@article{abashidze_clark_hammond_ritter_vanderweide_2021, title={Annuity pricing in public pension plans: importance of interest rates}, volume={20}, ISSN={["1475-3022"]}, DOI={10.1017/S1474747219000271}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={1}, journal={JOURNAL OF PENSION ECONOMICS & FINANCE}, author={Abashidze, Nino and Clark, Robert L. and Hammond, Robert G. and Ritter, Beth M. and Vanderweide, David}, year={2021}, month={Jan}, pages={27–48} }
 @article{dur_hammond_kesten_2021, title={Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab}, volume={198}, ISSN={["1095-7235"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.jet.2021.105344}, abstractNote={We analyze sequential preference submission in centralized matching problems. Our motivation comes from school districts and colleges that use an application website where students submit their preferences over schools sequentially, after learning information about previous submissions. Comparing the widely used Boston Mechanism (BM) to the celebrated Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism, we show that a sequential implementation of BM can achieve superior equilibrium outcomes relative to the student-optimal stable matching. Our empirical tests use data from the field and from a laboratory experiment. We find that sequential preference submission may allow students to overcome the coordination problem in school choice. Our findings may have important policy implications in numerous places across the world where BM is currently in use.}, journal={JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY}, author={Dur, Umut and Hammond, Robert G. and Kesten, Onur}, year={2021}, month={Dec} }
 @article{clark_hammond_liu_2021, title={Work after retirement: worklife transitions of career public employees}, volume={20}, ISSN={["1475-3022"]}, DOI={10.1017/S1474747219000428}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF PENSION ECONOMICS & FINANCE}, author={Clark, Robert L. and Hammond, Robert G. and Liu, Siyan}, year={2021}, month={Jul}, pages={341–356} }
 @article{zeytoon nejad moosavian_hammond_goodwin_2020, title={Risk aversion over price variability: experimental evidence}, volume={27}, ISSN={["1466-4291"]}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2020.1717426}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Eliciting risk attitudes is of crucial importance in economics. We test whether the degree of risk aversion that an individual exhibits in the context of the direct utility function is equivalent to that elicited in the context of the indirect utility function, as implied by duality theory. Our lab experiment uses payoff-based lottery choices (which are based on the direct utility function) and equivalent price-based lottery choices (which are based on the indirect utility function). We reject the equivalence of risk preferences from these two contexts. Subjects are more sensitive to price uncertainty than to equivalent payoff uncertainty.}, number={21}, journal={APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS}, author={Zeytoon Nejad Moosavian, Seyyed Ali and Hammond, Robert and Goodwin, Barry K.}, year={2020}, month={Dec}, pages={1739–1745} }
 @article{hammond_liu_lu_riyanto_2019, title={ENHANCING EFFORT SUPPLY WITH PRIZE-AUGMENTING ENTRY FEES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS}, volume={60}, ISSN={["1468-2354"]}, DOI={10.1111/iere.12379}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={3}, journal={INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW}, author={Hammond, Robert G. and Liu, Bin and Lu, Jingfeng and Riyanto, Yohanes E.}, year={2019}, month={Aug}, pages={1063–1096} }
 @article{clark_hammond_morrill_khalaf_2019, title={INFORMING RETIREMENT SAVINGS DECISIONS: A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON SUPPLEMENTAL PLANS}, volume={57}, ISSN={["1465-7295"]}, DOI={10.1111/ecin.12731}, abstractNote={Although supplemental saving plans can be an important part of an individual's financial security in retirement, contribution rates remain low, particularly among those with lower salaries and less education. We report findings from an intervention that provided information on key aspects of the employer‐provided supplemental saving plans to older public employees in North Carolina. Among workers participating in a supplemental plan, individuals who received an informational flyer increased their contributions in the months following the intervention relative to the control group. In contrast, individuals who were not enrolled in a retirement saving plan were not moved to begin contributing to a supplemental plan. The results suggest that informational interventions can induce workers who are already engaged in the saving process to reassess their level of retirement preparedness. (JEL C93, D14, D9)}, number={1}, journal={ECONOMIC INQUIRY}, author={Clark, Robert L. and Hammond, Robert G. and Morrill, Melinda S. and Khalaf, Christelle}, year={2019}, month={Jan}, pages={188–205} }
