@article{knoeber_tsoulouhas_2013, title={Introduction to the Special Issue on Tournaments and Contests}, volume={31}, ISSN={["0167-7187"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.04.001}, abstractNote={The papers in this special issue represent several of the directions taken by current research on tournaments and contests. Two surveys provide useful insight into promotion contests and into contest functions. Other papers analyze the implications of limited liability, incomplete information, cross-shareholding, and non-binding side payments. And two papers investigate dynamic incentives and momentum.}, number={3}, journal={INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION}, author={Knoeber, Charles and Tsoulouhas, Theofanis}, year={2013}, month={May}, pages={195–197} }
 @article{knoeber_walker_2013, title={The effect of tougher enforcement on foreign firms: Evidence from the Adelphia perp walk}, volume={23}, ISSN={["1872-6313"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.09.007}, abstractNote={The public arrest of Adelphia executives on July 24, 2002 signaled tougher enforcement of laws against corporate crime. On that day and the two following days, foreign firms experienced a cumulative 1.7% decline in value. Relative to domestic firms, the loss was a much larger 4.5%. The expected cost to firms from tougher enforcement suggests three possible reasons. Foreign firms may be targeted more heavily, may face greater penalties, or may find it more costly to react to (deflect) enforcement. We find evidence consistent with foreign firms facing higher costs from tougher enforcement for each of these reasons.}, journal={JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE}, author={Knoeber, Charles R. and Walker, Mark D.}, year={2013}, month={Dec}, pages={382–394} }
 @article{knoeber_walker_2013, title={On political connectedness and the arrest of Ivan Boesky}, volume={157}, ISSN={["1573-7101"]}, DOI={10.1007/s11127-012-9939-7}, number={1-2}, journal={PUBLIC CHOICE}, author={Knoeber, Charles R. and Walker, Mark D.}, year={2013}, month={Oct}, pages={41–50} }
 @article{mcfall_knoeber_thurman_2009, title={Contests, Grand Prizes, and the Hot Hand}, volume={10}, ISSN={["1552-7794"]}, DOI={10.1177/1527002508326683}, abstractNote={ Awarding a grand prize to the player who wins most often in a series of contests links the contests together and makes incentives in the current contest depend on past performance. A lucky player who wins early faces relatively stronger economic incentives to exert effort because of his early success. As a consequence, early winners are more likely to keep winning through the middle of the series. That is, a grand prize generates what looks like a hot hand. Indeed, this argument about economic incentives may help to rationalize the inconsistent evidence of a hot hand in sporting events. This article develops this argument and assesses it empirically using data from the Professional Golfers' Association Tour, before and after a grand prize, the season-ending Tour Championship, was introduced. }, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF SPORTS ECONOMICS}, publisher={SAGE Publications}, author={McFall, Todd A. and Knoeber, Charles R. and Thurman, Walter N.}, year={2009}, month={Jun}, pages={236–255} }
 @article{tsoulouhas_knoeber_agrawal_2007, title={Contests to become CEO: incentives, selection and handicaps}, volume={30}, ISSN={["0938-2259"]}, DOI={10.1007/s00199-005-0060-8}, number={2}, journal={ECONOMIC THEORY}, author={Tsoulouhas, Theofanis and Knoeber, Charles R. and Agrawal, Anup}, year={2007}, month={Feb}, pages={195–221} }
 @article{agrawal_knoeber_tsoulouhas_2006, title={Are outsiders handicapped in CEO successions?}, volume={12}, ISSN={["0929-1199"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2004.04.005}, abstractNote={We argue that outsiders are handicapped (chosen only if markedly better than the best insider) in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) successions to strengthen the incentive that the contest to become CEO provides inside candidates. Handicapping implies are that a firm will be more likely to choose an insider to succeed to the CEO position where insiders are more comparable to each other, where outsiders are less comparable to insiders, and where there are more inside candidates. We assess these predictions using a data set containing more than 1,000 observations on CEO succession in large U.S. firms over the period 1974–1995 and a novel measure of the comparability of insiders that identifies those firms with a product or line of business organizational structure. Our evidence is consistent with each prediction. We also explore more carefully our organizational structure variable. We find that where firms switch to a product or line of business structure (making insiders more comparable) the likelihood of outsider succession falls. And we consider the possibility that managers from firms with a product or line of business structure may be more likely to be chosen CEO because their experience as divisional head better prepares them for a CEO's duties. Two tests suggest that this is not the source of our finding that these firms are more likely to promote insiders to be CEO. The first test finds that controlling for prior experience managing a business (a division or a firm) among inside candidates to be CEO, those firms organized along product lines remain more likely to promote from within. The second test finds that when outsiders are chosen CEO, these outsiders do not come disproportionately from firms with a product or line of business structure.}, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE}, author={Agrawal, A and Knoeber, CR and Tsoulouhas, T}, year={2006}, month={Jun}, pages={619–644} }
