@article{peterson_2022, title={The Politicized Enforcement of Laws Criminalizing Executive Branch Conflicts of Interest}, ISSN={["1741-5705"]}, DOI={10.1111/psq.12765}, abstractNote={Abstract}, journal={PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY}, author={Peterson, Jordan Carr}, year={2022}, month={Jan} }
 @article{heersink_peterson_peterson_2021, title={Mobilization and Countermobilization: The Effect of Candidate Visits on Campaign Donations in the 2016 Presidential Election}, ISSN={["1468-2508"]}, DOI={10.1086/711407}, abstractNote={Political scientists studying the impact of campaign visits by presidential candidates have come to conflicting conclusions on whether campaigns change voter behavior in even small ways. In this article, we argue that, while scholars have generally interpreted campaign effect results as being unidirectional, the traditional metrics of such effects—polls and aggregate vote results—inherently reflect a net effect combining any potential mobilization of candidates’ supporters, offset by any countermobilization of their opponents. If such countermobilization occurs, weak or null findings in the campaign effects literature may understate or miss the true impact of campaign activities on voter behavior. To assess whether campaign visits produce mixed effects, we measure the extent to which visits by presidential and vice presidential candidates in the 2016 presidential election produced increases in campaign donations in the immediate aftermath of a visit. Our results show that visits by Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton inspired their supporters to donate more money than they otherwise would have. However, we also find a considerable level of countermobilization: visits by both Trump and Clinton resulted in an increase in donations to the opposing presidential campaign.}, journal={JOURNAL OF POLITICS}, author={Heersink, Boris and Peterson, Brenton D. and Peterson, Jordan Carr}, year={2021}, month={Oct} }
 @article{heersink_napolio_peterson_2021, title={The Mixed Effects of Candidate Visits on Campaign Donations in the 2020 Presidential Election}, ISSN={["1552-3373"]}, DOI={10.1177/1532673X211041571}, abstractNote={ Recent scholarship on the effect of candidate visits in presidential elections has found that appearances by candidates appear to mobilize both supporters and opponents. Specifically, in the 2016 presidential election, donations to campaigns of the visiting presidential candidates increased, but—in the case of Republican nominee Donald Trump—so did donations to his opponent, Hillary Clinton. In this paper, we extend this research by assessing the effect of visits on campaign donations by presidential and vice presidential candidates in the 2020 election. We find evidence that visits by Donald Trump and Kamala Harris had strong mobilizing and counter-mobilizing effects, increasing donations to both campaigns. We find weak evidence that visits by Joe Biden increased contributions to his campaign, but we do not find evidence that his visits had a counter-mobilizing effect, and we find no evidence that visits by Mike Pence affected donations in either direction. }, journal={AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH}, author={Heersink, Boris and Napolio, Nicholas G. and Peterson, Jordan Carr}, year={2021}, month={Sep} }
 @article{peterson_giallouri_menounou_2021, title={The Personal Finances of United States Supreme Court Justices and Decision-making in Economic Litigation}, volume={50}, ISSN={["1537-5366"]}, DOI={10.1086/714088}, abstractNote={What explains probusiness judicial decision-making? Existing scholarship focuses on federal judges acting strategically or ideologically, but this represents only some factors affecting judicial behavior. Our objective is to develop a theory of judicial decision-making in economic litigation based on judges’ personal finances. We test this approach by considering how Supreme Court justices’ investments impact decision-making in cases involving businesses. While ethical standards suggest that judges should recuse themselves from cases whose outcomes affect them financially, research implies that judges make strategic choices regarding ethical conflicts. If judges participate in cases that implicate their personal finances, does this affect their votes? We marshal evidence from Supreme Court justices’ financial disclosures and argue that in business litigation, judges vote to promote the economic well-being of industries in which they invest. We find justices are more likely to decide for business litigants when personally invested in firms from industries affected by the litigation’s outcome.}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES}, author={Peterson, Jordan Carr and Giallouri, Thora and Menounou, Elli}, year={2021}, month={Jun}, pages={379–405} }
 @article{carr peterson_grose_2021, title={The Private Interests of Public Officials: Financial Regulation in the US Congress}, volume={46}, ISSN={["1939-9162"]}, DOI={10.1111/lsq.12294}, abstractNote={Legislators' private financial holdings affect policy decisions. Due to financial self‐interest, we theorize that legislators whose personal investment portfolios include equities from firms affected by proposed policies vote for legislation that benefits those firms. We also theorize that legislators with greater personal exposure to equity investments support policies that benefit equities markets generally. We create a novel data set of legislators' personal stock investments and examine major congressional actions since the 1990s on financial deregulation and market intervention. US House members who own stocks in firms who benefit from financial deregulation vote for deregulation. House members with greater exposure to financial and automotive stocks support the financial and auto bailouts, respectively. General exposure to equities markets is also associated with support for key legislation boosting markets. The normative implications are significant, as legislators' private interests influence decisions in the public sphere.}, number={1}, journal={LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY}, author={Carr Peterson, Jordan and Grose, Christian R.}, year={2021}, month={Feb}, pages={49–84} }