@article{khisa_2023, title={Arbitrary States: Social Control and Modern Authoritarianism in Museveni's Uganda}, volume={5}, ISSN={["1743-9140"]}, DOI={10.1080/00220388.2023.2210381}, abstractNote={as calls for dignity and respect and negotiating the delay of their extortion payments, are not illegal acts. Therefore, it is questionable how well the Colombian case fits within Moncada’s overall framework of resistance. Despite these critiques, Resisting Extortion is a valuable contribution to the literature on criminal politics within and outside of Latin America, collective mobilization, and qualitative methodology. Alongside Janice Gallagher (2023), Michael J. Wolff (2020), and others, Moncada is one of a small, but growing, group of scholars who are taking the important step of centering the agency of victims of criminal violence. These studies are essential in demonstrating how these oft-overlooked actors play a significant role in shaping the social and political landscape. Consequently, this book is relevant to those inside and outside academia and Moncada’s clear and engaging writing style creates for a highly accessible work of scholarship for all.}, journal={JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2023}, month={May} }
 @article{khisa_rwengabo_2023, title={Militarism and the Politics of Covid-19 Response in Uganda}, volume={4}, ISSN={["1556-0848"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X231162848}, DOI={10.1177/0095327X231162848}, abstractNote={Within the broader context of securitized responses to Covid-19 globally, Uganda experienced an oversized military role, ranging from law-and-order and lockdown enforcement, to managing food-relief supplies, medical operations, and partisan political repression. What explains this excessive militarization? To address this poser, the article draws on secondary sources and key-informant interviews to test the hypothesis that military involvement in pandemic responses depends on pre-pandemic militarism. The findings reveal direct links between pre-crisis militarism and Covid-19 responses, contrary to the view that exceptionality and novelty of Covid-19 informed overly militarized responses. Through pandemic framing and institutional morphing, pre-pandemic militarism foregrounded military roles because Covid-19 provided Uganda’s ruling elites with a public health pretext to heighten militaristic rule, clutch the political arena in the context of elections, and deepen military presence in civilian public health realms. This excessive militarization of public health seriously impacts civil–military relations, specifically command and control, reporting and accountability, and resources management.}, journal={ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY}, author={Khisa, Moses and Rwengabo, Sabastiano}, year={2023}, month={Apr} }
 @article{bareebe_khisa_2023, title={Rwanda-Uganda relations: elites' attitudes and perceptions in interstate relations}, volume={5}, ISSN={["1743-9094"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2023.2200598}, DOI={10.1080/14662043.2023.2200598}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Rwanda and Uganda have had strained relations, oscillating between warm, lukewarm, hostile and outright war. Since the biggest falling out during the Second Congo War (1998–2003), both governments have variously accused each other of wrongdoing, including allegations of supporting rebel activities, covert counterintelligence operations and espionage. The most recent escalation in frosty relations saw the closure of Katuna border post. Because the respective ruling parties – the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the National Resistance Movement – at a minimum have shared ideological and historical origins, we would expect relations to be strong and constructive not hostile or tenuous. Yet, it is precisely the shared history and social ties among the politico-military and intelligence elites that shape the suspicion, mistrust and hostility that feed into official policies. This article analyses how shared ideological and historical origins, social relations and kindred ties inform individual attitudes and perceptions of key elites toward each other’s government.}, journal={COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS}, author={Bareebe, Gerald and Khisa, Moses}, year={2023}, month={May} }
 @article{khisa_2023, title={Uganda's ruling coalition and the 2021 elections: change, continuity and contestation}, volume={8}, ISSN={["1753-1063"]}, DOI={10.1080/17531055.2023.2246761}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Since coming to power, President Museveni has consistently stitched together disparate actors and representatives of divergent constituencies in his ruling coalition. This became especially necessary as his rule grew less popular and more precarious. This article argues that the nature of the ruling coalition reflects the structure of politics and menu of priorities for the incumbent. The political landscape shapes composition of the ruling coalition, which mirrors realignment of social forces, interest groups and balance of power. This article casts a critical spotlight on two phases – 1986–2005 and 2006 to the present – placing coalition dynamics and the 2021 elections in the broader context of the shift in Uganda’s overall political landscape. Drawing on qualitative data sources including elite interviews and newspaper reports, and with specific focus on cabinet appointments, the article shows that electoral calculations and regime survival considerations are the biggest drivers of Museveni’s ruling coalition changes and composition.}, journal={JOURNAL OF EASTERN AFRICAN STUDIES}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2023}, month={Aug} }
