members are not demonstrably less effective than their male counterparts. Legislative effectiveness is the product of seniority, preferences, and membership in important House institutions.}, number={1}, journal={POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY}, author={Jeydel, A and Taylor, AJ}, year={2003}, month={Mar}, pages={19–27} }
 @article{taylor_2003, title={Conditional party government and campaign contributions: Insights from the tobacco and alcoholic beverage industries}, volume={47}, DOI={10.1111/1540-5907.00020}, abstractNote={ I examine whether tobacco and alcoholic beverage PAC giving in the 1975‐to‐2000 period has followed trends inferred by the conditional party government (CPG) model. I look specifically at these PACs because they should be especially sensitive to shifting veto points in the legislative process and, consistent with CPG, contribute increasingly more to the majority party and its leadership and relatively less to members of relevant standing committees. My results show both sectors to give more to leadership as party becomes more important. Increasing CPG, however, generally results in greater giving by tobacco to members of the majority party and relatively larger contributions from alcoholic beverages to committee members and their chairs. I reveal a principal cause of this difference to be issue salience and conclude by arguing that contributions from some PACs are reacting to increased partisanship in the House but PACs interested in issues of relatively low salience still behave as if dealing with a chamber organized along distributive lines—a development that is consistent with CPG. }, number={2}, journal={American Journal of Political Science}, author={Taylor, Andrew}, year={2003}, pages={293–304} }
 @article{jeydel_taylor_2002, title={Are women effective legislators? Evidence from the US House in the 103d-105th Congresses.}, volume={27}, number={1}, journal={Legislative Studies Quarterly}, author={Jeydel, A. S. and Taylor, A. J.}, year={2002}, pages={151} }
 @article{taylor_2002, title={The The ideological roots of deficit reduction policy}, volume={19}, DOI={10.1111/j.1541-1338.2002.tb00329.x}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT}, number={4}, journal={Review of Policy Research}, author={Taylor, Andrew}, year={2002}, pages={11–29} }
 @article{taylor_2002, title={The The political party matrix: The persistence of organization.}, volume={96}, DOI={10.1017/s000305540256024x}, abstractNote={It used to be an axiom in political science that American parties were weak. Now we are not so sure. During the 1980s and 1990s, the profession produced a great deal of theoretical and empirical work suggesting that U.S. political parties were “resurgent.” J. P. Monroe's book, The Political Party Matrix: The Persistence of Organization, provides an interesting twist on the new literature. It argues that party change is the result not so much of strengthening but of adaptation.}, number={2}, journal={American Political Science Review}, author={Taylor, Andrew}, year={2002}, pages={430} }
 @article{taylor_2001, title={Money, markets, and the state: Social democratic policies since 1918.}, volume={63}, ISSN={["0022-3816"]}, DOI={10.1086/jop.63.4.2691820}, abstractNote={Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsMoney, Markets, and the State: Social Democratic Policies since 1918. Ton Notermans Andrew J. TaylorAndrew J. Taylor Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 63, Number 4Nov., 2001 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/jop.63.4.2691820 Views: 3Total views on this site Copyright 2001 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF POLITICS}, author={Taylor, AJ}, year={2001}, month={Nov}, pages={1276–1277} }
 @article{taylor_2000, title={The congressional budget process in an era of surpluses}, volume={33}, ISSN={["1049-0965"]}, DOI={10.2307/420861}, abstractNote={How the federal government's fiscal health has improved! As recently as 1992, the United States experienced its largest ever current-dollar annual unified budget deficit of $290 billion. At the close of its last fiscal year, on September 30 1999, the nation's government recorded a budget surplus of $124 billion. More significantly, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has projected healthy on—budget surpluses—that is, no money will have to be taken out of the Social Security trust fund and revenues will still exceed expenditures—well into the second decade of the new century.}, number={3}, journal={PS-POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS}, author={Taylor, AJ}, year={2000}, month={Sep}, pages={575–580} }
