@article{lian_chakrabortty_duel-hallen_2017, place={USA}, title={Game-Theoretic Multi-Agent Control and Network Cost Allocation Under Communication Constraints}, volume={35}, ISSN={["1558-0008"]}, DOI={10.1109/jsac.2017.2659338}, abstractNote={Multi-agent networked linear dynamic systems have attracted the attention of researchers in power systems, intelligent transportation, and industrial automation. The agents might cooperatively optimize a global performance objective, resulting in social optimization, or try to satisfy their own selfish objectives using a noncooperative differential game. However, in these solutions, large volumes of data must be sent from system states to possibly distant control inputs, thus resulting in high cost of the underlying communication network. To enable economically viable communication, a game-theoretic framework is proposed under the communication cost, or sparsity, constraint, given by the number of communicating state/control input pairs. As this constraint tightens, the system transitions from dense to sparse communication, providing the tradeoff between dynamic system performance and information exchange. Moreover, using the proposed sparsity-constrained distributed social optimization and noncooperative game algorithms, we develop a method to allocate the costs of the communication infrastructure fairly and according to the agents’ diverse needs for feedback and cooperation. Numerical results illustrate utilization of the proposed algorithms to enable and ensure economic fairness of wide-area control among power companies.}, number={2}, journal={IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS}, author={Lian, Feier and Chakrabortty, Aranya and Duel-Hallen, Alexandra}, year={2017}, month={Feb}, pages={330–340} }
 @inproceedings{lian_duel-hallen_chakrabortty_2016, title={Ensuring economic fairness in wide-area control for power systems via game theory}, DOI={10.1109/acc.2016.7525415}, abstractNote={Wide-area control helps in suppression of interarea oscillations in electric power systems, but potentially requires a substantial investment into the communication network needed to exchange state information. To provide companies with incentives to subsidize the wide-area communication links, a fair cost-allocation method based on the theory of cooperative network-formation games (NFG) is developed. The Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is utilized to fairly allocate the communication cost to the companies, which act as game-players. First, the wide-area control problem is formulated using the state-feedback-based LQR minimization approach, and the social communication cost is computed using a sparsity-promoting algorithm. Second, the disagreement point, which determines the maximum cost each area is willing to pay, is computed. This selfish cost is proportional to the energy an area saves by utilizing wide-area feedback and is derived from the Nash Equilibria (NEs) of two noncooperative NFGs, with and without wide-area feedback, respectively. Finally, the social cost is divided optimally among the companies, with all players benefiting from cooperation. The proposed cost allocation is illustrated for the Australian 50-bus power system example.}, booktitle={2016 american control conference (acc)}, author={Lian, F. and Duel-Hallen, A. and Chakrabortty, Aranya}, year={2016}, pages={3231–3236} }