 @book{edozie_khisa_2022, title={Africa's New Global Politics}, ISBN={9781955055543}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781955055543}, DOI={10.1515/9781955055543}, abstractNote={The African Union’s threat to lead African states’ mass withdrawal from the International Criminal Court in 2008 marked just one of many encounters that demonstrate African leaders’ growing confidence and activism in international relations. Rita Kiki Edozie and Moses Khisa explore the myriad ways in which the continent’s diplomatic engagement and influence in the global arena has been expanding in recent decades. Focusing in particular on collective action through the institutional platform of the AU—while acknowledging the internal challenges involved—the authors show how Africa’s role as a dynamic world region is both shaping and being shaped by current trends in global development and geopolitics.}, publisher={Lynne Rienner Publishers}, author={Edozie, Rita Kiki and Khisa, Moses}, year={2022}, month={Jul} }
 @book{khisa_day_2022, place={Boulder, CO}, title={Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in Africa}, ISBN={9781955055468}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781955055468}, DOI={10.1515/9781955055468}, publisher={Lynne Rienner Publishers}, year={2022}, month={Apr} }
 @article{khisa_rwengabo_2022, title={The Deepening Politics of Fragmentation in Uganda: Understanding Violence in the Rwenzori Region}, volume={8}, ISSN={["1555-2462"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2022.80}, DOI={10.1017/asr.2022.80}, abstractNote={Abstract In November 2016, Uganda’s armed forces raided the Rwenzururu kingdom palace in Kasese Municipality, arresting and detaining the king and other kingdom officials on treason and other charges. This was the climax to a puzzling wave of violence that was then unfolding in the Rwenzori Region. We consider this violence an unintended consequence of the deepening politics of fragmentation, which takes two forms: “kingdomization” and “districtization.” Through fragmentation, Uganda’s ruling elites seek to weaken subnational concentrations of power, resources, and legitimacy wielded by otherwise coalesced, potentially strong, subnational authority structures and sociopolitical groups. Fragmentation fractures preexisting intra-regional unity, generates new conflicts, and reopens old wounds, leading to violent encounters at the sub-national level, between regional sub-groups, and with the central state. This unfolding of violent encounters involving both state and non-state actors has important ramifications for managing national security within socially fragile contexts and a politically fragmented polity.}, journal={AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW}, author={Khisa, Moses and Rwengabo, Sabastian}, year={2022}, month={Aug} }
 @article{khisa_2022, title={The Lord's Resistance Army: Violence and Peacemaking in Africa}, volume={53}, ISSN={["1530-9169"]}, DOI={10.1162/jinh_r_01828}, abstractNote={The Lord’s Resistance Army (lra) was and remains an enigmatic rebel group. Officially defeated and driven out of northern Uganda since about 2008, following failed peace talks brokered by the then semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS, before it became South Sudan), the lra and its long surviving commander Joseph Kony have remained at large in 2022. No longer in Uganda and posing almost no direct security threat, the lra nonetheless quickly assumed a regional presence, straddling South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic.The GoSS Vice-President, Riek Machar, initiated and spearheaded the peace negotiations, dubbed “Juba Talks,” conducted intermittently between 2006 and 2008. These peace talks were not the first between the lra and the government of Uganda, but they were certainly the most promising and protracted, at least on paper and in form. Despite the power struggles and squabbles between the participants, and the cleavages between the rebels and their ostensibly chosen delegation of negotiators, a series of preliminary and ground-setting agreements emerged, setting the stage for the rebels to move from Uganda and other locations in South Sudan to two designated assembly points.In the end, however, the Final Peace Agreement (fpa) never materialized; Kony snubbed several entreaties that he sign the agreement. Kony and four of his top commanders viewed their indictment by the International Criminal Court (icc) as a hindrance to negotiated peace. During the talks, the government of Uganda and its international allies, especially the United States, reserved the option of returning to a military solution. As the push to sign the fpa persisted, the lra continued to show its mistrust of the government of Uganda and its international allies, including the icc. The talks ended when the lra left designated assembly points and retreated into the Garamba forest of the DRC, and the Uganda military launched Operation Lightning Thunder, a series of airstrikes and ground offensives, against it.Did this development mean that the Juba Talks had failed? Why did Kony refuse to sign the fpa? How did the Juba Talks demonstrate the disjuncture between peace building as a technocratic exercise and the actual political processes and experiences around negotiations? How does a rebel group’s internal organization shape its approach to, and perception of, peace talks? Schomerus addresses these questions (and others) meticulously via a rare collection of original field material and firsthand information, combining theoretical