@article{aiken_clifford_ellis_huang_2021, title={Funding Liquidity Risk and the Dynamics of Hedge Fund Lockups}, volume={56}, ISSN={["1756-6916"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109020000393}, DOI={10.1017/S0022109020000393}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Aiken, Adam L. and Clifford, Christopher P. and Ellis, Jesse A. and Huang, Qiping}, year={2021}, month={Jun}, pages={1321–1349} }
 @article{ellis_guo_mobbs_2021, title={How Does Forced-CEO-Turnover Experience Affect Directors?}, volume={56}, ISSN={["1756-6916"]}, DOI={10.1017/S0022109020000307}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS}, author={Ellis, Jesse and Guo, Lixiong and Mobbs, Shawn}, year={2021}, month={Jun}, pages={1163–1191} }
 @article{ellis_smith_white_2020, title={Corruption and Corporate Innovation}, volume={55}, ISSN={["1756-6916"]}, DOI={10.1017/S0022109019000735}, abstractNote={We examine whether political corruption impedes innovation. Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. firms, we find that corruption has a substantial, negative relation with the quantity and quality of innovation. These results are robust to using various fixed effects, proxies for corruption and innovation, and subsamples. To establish causality, we employ 2 instruments for corruption: local ethnic diversity and the corruption of the state a firm’s founder grew up in. Corruption appears to reduce innovation output both on average and for the most innovative firms. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the notion that corruption reduces social welfare by impeding innovation.}, number={7}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS}, author={Ellis, Jesse and Smith, Jared and White, Roger}, year={2020}, month={Nov}, pages={2124–2149} }
 @article{aiken_ellis_kang_2020, title={Do Politicians "Put Their Money Where Their Mouth Is?" Ideology and Portfolio Choice}, volume={66}, ISSN={["1526-5501"]}, DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2018.3175}, abstractNote={ We examine the role of political ideology in portfolio formation by studying a unique set of investors whose ideology can be precisely captured by a well-defined, continuous measure and whose personal asset allocation decisions are mandatorily disclosed, namely, the members of the U.S. Congress. As such, we overcome important methodological issues facing previous work in this area. We find that politicians with similar beliefs hold similar portfolios and that more liberal members engage in more socially responsible investing (SRI), even within political parties. Politicians disproportionately favor the SRI categories that reflect their favorite issues, while salience plays an important role in activating their ideologically based preferences for SRI. In addition, more ideological investors are less likely to engage in quid pro quo behavior. We conclude that ideology is a pervasive psychological factor that governs decisions across the domains of politics, investing, and, even, ethics. }, number={1}, journal={MANAGEMENT SCIENCE}, author={Aiken, Adam L. and Ellis, Jesse A. and Kang, Minjeong}, year={2020}, month={Jan}, pages={376–396} }
 @article{ellis_madureira_underwood_2020, title={The Causal Effects of Proximity on Investment: Evidence from Flight Introductions}, volume={55}, ISSN={["1756-6916"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109019000565}, DOI={10.1017/S0022109019000565}, abstractNote={We use the introduction of direct flights as an exogenous shock to the travel time between mutual funds and firms to estimate the causal effects of proximity on fund investment decisions and performance. We find that a fund invests significantly more in firms that become more proximate following the introduction of direct flights and that these more proximate investments exhibit superior performance. Our findings are robust to including a variety of fixed effects and potential confounders such as firm-level shocks, fund-level shocks, and time trends. Collectively, our results indicate that proximity enhances investors’ ability to acquire value-relevant information about firms.}, number={6}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Ellis, Jesse and Madureira, Leonardo and Underwood, Shane}, year={2020}, month={Sep}, pages={1978–2004} }
 @article{clifford_ellis_gerken_2018, title={Hedge Fund Boards and the Market for Independent Directors}, volume={53}, ISSN={["1756-6916"]}, DOI={10.1017/S0022109018000352}, abstractNote={We provide the first examination of hedge fund boards and their directors. The majority of directorships are held by extremely busy independent directors. These directors are sought by funds because they have more reputational capital at stake, making them independent and credible monitors whose presence can certify fund quality to investors. Busy independent directors are more likely to be hired by high-quality funds, and their departure from the board is associated with investor withdrawals. Moreover, funds with busy independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, abuse discretionary liquidity restrictions, or engage in performance-based risk shifting.}, number={5}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS}, author={Clifford, Christopher P. and Ellis, Jesse A. and Gerken, William C.}, year={2018}, month={Oct}, pages={2067–2101} }
 @article{ellis_fee_thomas_2018, title={Playing Favorites? Industry Expert Directors in Diversified Firms}, volume={53}, ISSN={0022-1090 1756-6916}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109018000169}, DOI={10.1017/s0022109018000169}, abstractNote={We examine the influence of outside directors’ industry experience on segment investment, segment operating performance, and firm valuation for conglomerates. Given board composition is endogenous, we instrument for the presence of industry expert directors using the supply of experienced executives near conglomerate firms’ headquarters. We find that industry expert representation on the board causes increased segment investment. Consistent with experienced directors playing favorites rather than acting as dispassionate advisors, segment profitability (firm value) is lower for segments (firms) with industry expert outside directors. We do not find analogous negative profitability or valuation effects of director experience for single-segment firms.}, number={4}, journal={Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Ellis, Jesse A. and Fee, C. Edward and Thomas, Shawn}, year={2018}, month={Jul}, pages={1679–1714} }
