@article{driscoll_2024, title={Can human nature be saved?}, volume={103}, ISSN={["1879-2510"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.shpsa.2023.11.005}, abstractNote={This paper argues that the best interpretation of the human nature concept used in evolutionary social science (ESS) is as the human adaptive complex. This understanding of the concept enables us to make sense of the features of human nature that are described in that literature as symptomatic of traits which are part of human nature, rather than being constitutive of human nature itself. This enables this proposal to make better sense of how the human nature concept is used than other current proposals for how to understand that concept.}, journal={STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2024}, month={Feb}, pages={39–45} }
 @article{driscoll_2023, title={LIFE IS SIMPLE: HOW OCCAM'S RAZOR SET SCIENCE FREE AND SHAPES THE UNIVERSE}, volume={98}, ISSN={["1539-7718"]}, DOI={10.1086/725295}, abstractNote={Previous articleNext article No AccessHistory, Philosophy, and Ethics of BiologyLife Is Simple: How Occam’s Razor Set Science Free and Shapes the Universe. By Johnjoe McFadden. New York: Basic Books. $32.00. vi + 376 p.; ill.; index. ISBN: 9781541620445 (hc); 9781541620438 (eb). 2021.Catherine DriscollCatherine DriscollPhilosophy & Religious Studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Quarterly Review of Biology Volume 98, Number 2June 2023 Published in association with Stony Brook University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/725295 Views: 30Total views on this site For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected].PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.}, number={2}, journal={QUARTERLY REVIEW OF BIOLOGY}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2023}, month={Jun}, pages={86–87} }
 @article{driscoll_2018, title={Cultural evolution and the social sciences: a case of unification?}, volume={33}, ISSN={["1572-8404"]}, DOI={10.1007/s10539-018-9618-2}, number={1-2}, journal={BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2018}, month={Apr} }
 @article{driscoll_2017, title={The Evolutionary Culture Concepts}, volume={84}, ISSN={["1539-767X"]}, DOI={10.1086/688934}, abstractNote={Most attempts to define culture as used in the cultural evolution literature treat culture as a single phenomenon that can be given a single nondisjunctive definition. In this article I argue that, really, cultural evolutionists employ a variety of distinct but closely related concepts of culture. I show how the main prominent attempts to define a culture concept fail to properly capture all the uses of “culture” employed in cultural evolutionary work. I offer a description of some of the most important culture concepts used by cultural evolutionists.}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2017}, month={Jan}, pages={35–55} }
 @article{driscoll_2015, title={Neither Adaptive Thinking nor Reverse Engineering: methods in the evolutionary social sciences}, volume={30}, ISSN={["1572-8404"]}, DOI={10.1007/s10539-014-9466-7}, number={1}, journal={BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2015}, month={Jan}, pages={59–75} }
 @article{driscoll_2014, title={Constructive criticism: An evaluation of Buller and Hardcastle's genetic and neuroscientific arguments against Evolutionary Psychology}, volume={27}, ISSN={["1465-394X"]}, DOI={10.1080/09515089.2013.785068}, abstractNote={David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and nature of brain development show that most “central” psychological mechanisms cannot be adaptations because the nature of the contribution from the environment on which they are based shows they are not heritable. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that a strong role for the environment is compatible with high heritability as long as the environment is highly stable down lineages. In this paper I support this view by arguing that the discoveries Buller and Hardcastle refer to either do not show as strong a role for the environment as they suggest, or these discoveries show that the brain's developmental process depends in many cases on input from the environment that is highly stable across generations.}, number={6}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2014}, month={Nov}, pages={907–925} }
 @misc{driscoll_2014, title={Review of Studying Human Behavior: Helen Longino, Studying Human Behavior: How Scientists Investigate Aggression and Sexuality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (2013), 256 pp., $75.00 (cloth).