@article{gu_heese_kemahlioglu-ziya_ziya_2024, title={Pricing for services with cross-segment externalities, capacity constraints, and competition}, volume={313}, ISSN={["1872-6860"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.ejor.2023.09.021}, abstractNote={In many service systems such as movie theaters, sports clubs, or hotels, different customer segments share physical space, and the presence of customers from different segments may affect the utility a customer receives from the service. We consider a setting where two competing facilities offer service to two distinct types of customers and study whether and when the firms can benefit from using differential pricing. The two firms do not explicitly decide whether to use uniform or differential pricing. Rather, we derive our findings by characterizing and comparing all equilibria that might arise when differential pricing is feasible. Our results suggest that if the network externalities are symmetric, that is, if the two customer segments feel equally about the presence of customers of the other segment, then the firms never benefit from price differentiation, unless the network externalities are negative and strong when compared to the travel/inconvenience cost that the customers incur when receiving service from their less preferred facility. Interestingly, we find that using differential pricing can even hurt firm profits, when it leads to fierce price competition between the two service providers.}, number={2}, journal={EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH}, author={Gu, Wei and Heese, H. Sebastian and Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda and Ziya, Serhan}, year={2024}, month={Mar}, pages={801–813} }
 @article{heese_kemahlioglu-ziya_2023, title={Capacity shortages, regulation, and firm incentives in the generic drugs industry}, volume={6}, ISSN={["1520-6750"]}, DOI={10.1002/nav.22132}, abstractNote={Abstract}, journal={NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS}, author={Heese, H. Sebastian and Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda}, year={2023}, month={Jun} }
 @article{sahebi-fakhrabad_kemahlioglu-ziya_handfield_wood_patel_page_chang_2023, title={In-Hospital Code Status Updates: Trends Over Time and the Impact of COVID-19}, volume={12}, ISSN={["1938-2715"]}, DOI={10.1177/10499091231222188}, abstractNote={Objective The primary objective was to evaluate if the percentage of patients with missing or inaccurate code status documentation at a Trauma Level 1 hospital could be reduced through daily updates. The secondary objective was to examine if patient preferences for DNR changed during the COVID-19 pandemic. }, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MEDICINE}, author={Sahebi-Fakhrabad, Amirreza and Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda and Handfield, Robert and Wood, Stacy and Patel, Mehul D. and Page, Cristen P. and Chang, Lydia}, year={2023}, month={Dec} }
 @article{sahebi-fakhrabad_sadeghi_kemahlioglu-ziya_handfield_tohidi_vasheghani-farahani_2023, title={The Impact of Opioid Prescribing Limits on Drug Usage in South Carolina: A Novel Geospatial and Time Series Data Analysis}, volume={11}, ISSN={["2227-9032"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.3390/healthcare11081132}, DOI={10.3390/healthcare11081132}, abstractNote={The opioid crisis in the United States has had devastating effects on communities across the country, leading many states to pass legislation that limits the prescription of opioid medications in an effort to reduce the number of overdose deaths. This study investigates the impact of South Carolina’s prescription limit law (S.C. Code Ann. 44-53-360), which aims to reduce opioid overdose deaths, on opioid prescription rates. The study utilizes South Carolina Reporting and Identification Prescription Tracking System (SCRIPTS) data and proposes a distance classification system to group records based on proximity and evaluates prescription volumes in each distance class. Prescription volumes were found to be highest in classes with pharmacies located further away from the patient. An Interrupted Time Series (ITS) model is utilized to assess the policy impact, with benzodiazepine prescriptions as a control group. The ITS models indicate an overall decrease in prescription volume, but with varying impacts across the different distance classes. While the policy effectively reduced opioid prescription volumes overall, an unintended consequence was observed as prescription volume increased in areas where prescribers were located at far distances from patients, highlighting the limitations of state-level policies on doctors. These findings contribute to the understanding of the effects of prescription limit laws on opioid prescription rates and the importance of considering location and distance in policy design and implementation.}, number={8}, journal={HEALTHCARE}, author={Sahebi-Fakhrabad, Amirreza and Sadeghi, Amir Hossein and Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda and Handfield, Robert and Tohidi, Hossein and Vasheghani-Farahani, Iman}, year={2023}, month={Apr} }
 @article{heese_kemahlioglu-ziya_perdikaki_2021, title={Outsourcing under Competition and Scale Economies: When to Choose a Competitor as a Supplier}, volume={52}, ISSN={["1540-5915"]}, DOI={10.1111/deci.12449}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT}, number={5}, journal={DECISION SCIENCES}, author={Heese, Hans Sebastian and Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda and Perdikaki, Olga}, year={2021}, month={Oct}, pages={1209–1241} }
