@misc{pendlebury_2022, title={Making Sense of Kant's “Critique of Pure Reason”}, ISBN={9781350254763 9781350254770 9781350254787 9781350254794 9781350254800}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781350254800}, DOI={10.5040/9781350254800}, abstractNote={Tackling Kant’s seminal enlightenment text, Critique of Pure Reason, remains key for every student of modern philosophy. Michael Pendlebury distils his breadth of experience teaching Kant’s first Critique to provide a short, accessible introduction that reveals its enduring inspirations, challenges and ideas to thinkers grappling with contemporary philosophical issues. Clarifying and making sense of Kant’s account of perception, cognition, space, time, substance, causation, actuality, objectivity, and the presuppositions and limits of human knowledge makes Critique of Pure Reason digestible for all students, including those approaching it for the first time.}, publisher={Bloomsbury Academic}, author={Pendlebury, Michael}, year={2022} }
 @article{pendlebury_2017, title={A Kantian Account of Animal Cognition}, volume={48}, ISSN={["1467-9191"]}, DOI={10.1111/phil.12171}, abstractNote={The Philosophical ForumVolume 48, Issue 4 p. 369-393 ORIGINAL ARTICLE A Kantian Account of Animal Cognition Michael Pendlebury, Michael Pendlebury North Carolina State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Michael Pendlebury, Michael Pendlebury North Carolina State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 02 November 2017 https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12171Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Volume48, Issue4Winter 2017Pages 369-393 RelatedInformation}, number={4}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM}, author={Pendlebury, Michael}, year={2017}, pages={369–393} }
 @article{pendlebury_2013, title={Reasons in Action}, volume={42}, ISSN={["1996-8523"]}, DOI={10.1080/05568641.2013.854026}, abstractNote={When an agent performs an action because she takes something as a reason to do so, does she take it as a normative reason for the action or as an explanatory reason? In Reasons Without Rationalism, Setiya criticizes the normative view and advances a version of the explanatory view. I defend a version of the normative view against Setiya's criticisms and show that Setiya's explanatory account has two major flaws: it raises questions that it cannot answer about the occurrence of one motivational ‘because’ within the scope of another; and it cannot accommodate the fact that, if an agent can φ for the reason that p, then she could take p as a reason to φ without φ-ing.}, number={3}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS}, author={Pendlebury, Michael}, year={2013}, month={Nov}, pages={341–368} }
 @article{pendlebury_2011, title={OBJECTIVISM VERSUS REALISM}, volume={42}, ISSN={["1467-9191"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1467-9191.2010.00379.x}, abstractNote={This paper advocates a distinction between realism and objectivism. I treat realism about affirmations of a given type as the view that these affirmations are to be understood as factual assertions which attempt to describe features of a largely independent reality, and that they are correct if and only if they manage to do so. I treat objectivism about affirmations of a given type as the view that they are subject to adequate, non-arbitrary standards of correctness, and that there are a significant number of nontrivial affirmations of this type that can be known to be correct. So understood, realism and objectivism are independent. I compare and contrast these conceptions of realism and objectivism with those of Dummett and Wright; illustrate how they can be used to classify and make sense of different positions that philosophers have taken or might be tempted to take on various subject matters; elaborate the conceptions by developing and defending criteria for evaluating realist and objectivist theses; and illustrate how these criteria can be applied to support objectivism without realism with respect to theoretical reasons for beliefs about the macro-physical environment.}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM}, author={Pendlebury, Michael}, year={2011}, pages={79–104} }
 @article{pendlebury_2010, title={Facts and Truth-making}, volume={29}, ISSN={["1572-8749"]}, DOI={10.1007/s11245-009-9073-4}, number={2}, journal={TOPOI-AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Pendlebury, Michael}, year={2010}, month={Oct}, pages={137–145} }
 @article{pendlebury_2010, title={How to be a Normative Expressivist1}, volume={80}, ISSN={["1933-1592"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00315.x}, abstractNote={.  Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief.}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH}, author={Pendlebury, Michael}, year={2010}, month={Jan}, pages={182–207} }
 @article{pendlebury_2007, title={Global justice and the specter of Leviathan (Thomas Nagel)}, volume={38}, ISSN={["0031-806X"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1467-9191.2007.00252.x}, abstractNote={In a recent article on “The Problem of Global Justice,” Thomas Nagel argues that global socioeconomic justice presupposes a sovereign world state. I seek to undermine his arguments, which exemplify and give explicit voice to a widespread tendency in political philosophy to assign what I regard as excessive weight to the idea of the sovereign state with “a monopoly of force” (p. 115)—in other words, Leviathan. Nagel’s reasoning is worthy of attention in its own right and also because it is perhaps the most careful attempt to provide individualistic foundations for Rawls’s Law of Peoples thesis that requirements of distributive justice do not apply to the world as a whole. Nagel advances two main arguments for the claim that global socioeconomic justice is possible only within a sovereign world state. The first of these, which I discuss in section II, generalizes Hobbes’s state of nature argument for the view that “actual justice cannot be achieved except within a sovereign state” (p. 114) to “a wide range of conceptions of justice” (p. 115), including non-Hobbesian “conceptions [. . .] that are based on much more other-regarding motives” (p. 116).}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM}, author={Pendlebury, Michael}, year={2007}, pages={43–56} }
 @article{pendlebury_2007, title={Objective reasons ('What We Owe to Each Other')}, volume={45}, ISSN={["2041-6962"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.2041-6962.2007.tb00064.x}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={4}, journal={SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Pendlebury, Michael}, year={2007}, pages={533–563} }
 @article{pendlebury_2004, title={Individual autonomy and global democracy}, volume={103}, number={ }, journal={Theoria}, author={Pendlebury, M.}, year={2004}, pages={43–58} }