}, volume={81}, ISSN={0031-8248 1539-767X}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/678555}, DOI={10.1086/678555}, abstractNote={In “The Pluralist Stance,” StephenKellert, Helen Longino, andC.Kenneth Waters ð2006Þ contrast monism about the sciences with pluralism. The core claim of monism as they define it is that the sciences are aiming to give a single complete, comprehensive account of the natural world; this requires that there be methods that could yield such an account. Pluralism, however, is simply the view that whether such a single account could exist for any field is an empirical matter, and the existence of methods contributing to more than one model is not necessarily problematic. More strongly pluralist views of the sciences are, however, possible, and in Studying Human Behavior Helen Longino takes just such a view of a series of approaches used to study the ðdevelopmentalÞ causes of human behavior, in particular aggression and homosexuality: she argues that these approaches could not contribute to such a single complete account and that it is not clear that such an account is even desirable. The approaches in question are quantitative behavioral genetics ðQBGÞ, molecular behavioral genetics ðMBGÞ, social environmental approaches ðSEAÞ, neurobiological approaches, and a variety of integrative approaches such as genes environment neurology ðG E NÞ, multifactorial path analysis, and developmental systems theory: I will refer to these as the behavioral biological approaches ðBBAsÞ. The first part of Studying Human Behavior ðchaps. 2–7Þ is a very interesting, well-researched discussion of major work, research questions, methods, and relationships between the BBAs.}, number={4}, journal={Philosophy of Science}, publisher={University of Chicago Press}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2014}, month={Oct}, pages={676–680} }
 @misc{driscoll_2014, title={Studying human behavior: How scientists investigate aggression and sexuality}, volume={81}, number={4}, journal={Philosophy of Science}, author={Driscoll, C.}, year={2014}, pages={676–680} }
 @article{driscoll_2013, title={The Philosophy of Human Evolution}, volume={80}, ISSN={["0031-8248"]}, DOI={10.1086/668883}, abstractNote={When I first picked up Michael Ruse’s The Philosophy of Human Evolution, I thought for a moment that this was a text primarily addressing the evolution of human cognition. I was wrong. While the evolution of cognition is part of the focus of the text, it really does do what it says on the tin: it addresses a very broad range of philosophical questions connected to human evolution. The book’s primary topic areas can be roughly divided into three main types, as follows: (a) how certain problems in general philosophy of biology apply to the evolution of humans, (b) how the evolutionary origins of humans affect the answers to certain sorts of important general philosophical questions, and (c) how evolutionary biology answers certain socially problematic questions about the nature of humans. Chapters 1–4, for example, address questions of type a: Ruse considers the evidence for evolution and the evidence for human evolution in chapters 1 and 2, questions about whether the sciences of human evolution are good sciences in chapter 3, and questions about whether evolutionary processes are progressive (especially in the sense that humans are the pinnacle of evolution) in chapter 4. Chapters 5 and 6 address questions about the nature of knowledge and the nature of morality from an evolutionary perspective and hence primarily address questions of type b. Chapters 7 and 8 address questions of sex and race and eugenics and evolutionary medicine, respectively, and hence primarily address questions of type c. Ruse structures most of these chapters historically: he usually starts with Darwin’s views on a topic (or occasionally the views of pre-Darwinian evolutionary thinkers) and then works through major histor-}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2013}, month={Jan}, pages={160–164} }
 @article{driscoll_2012, title={Evolution and the loss of hierarchies: Dubreuil's "Human evolution and the origin of hierarchies: the state of nature"}, volume={27}, ISSN={["0169-3867"]}, DOI={10.1007/s10539-011-9266-2}, number={1}, journal={BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2012}, month={Jan}, pages={125–135} }
 @article{driscoll_2011, title={Fatal Attraction? Why Sperber's Attractors do not Prevent Cumulative Cultural Evolution}, volume={62}, ISSN={["1464-3537"]}, DOI={10.1093/bjps/axq032}, abstractNote={In order to explain why cultural traits remain stable despite the error-proneness of social learning, Dan Sperber has proposed that human psychology and ecology lead to cultural traits being transformed in the direction of attractors. This means that simple-minded Darwinian models of cultural evolution are not appropriate. Some scientists and philosophers have been concerned that Sperber’s notion of attractors might show more than this, that attractors destroy subtle cultural variation and prevent adaptive cultural evolutionary processes from occurring. I show that Sperber’s view does not have this consequence—that even if there are attractors, cumulative cultural evolution can still occur. 