 @article{ellis_underwood_2018, title={The Only Fund in Town? Geographic Segmentation in the US Mutual Fund Industry}, volume={47}, ISSN={["1755-053X"]}, DOI={10.1111/fima.12216}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={3}, journal={FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT}, author={Ellis, Jesse A. and Underwood, Shane}, year={2018}, pages={715–737} }
 @article{ellis_moeller_schlingemann_stulz_2017, title={Portable country governance and cross border acquisitions}, volume={48}, ISSN={["1478-6990"]}, DOI={10.1057/s41267-016-0029-9}, abstractNote={The agency theory and law and finance literatures show good country governance encourages financial development, mitigates agency problems, and increases firm value. Drawing on these literatures, we develop a theory that benefits from good country governance are portable by firms across countries through cross-border acquisitions. Using acquisitions from 56 countries from 1990 to 2007, we find that acquirers can transport the benefits from good country governance, so that they gain more from acquiring targets with worse country governance than their own. As predicted, the acquirer’s stock-price reaction to acquisitions increases with the country governance distance between the acquirer and the target.}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STUDIES}, author={Ellis, Jesse A. and Moeller, Sara B. and Schlingemann, Frederik P. and Stulz, Rene M.}, year={2017}, month={Feb}, pages={148–173} }
 @article{aiken_clifford_ellis_2015, title={Hedge funds and discretionary liquidity restrictions}, volume={116}, ISSN={["0304-405X"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.01.002}, abstractNote={We study hedge funds that imposed discretionary liquidity restrictions (DLRs) on investor shares during the financial crisis. DLRs prolong fund life, but impose liquidity costs on investors, creating a potential conflict of interest. Ostensibly, funds establish DLRs to limit performance-driven withdrawals that could force fire sales of illiquid assets. However, after they restrict investor liquidity, DLR funds do not reduce illiquid stock sales and underperform a control sample of non-DLR funds. Consequently, DLRs appear to negatively impact fund family reputation. After the crisis, funds from DLR families faced difficulties raising capital and were more likely to cut their fees.}, number={1}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS}, author={Aiken, Adam L. and Clifford, Christopher P. and Ellis, Jesse A.}, year={2015}, month={Apr}, pages={197–218} }
 @article{aiken_clifford_ellis_2015, title={The Value of Funds of Hedge Funds: Evidence from Their Holdings}, volume={61}, ISSN={["1526-5501"]}, DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2014.2032}, abstractNote={ We examine the portfolio holdings of funds of hedge funds (FoFs) to identify the channels through which FoFs add value for their clients. FoFs offer access to a diversified portfolio of funds that would be costly for constrained investors to manage on their own. Although we find only limited evidence that FoFs exhibit skill when selecting hedge funds, we find strong evidence that FoFs make skillful termination decisions. After FoFs divest from a hedge fund, those hedge funds subsequently underperform and fail more often. Our evidence indicates that FoFs learn and skillfully process information about their portfolio funds after they become investors, enabling them to forecast poor future performance. Our study suggests that FoFs serve an important role as intermediaries in a market characterized by significant frictions and transactions costs. }, number={10}, journal={MANAGEMENT SCIENCE}, author={Aiken, Adam L. and Clifford, Christopher P. and Ellis, Jesse}, year={2015}, month={Oct}, pages={2415–2429} }
 @article{aiken_clifford_ellis_2012, title={Out of the Dark: Hedge Fund Reporting Biases and Commercial Databases}, volume={26}, ISSN={0893-9454 1465-7368}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs100}, DOI={10.1093/rfs/hhs100}, abstractNote={We examine the potential for selection bias in voluntarily reported hedge fund performance data. We construct a set of hedge fund returns that have never been reported to a commercial hedge fund database. These returns allow a direct comparison of performance between funds that choose to report to commercial databases and funds that do not. We find that funds that report their performance to commercial databases significantly outperform nonreporting funds. Our results suggest that the voluntarily reported performance in commercial databases suffers from a selection bias that may exaggerate the average skill of the universe of hedge fund managers.}, number={1}, journal={Review of Financial Studies}, publisher={Oxford University Press (OUP)}, author={Aiken, Adam L. and Clifford, Christopher P. and Ellis, Jesse}, year={2012}, month={Sep}, pages={208–243} }
 @article{ellis_fee_thomas_2012, title={Proprietary Costs and the Disclosure of Information About Customers}, volume={50}, ISSN={0021-8456}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2012.00441.x}, DOI={10.1111/j.1475-679x.2012.00441.x}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT }, number={3}, journal={Journal of Accounting Research}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Ellis, Jesse A. and Fee, C. Edward and Thomas, Shawn E.}, year={2012}, month={Apr}, pages={685–727} }