 @article{knoeber_2003, title={The econometrics of corporate governance studies}, volume={80}, ISSN={["0931-8658"]}, DOI={10.1007/s00712-003-0001-6}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE}, author={Knoeber, CR}, year={2003}, month={Oct}, pages={203–206} }
 @article{agrawal_knoeber_2001, title={Do some outside directors play a political role?}, volume={44}, ISSN={["0022-2186"]}, DOI={10.1086/320271}, abstractNote={If outside directors with backgrounds in politics and in law play a political role, they will be more important on the boards of firms for which politics matters more. We conduct three tests. First, for a sample of manufacturing firms, we find that politically experienced directors are more prevalent in firms where sales to government, exports, and lobbying are greater; lawyer‐directors are more prevalent in firms where costs of environmental regulation are higher; and both are more prevalent in larger firms. Second, for a sample of electric utilities during the 1990s, when the advent of retail competition made politics more important, we find increased incidence of politically experienced directors. Finally, we explore whether a governmental taste for diversity creates a political role for women directors. Although we document increased incidence of women directors over time, we find little evidence that women directors play a political role.}, number={1}, journal={JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS}, author={Agrawal, A and Knoeber, CR}, year={2001}, month={Apr}, pages={179–198} }
 @article{agrawal_knoeber_1998, title={Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover}, volume={47}, ISSN={["0304-405X"]}, DOI={10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00044-5}, abstractNote={A greater threat of takeover has two opposing effects on managerial compensation. The competition effect in the market for managers reduces compensation. The risk effect increases compensation by making managers' implicitly deferred compensation and firm-specific human capital less secure. Using a sample of about 450 large firms, we find that an increase in the threat of takeover from the first to the third quartile reduces a typical CEO's salary and bonus by $22,800–211,600 due to the competition effect, but raises salary and bonus by $41,500–255,300 due to the risk effect. The net effect is an increase of $18,700–43,700.}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS}, author={Agrawal, A and Knoeber, CR}, year={1998}, month={Feb}, pages={219–239} }
 @article{agrawal_knoeber_1996, title={Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders}, volume={31}, ISSN={["0022-1090"]}, DOI={10.2307/2331397}, abstractNote={Abstract This paper examines the use of seven mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders. These mechanisms are: shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large blockholders; use of outside directors; debt policy; the managerial labor market; and the market for corporate control. We present direct empirical evidence of interdependence among these mechanisms in a large sample of firms. This finding suggests that crosssectional OLS regressions of firm performance on single mechanisms may be misleading. Indeed, we find relationships between firm performance and four of the mechanisms when each is included in a separate OLS regression. These are insider shareholdings, outside directors, debt, and corporate control activity. Importantly, the effect of insider shareholdings disappears when all of the mechanisms are included in a single OLS regression, and the effects of debt and corporate control activity also disappear when estimations are made in a simultaneous systems framework. Together, these findings are consistent with optimal use of each control mechanism except outside directors.}, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS}, author={Agrawal, A and Knoeber, CR}, year={1996}, month={Sep}, pages={377–397} }
 @article{knoeber_thurman_1995, title={DONT COUNT YOUR CHICKENS - RISK AND RISK SHIFTING IN THE BROILER INDUSTRY}, volume={77}, ISSN={["0002-9092"]}, DOI={10.2307/1243218}, abstractNote={AbstractThe contracts used to reward growers of broiler chickens in the United States base pay on a grower's performance relative to other growers. From a panel of data covering seventy‐five growers over four years, we use simulation methods to measure the price and production risk shifted from growers to integrator companies by these contracts. We also decompose the risk in broiler production variability. We conclude that the bulk of the risk in our sample, which is primarily price risk, is shifted from growers through the use of production contracts.}, number={3}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, publisher={Oxford University Press (OUP)}, author={KNOEBER, CR and THURMAN, WN}, year={1995}, month={Aug}, pages={486–496} }
 @article{knoeber_baumer_1983, title={UNDERSTANDING RETAINED PATRONAGE REFUNDS IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES}, volume={65}, ISSN={["0002-9092"]}, DOI={10.2307/1240334}, abstractNote={AbstractThe share of patronage refunds retained by an agricultural cooperative is modeled as arising from the portfolio decision of its median member. The member is viewed as maximizing expected utility by allocating wealth between investments in farming assets and equity in the cooperative. Determinants of the share of patronage refunds retained are the expected rates of return on these two investments, their variances, their covariance, and the expected future share of patronage and its variance. Empirical examinations of aggregate cooperative data and cross‐section analysis of seventeen regional supply cooperatives are found to be consistent with the model.}, number={1}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={KNOEBER, CR and BAUMER, DL}, year={1983}, pages={30–37} }