1 Introduction 2 Why Attractors are Supposed to Pose a Problem for Cumulative Cultural Evolution 3 Why Attractors do not Prevent Cumulative Cultural Evolution  3.1 Reconstruction probably retains adaptively important features of cultural traits  3.2 Cultural selection may counteract the effects of attractors when cultural variation is adaptively important  3.3 Attractors may be numerous  3.4 Factors of attraction may often be working on the components of cultural traits  3.5 Attractors are highly variable, even within local populations 4 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 Why Attractors are Supposed to Pose a Problem for Cumulative Cultural Evolution 3 Why Attractors do not Prevent Cumulative Cultural Evolution  3.1 Reconstruction probably retains adaptively important features of cultural traits  3.2 Cultural selection may counteract the effects of attractors when cultural variation is adaptively important  3.3 Attractors may be numerous  3.4 Factors of attraction may often be working on the components of cultural traits  3.5 Attractors are highly variable, even within local populations  3.1 Reconstruction probably retains adaptively important features of cultural traits  3.2 Cultural selection may counteract the effects of attractors when cultural variation is adaptively important  3.3 Attractors may be numerous  3.4 Factors of attraction may often be working on the components of cultural traits  3.5 Attractors are highly variable, even within local populations 4 Conclusion}, number={2}, journal={BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2011}, month={Jun}, pages={301–322} }
 @article{driscoll_2009, title={Grandmothers, hunters and human life history}, volume={24}, ISSN={["1572-8404"]}, DOI={10.1007/s10539-009-9166-x}, number={5}, journal={BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2009}, month={Nov}, pages={665–686} }
 @article{driscoll_2009, title={On our best behavior: optimality models in human behavioral ecology}, volume={40}, ISSN={1369-8486}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2009.03.005}, DOI={10.1016/j.shpsc.2009.03.005}, abstractNote={This paper discusses problems associated with the use of optimality models in human behavioral ecology. Optimality models are used in both human and non-human animal behavioral ecology to test hypotheses about the conditions generating and maintaining behavioral strategies in populations via natural selection. The way optimality models are currently used in behavioral ecology faces significant problems, which are exacerbated by employing the so-called ‘phenotypic gambit’: that is, the bet that the psychological and inheritance mechanisms responsible for behavioral strategies will be straightforward. I argue that each of several different possible ways we might interpret how optimality models are being used for humans face similar and additional problems. I suggest some ways in which human behavioral ecologists might adjust how they employ optimality models; in particular, I urge the abandonment of the phenotypic gambit in the human case.}, number={2}, journal={Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2009}, month={Jun}, pages={133–141} }
 @article{driscoll_2008, title={The problem of adaptive individual choice in cultural evolution}, volume={23}, ISSN={["0169-3867"]}, DOI={10.1007/s10539-007-9070-1}, number={1}, journal={BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2008}, month={Jan}, pages={101–113} }
 @article{driscoll_2006, title={The bowerbirds and the bees: Miller on art, altruism, and sexual selection}, volume={19}, ISSN={["1465-394X"]}, DOI={10.1080/09515080600806575}, abstractNote={Geoffrey Miller argues that we can account for the evolution of human art and altruism via the action of sexual selection. He identifies five characteristics supposedly unique to sexual adaptations: fitness indicating cost; involvement in courtship; heritability; variability; and sexual differentiation. Miller claims that art and altruism possess these characteristics. I argue that not only does he not demonstrate that art and altruism possess these characteristics, one can also explain the origins of altruism via a form of group selection and traits with the five characteristics in terms of a process I call “cultural sexual selection.”}, number={4}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2006}, month={Aug}, pages={507–526} }
 @article{driscoll_2005, title={Killing Babies: Hrdy on the Evolution of Infanticide}, volume={20}, ISSN={0169-3867 1572-8404}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-004-0680-6}, DOI={10.1007/s10539-004-0680-6}, number={2-3}, journal={Biology & Philosophy}, publisher={Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2005}, month={Mar}, pages={271–289} }
 @article{driscoll_2004, title={Can Behaviors Be Adaptations?*}, volume={71}, ISSN={0031-8248 1539-767X}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/381410}, DOI={10.1086/381410}, abstractNote={Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths (Sterelny 1992, Sterelny and Griffiths 1999) have argued that sociobiology is unworkable because it requires that human behaviors can be adaptations; however, behaviors produced by a functionalist psychology do not meet Lewontin's quasi‐independence criterion and therefore cannot be adaptations. Consequently, an evolutionary psychology—which regards psychological mechanisms as adaptations—should replace sociobiology. I address two interpretations of their argument. I argue that the strong interpretation fails because functionalist psychology need not prevent behaviors from evolving independently, and it relies on too strong an interpretation of the quasi‐independence criterion. The weaker interpretation does not undermine sociobiology, and evolutionary psychology would be vulnerable to the same criticism. Finally, I offer reasons to think that both mental mechanisms and behaviors can be adaptations.}, number={1}, journal={Philosophy of Science}, publisher={University of Chicago Press}, author={Driscoll, Catherine}, year={2004}, month={Jan}, pages={16–35} }