rigor with empirical observation. The result is a comprehensive and compelling portrait of the Juba Talks carrying implications for peace building in Africa and elsewhere. Schomerus had unusual access not just to the deliberations in Juba, but also to lra rebels in the “bush.” The book draws from conversations with rebel fighters and fascinating encounters with the two top commanders, Kony and Vincent Otti, Kony’s then number two. The negotiations were still ongoing when Kony reportedly killed Otti, the face of the lra during the talks. Otti had made the rebel group known to the world through interviews and statements, including interactions with Schomerus.Schomerus shows that the lra’s internal fragmentation, the mistrust between the parties to the talks—borne of past experiences as well as Uganda’s checkered political history—and conflicting individual interests may have doomed the peace process from start. Yet the Juba Talks contributed to pacifying northern Uganda. At one point, the humanitarian crisis there was the worst in the world—masses of people condemned to an appalling life in internally displaced-peoples’ camps. The Ugandan military through Operation Iron Fist (ois) in the early 2000s uprooted the lra from their bases inside Southern Sudan, prompting the rebels to move into northern Uganda where they visited enormous brutality on locals. When militarily cornered, the lra often responded with mass abductions and killings of civilians. By the time of the Juba Talks, the lra had been strategically weakened, in part due to ois, but northern Uganda had suffered the worst violence in the two decades of the conflict after the rebels were pushed out of South Sudan. Thus, for all its failings, one of the most important successes of the Juba Talks was the removal of lra fighters from northern Uganda to the assembly points as part of the peace negotiations, marking the last major presence of the lra in northern Uganda.This book is arguably the most thorough, nuanced, and rigorous study of the lra as a rebel organization and of the Juba Talks. A few lapses and factual errors occur: For instance, Ruth Nankabirwa, then Minister of State for Defense, was not the spokesperson for the Uganda People’s Defense Force (updf) (93); Uganda’s Weekly Observer (now The Observer) was not a Kenyan newspaper (123); and connecting the Juba Talks to the governmental response to street protests in 2011 is far-fetched (269). Moreover, a perceptive reader might wonder how Schomerus, an independent scholar, managed to gain such deep and privileged access to the peace negotiations and to obtain multiple interviews with Kony and Otti, who were famously elusive and mysterious. Schomerus would have done well to clarify this matter upfront as both a methodological and an ethical matter, especially given that her relationship with them and the rebels oscillated between distrust and confidence.That said, the book’s rich and nuanced theoretical insights and the empirical ground that it covers makes it an invaluable reference for conflict studies and peace building in Africa and elsewhere. Its methodology and its close observation of processes and participants results in a uniquely appealing and elegant narrative.}, number={1}, journal={JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2022}, month={Jun}, pages={186–188} }
 @article{wilkins_vokes_khisa_2021, title={BRIEFING: CONTEXTUALIZING THE BOBI WINE FACTOR IN UGANDA'S 2021 ELECTIONS}, volume={120}, ISSN={["1468-2621"]}, DOI={10.1093/afraf/adab024}, abstractNote={A year out from the 2021 ugandan election, opposition supporters had a lot to worry about. After four straight presidential elections in which the non-incumbent vote was remarkably concentrated in the candidacy of Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), political developments were suggesting that this coalescence would not survive into the upcoming campaign season. At the centre of the FDC, Besigye’s long-time rival for the party nomination, Mugisha Muntu, finally concluded that his differences in approach with Besigye’s faction were too significant to be housed in one party, breaking off to form the Alliance for National Transformation with a few of his factional allies from the FDC.1 More significantly, however, the youthful and confrontational crowd that had been Besigye’s political base for years seemed to have a new champion: musician Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, better known by his stage name Bobi Wine, who entered Parliament in a by-election in 2017. In the subsequent years, Bobi Wine’s political profile rose via several high-profile confrontations with the authorities, and, as the election approached, his brand clearly rivalled Besigye’s to a greater degree than any opposition figure to date.}, number={481}, journal={AFRICAN AFFAIRS}, author={Wilkins, Sam and Vokes, Richard and Khisa, Moses}, year={2021}, month={Oct}, pages={629–643} }
 @article{khisa_2020, title={Legislative development in Africa: Politics and postcolonial legacies}, volume={58}, ISSN={["1743-9094"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2020.1824350}, DOI={10.1080/14662043.2020.1824350}, abstractNote={The predominant narrative in mainstream scholarship on African politics has a decidedly personalist outlook. The most ubiquitous and influential analytical framework for many decades was neopatrimo...}, number={4}, journal={COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2020}, month={Oct}, pages={527–530} }