 @article{jaunich_decarolis_handfield_kemahlioglu-ziya_ranjithan_moheb-alizadeh_2020, title={Life-cycle modeling framework for electronic waste recovery and recycling processes}, volume={161}, ISSN={["1879-0658"]}, url={http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-85086084470&partnerID=MN8TOARS}, DOI={10.1016/j.resconrec.2020.104841}, abstractNote={Policies and regulations such as Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) have been implemented to potentially increase the recycling rate of electronic waste (e-waste), but the cost and environmental impacts of associated collection, transportation, material recovery, material re-processing, and disposal could outweigh the benefits of recycling if the e-waste management system is not effectively designed and implemented. This paper presents a quantitative, holistic framework to systematically estimate life-cycle impacts and costs associated with e-waste management. This new framework was tested using data from the state of Washington's EPR program to represent e-waste collection, transportation, processing and disposal. Sensitivity of process-level life-cycle model outputs to parameter and input variability was also conducted. Drop-off using fossil-fuel-powered personal vehicles was found to be a key contributor to cost and carbon dioxide emissions. Decision-makers must account for drop-off and consider the feasibility of alternate e-waste aggregation strategies to ensure life-cycle benefits of e-waste recycling are maximized.}, journal={RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND RECYCLING}, author={Jaunich, Megan Kramer and DeCarolis, Joseph and Handfield, Robert and Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda and Ranjithan, S. Ranji and Moheb-Alizadeh, Hadi}, year={2020}, month={Oct} }
 @article{heese_kemahlıoğlu-ziya_2016, title={Don't ask, don't tell: Sharing revenues with a dishonest retailer}, volume={248}, ISSN={0377-2217}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.07.054}, DOI={10.1016/j.ejor.2015.07.054}, abstractNote={When different supply chain parties have private information, some form of information sharing is required to improve supply chain performance. However, it might be difficult to ensure truthful information transfer when firms can benefit from distorting their private information. To investigate the impact of dishonest information transfer, we consider a single-supplier single-retailer supply chain that operates under a contract with a revenue sharing clause, providing the retailer incentive to underreport sales revenues. In practice, suppliers utilize audits based on statistical tools that, for example, compare the retailers' sales reports and order quantities to limit, but not necessarily eliminate, cheating. We investigate the impact of such limited cheating on the different supply chain constituents. We show that when the retailer can exert sales effort, a supplier might benefit from the retailer's dishonesty. Our findings also suggest that if the retailer's negotiation power is high or if retailer effort is effective, the supplier should reduce the retailer's revenue share and absorb some of the demand risk to increase retailer participation. When facing a less powerful or less capable retailer, the supplier might be better off extracting profitability upfront through a higher wholesale price.}, number={2}, journal={European Journal of Operational Research}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Heese, H. Sebastian and Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya, Eda}, year={2016}, month={Jan}, pages={580–592} }
 @article{esenduran_kemahlioglu-ziya_swaminathan_2016, title={Take-Back Legislation: Consequences for Remanufacturing and Environment}, volume={47}, ISSN={["1540-5915"]}, DOI={10.1111/deci.12174}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT}, number={2}, journal={DECISION SCIENCES}, author={Esenduran, Goekce and Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda and Swaminathan, Jayashankar M.}, year={2016}, month={Apr}, pages={219–256} }
 @article{esenduran_kemahlioglu-ziya_2015, title={A Comparison of Product Take-Back Compliance Schemes}, volume={24}, ISSN={["1937-5956"]}, DOI={10.1111/poms.12213}, abstractNote={ Product take‐back regulation, under which firms finance the collection and treatment of their end‐of‐life products, is a widely used environmental program. One of the most common compliance schemes is collectively with cost allocation by market share. As an alternative, individual compliance scheme is considered. Assuming that firms can choose their compliance scheme, we compare these two schemes with respect to the costs they impose on firms and environmental benefits. We show that high collection targets and large market shares among firms in a collective compliance scheme make it more cost‐effective. From an environmental benefits perspective, the prevailing intuition is that collection rates will be higher under collective schemes but individual compliance will provide more incentive for higher recyclability levels. Our results challenge both of these premises. We identify conditions under which collection rates are higher when firms comply individually and recyclability levels are higher when firms comply collectively and allocate costs with respect to market shares. }, number={1}, journal={PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT}, author={Esenduran, Goekce and Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda}, year={2015}, month={Jan}, pages={71–88} }
 @article{heese_kemahlioglu-ziya_2013, title={Enabling Opportunism: Revenue Sharing when Sales Revenues are Unobservable}, volume={23}, ISSN={1059-1478}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/poms.12163}, DOI={10.1111/poms.12163}, abstractNote={ We consider a supply chain with a supplier that sells to a retailer under a revenue‐sharing arrangement. Demand is uncertain and unobservable to the supplier. We assume that the retailer is rational, that is, the retailer behaves opportunistically and underreports sales revenues to the supplier whenever such underreporting is profitable. Assuming the supplier has the ability to audit the retailer and learn about the actual sales revenues, we show that the supplier will never find it optimal to audit to the point that ensures truthful reporting for all demand realizations. By committing to an auditing policy, the supplier can exploit retailer opportunism and derive profits that at times even exceed those that could be obtained when dealing with a retailer that always strictly adheres to the agreed‐upon contract terms. We also show that the retailer's opportunistic behavior can increase total supply chain profits. }, number={9}, journal={Production and Operations Management}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Heese, H. Sebastian and Kemahlioglu-Ziya, Eda}, year={2013}, month={Nov}, pages={1634–1645} }