 @article{burns_taylor_2000, title={The mythical causes of the republican supply-side economics revolution}, volume={6}, ISSN={["1354-0688"]}, DOI={10.1177/1354068800006004002}, abstractNote={In this paper we analyze the two conventional explanations of the Republican Party's adoption of supply-side economic philosophy in the 1977-81 period: first, that the position change was induced by the Sunbelt component of the party; and second, that the doctrinal shift was brought about by widespread concern with tax policy among the public and the Republican mass in particular. We reveal both arguments to be flawed and suggest that the party's advocation of large across-the-board tax cuts was the result of calculated and coordinated decisions by Washington elites within the party. We provide empirical and theoretical justification for a national elite-led explanation of this event. As a result, our study helps solidify contemporary scholarship that counteracts conventional wisdom in comparative politics and suggests that national American parties, at least when it comes to policy formation, can be relatively hierarchical institutions that shape as much as respond to mass and local behavior.}, number={4}, journal={PARTY POLITICS}, author={Burns, JW and Taylor, AJ}, year={2000}, month={Oct}, pages={419–440} }
 @article{taylor_1998, title={Domestic agenda setting, 1947-1994}, volume={23}, ISSN={["0362-9805"]}, DOI={10.2307/440359}, abstractNote={This article examines domestic agenda setting in Washington between 1947 and 1994. It finds that House and Senate majority leaders have, over time, set increasingly more of this agenda. I examine the role of presidents and congressional committee chairs in domestic agenda setting, and I evaluate the success of presidential and congressional proposals within the legislative process. Recent changes in agendasetting patterns seem to be the product of a number of factors, including more frequent and polarized divided government, as well as changes in the formal rules of Congress and the ideological composition of the legislative parties.}, number={3}, journal={LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY}, author={Taylor, AJ}, year={1998}, month={Aug}, pages={373–397} }
 @article{taylor_1998, title={Explaining government productivity}, volume={26}, ISSN={["0044-7803"]}, DOI={10.1177/1532673X9802600403}, abstractNote={This article revises our understanding of the conditions under which the federal government produces important legislation. I reevaluate and only mildly vindicate Mayhew's findings about the effect public opinion has on the productivity of the federal government. By revealing the size of the nation's debt to be an important determinant of productivity, however, I suggest that Mayhew's work overlooked the relationship between fiscal conditions and policy output. I also examine empirically the claims of Krehbiel's theoretical work about gridlock.}, number={4}, journal={AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY}, author={Taylor, AJ}, year={1998}, month={Oct}, pages={439–458} }
 @article{taylor_1998, title={For fairer taxes think flat and pure}, number={1998 Jan. 7}, journal={News and Observer [Raleigh, N.C.]}, author={Taylor, A.}, year={1998}, pages={13A} }
 @article{taylor_1998, title={The The legislative strategies of independent and third party executives}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1111/j.1747-1346.1998.tb00469.x}, abstractNote={Recent developments in state and national politics have presented political scientists with an obligation and opportunity to study independent and third party executives. This article examines the legislative strategies that are available to such executives as they attempt to turn their policy preferences into government output. The article examines the case of Connecticut Governor Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., and his income tax proposal in 1991 and reveals, somewhat surprisingly, that independent executives can and probably must use the institution of party to get what they want from the legislative process. Perhaps more predictably, the article shows that independent executives will readily tap the formal powers of their office to ensure success for their agenda. It is also argued that such executives need not rely solely on public support for legislative success and that, despite a lack of formal partisan connections, they can be successful when directly lobbying legislators.}, number={1998 Mar.}, journal={Southeastern Political Review}, author={Taylor, Andrew}, year={1998}, pages={3–23} }
 @misc{taylor_1998, title={The international origins of the Federal Reserve system.}, volume={92}, number={3}, journal={American Political Science Review}, author={Taylor, A. J.}, year={1998}, pages={702–703} }
 @misc{taylor_1997, title={Party decline in America: Policy, politics, and the fiscal state, by John J. Coleman}, volume={24}, number={1997 Spring}, journal={Congress & the Presidency}, author={Taylor, A.}, year={1997}, pages={97–99} }
 @article{taylor_1997, title={Two vital issues in Helms vs Weld}, number={1997 Aug. 3}, journal={News and Observer [Raleigh, N.C.]}, author={Taylor, A.}, year={1997}, pages={29A} }