 @article{khisa_2020, title={Politicisation and Professionalisation: The Progress and Perils of Civil-Military Transformation in Museveni's Uganda}, volume={22}, ISSN={["1743-968X"]}, DOI={10.1080/13698249.2020.1724727}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Problems of civil-military relations have been at the centre of recurring political crises in contemporary Africa. Routine military intrusion in politics characterised the first four decades of independent Africa. Citizens suffered at the hands of the armed forces, infamous for widespread human rights violations. One key response to this dual civil-military problem was to pursue a strategy of politicising the armed forces in order to make them a) subordinate to civilian authority and b) organically close to the public and protective than predatory. This also entailed the militarisation of politics ostensibly to bring the political class into closer conversation and collaboration with the military. To what extent did this strategy contribute to transforming civil-military relations? Taking the Ugandan case, this article argues that transformation was attained in making the military more respectful of citizens’ rights while simultaneously creating a fusion with the ruling class thereby subverting the very goal of professionalism.}, number={2-3}, journal={CIVIL WARS}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2020}, pages={289–312} }
 @article{khisa_day_2020, title={Reconceptualising Civil-Military Relations in Africa}, volume={22}, ISSN={["1743-968X"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2020.1753437}, DOI={10.1080/13698249.2020.1753437}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Relations between African militaries, civilian authority and the public have undergone significant transformation over the past decades. Much of previous scholarship on civil-military relations tended to approach the subject through the idiom of the coup. Analysts in the 1960s initially presented the military in positive terms as a modernising agent, a representation cast aside in the throes of coups d’état, instability and rights violations at the behest of armed forces. This article revisits the conceptual and theoretical terrain in light of recent socio-political changes and in the wake of the peak of military coups on the continent. In reconceptualising civil-military relations, this article proposes a typology that combines the nature of modal relations with civilian authority and relations with the civilian public. The article analyses the different models of relations, tracing the domestic reconfigurations and external influences that structure news ways of civil-military engagement.}, number={2-3}, journal={CIVIL WARS}, author={Khisa, Moses and Day, Christopher}, year={2020}, pages={174–197} }
 @article{day_khisa_reno_2020, title={Revisiting the Civil-Military Conundrum in Africa}, volume={22}, ISSN={["1743-968X"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2020.1736808}, DOI={10.1080/13698249.2020.1736808}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT The military is a central component of the state and society with implications for statehood and social stability. Since independence, Africa has grappled with contentious and contradictory roles of armed forces whether they be part of or against the state. Much of the early scholarship on the role of the military tended to paint a positive picture, presenting it as a critical pillar and an agent of modernisation for the newly independent states. This was to change drastically in the era of routine and rampant coups d’états and proliferation of organised rebel activities. But the continent has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. This introduction highlights some of the major changes at the centre of transformations in relations between African militaries and civilian authorities and the public. The overall focus of the introduction, and the entire special issue, is to reposition the theoretical and conceptual aperture for analysing civil-military relations in Africa.}, number={2-3}, journal={CIVIL WARS}, author={Day, Christopher and Khisa, Moses and Reno, William}, year={2020}, pages={156–173} }
 @inbook{khisa_2019, place={Cheltenham, UK}, title={Inclusive Co-optation and Political Corruption in Uganda}, booktitle={Political Corruption in Africa. Extraction and Power Preservation}, publisher={Edward Elgar Publishing}, author={Khisa, M.}, editor={Amundsen, I.Editor}, year={2019} }
 @inbook{asante_khisa_2019, place={Cheltenham/UK}, title={Political Corruption and the Limits of Anti-Corruption Activism in Ghana}, booktitle={Political Corruption in Africa. Extraction and Power Preservation}, publisher={Edward Elgar Publishing}, author={Asante, Kofi Takyi and Khisa, Moses}, editor={Amundsen, I.Editor}, year={2019} }
 @book{political corruption in africa: extraction and power preservation_2019, ISBN={["978-1-78897-251-2"]}, DOI={10.4337/9781788972529}, journal={POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: EXTRACTION AND POWER PRESERVATION}, year={2019}, pages={1–201} }
 @article{khisa_2019, title={Politics of exclusion and institutional transformation in Ethiopia}, volume={40}, ISSN={["1360-2241"]}, DOI={10.1080/01436597.2018.1556564}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Ethiopia experienced a critical juncture in 1991 with the defeat of the military dictatorship, opening up the possibilities of a new political order. Since then the country underwent social engineering and institutional transformation emerging as a leading reformist state under hegemonic-party rule with high institutional state capacity but also a concentration, and even personalisation, of decision-making power. This approximates to a path of ‘authoritarian institutionalisation’. This article argues that Ethiopia’s institutional trajectory can be explained by the nature of coalition politics in the formative years of transition, specifically the extent to which credible challengers were excluded from transitional processes. The strategy of excluding Pan-Ethiopian parties and sideling the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) set the country on the path of establishing a hegemonic rule by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Sustaining hegemonic rule entailed fending off threats from excluded groups in the 1990s but which coalesced into a strong electoral performance in the 2005 elections in whose aftermath the ruling party embarked on aggressive pursuit of state-directed development for political legitimation.}, number={3}, journal={THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2019}, month={Mar}, pages={542–557} }
 @article{khisa_2019, title={Shrinking democratic space? Crisis of consensus and contentious politics in Uganda}, volume={57}, ISSN={["1743-9094"]}, DOI={10.1080/14662043.2019.1576277}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Previously considered a reforming and promising African country, economically and politically, Uganda has in recent years suffered substantial shrinkage of democratic space. This article argues that two factors have been crucial: the gradual breakdown of minimum political consensus forged under a ‘broad-based’ government which climaxed in a relatively progressive constitution in 1995 and, second, the security imperative accentuated by the war on terror. These two are compounded by the exigencies of incumbent president Museveni’s determination to rule for life, the result being erosion of basic democratic institutions, securitisation of politics, criminalisation of political competition and upsurge in contentious politics.}, number={3}, journal={COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2019}, pages={343–362} }
 @article{khisa_2019, title={Whose Africa is Rising?}, volume={46}, ISSN={["1740-1720"]}, DOI={10.1080/03056244.2019.1605589}, abstractNote={SUMMARY This briefing revisits the ‘Africa rising’ narrative. It makes two arguments. First, the ‘Africa rising’ narrative at best sits on a shaky foundation. African economies may have registered modest growth in recent years but the growth is either superficial or not happening in the sectors that matter the most. Second, the rather rosy picture of a rising Africa masks the continent’s continued marginal position in the global capitalist structures of power, domination and exploitation.}, number={160}, journal={Review of African Political Economy}, author={Khisa, M.}, year={2019}, month={Jun}, pages={304–316} }
 @inbook{khisa_rwengabo_2017, place={Trenton, NJ}, title={Beyond legal reform in understanding opposition underperformance}, booktitle={Controlling Consent: Uganda's 2016 election}, publisher={Africa World Press}, author={Khisa, Moses and Rwengabo, Sabastiano}, editor={Oloka-Onyango, J. and Ahikire, J.Editors}, year={2017} }
 @article{khisa_2016, title={Managing elite defection in Museveni’s Uganda: the 2016 elections in perspective}, volume={10}, ISSN={1753-1055 1753-1063}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2016.1272288}, DOI={10.1080/17531055.2016.1272288}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Like other semi-authoritarian leaders, Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni faced constant threats of elite defections during successive general elections since 1996. Except in 2011 when he lured prominent opposition members to his ruling party, Museveni faced defections on the eve of four out of the five general elections during his rule: in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2016. The 2015 defection of former Prime Minister Amama Mbabazi was billed as Museveni’s toughest challenge ever. However, Museveni successfully countered this threat with ministerial appointments, cash handouts along with targeted use of state coercive apparatus, chiefly the police, thus stopping Mbabazi from taking many National Resistance Movement (NRM) party elites into his camp to mount a serious electoral challenge. This article situates Mbabazi’s defection, and his poor performance at the polls going by the official election results, in the context of previous episodes of elite defections. The article argues that defections have been avoided and mitigated by a triple-strategy of elite inclusion, deterrence and the maintenance of various networks that constrain potential defectors. By documenting this theory with examples from previous and the 2016 elections, the article concludes that Mbabazi’s poor showing in the February 2016 election was predictable, in spite of his clout as heretofore the second most powerful figure in NRM and Museveni’s heir apparent.}, number={4}, journal={Journal of Eastern African Studies}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2016}, month={Oct}, pages={729–748} }
 @article{khisa_2015, title={Political Uncertainty and Its Impact on Service Delivery in Uganda}, volume={40}, number={4}, journal={Africa Development / Afrique et Développement}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2015}, pages={159–188} }
 @article{khisa_2014, title={Challenges to Policy Implementation in Uganda: Reflections on Politics and the State}, volume={8}, number={1}, journal={The Ugandan Journal of Management and Public Policy Studies}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2014}, month={Sep}, pages={35–51} }
 @article{khisa_2013, title={The Making of the 'Informal State' in Uganda}, volume={38}, number={1-2}, journal={Africa Development / Afrique et Développement}, author={Khisa, Moses}, year={2013}, pages={191–226} }