 @article{clark_hammond_vanderweide_2019, title={Navigating complex financial decisions at retirement: evidence from annuity choices in public sector pensions}, volume={18}, ISSN={["1475-3022"]}, DOI={10.1017/S1474747218000410}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF PENSION ECONOMICS & FINANCE}, author={Clark, Robert L. and Hammond, Robert G. and Vanderweide, David}, year={2019}, month={Oct}, pages={594–611} }
 @article{clark_hammond_khalaf_2019, title={Planning for Retirement? The Importance of Time Preferences}, volume={40}, ISSN={["1936-4768"]}, DOI={10.1007/s12122-019-09287-y}, abstractNote={Ensuring retirement income security is a priority for individuals, employers, and policymakers. To achieve this, employers and policymakers sponsor and subsidize retirement saving plans and provide educational interventions. The effectiveness of these tools will depend on individuals’ interest and willingness to engage in planning and preparing for retirement. Using merged administrative and survey data for public sector workers in North Carolina, we find that individuals who more heavily discount the future are less likely to plan and save for retirement. Further, retirement planning behavior is measured both subjectively and objectively, and time preferences have an association with subjectively measured retirement planning but not with objectively measured retirement planning. Finally, individuals’ retirement timing is associated with time preferences but only among individuals with a retirement plan. In total, our results highlight the important role of time preferences in determining retirement planning and preparedness.}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF LABOR RESEARCH}, author={Clark, Robert L. and Hammond, Robert G. and Khalaf, Christelle}, year={2019}, month={Jun}, pages={127–150} }
 @article{dur_hammond_morrill_2019, title={The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments}, volume={22}, ISSN={["1573-6938"]}, DOI={10.1007/s10683-018-9594-z}, number={4}, journal={EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS}, author={Dur, Umut and Hammond, Robert G. and Morrill, Thayer}, year={2019}, month={Dec}, pages={918–953} }
 @article{farajallah_hammond_penard_2019, title={What drives pricing behavior in Peer-to-Peer markets? Evidence from the carsharing platform BlaBlaCar}, volume={48}, ISSN={["1873-5975"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.infoecopol.2019.01.002}, abstractNote={We examine how price and demand are determined on peer-to-peer platforms and whether experience and reputation have the same impact as in traditional markets. We use data from the world's leading intercity carsharing platform, BlaBlaCar, which connects drivers with empty seats to riders. We find that pricing decisions evolve as drivers gain experience with the platform. More-experienced drivers set lower prices and, controlling for price, sell more seats. Our interpretation is that more-experienced drivers on BlaBlaCar learn to lower their prices as they gain experience; accordingly, more-experienced drivers earn more revenue per trip. In total, our results suggest that peer-to-peer markets such as BlaBlaCar share some characteristics with other types of peer-to-peer markets such as eBay but remain a unique and rich setting in which there are many new insights to be gained.}, journal={INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY}, author={Farajallah, Mehdi and Hammond, Robert G. and Penard, Thierry}, year={2019}, month={Sep}, pages={15–31} }
 @article{dur_hammond_morrill_2018, title={Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms}, volume={10}, ISSN={["1945-774X"]}, DOI={10.1257/pol.20160132}, abstractNote={ An important but under-explored issue in student assignment procedures is heterogeneity in the level of strategic sophistication among students. Our work provides the first direct measure of which students rank schools following their true preference order (sincere students) and which rank schools by manipulating their true preferences (sophisticated students). We present evidence that our proxy for sophistication captures systematic differences among students. Our results demonstrate that sophisticated students are 9.6 percentage points more likely to be assigned to one of their preferred schools. Further, we show that this large difference in assignment probability occurs because sophisticated students systematically avoid over-demanded schools. (JEL D82, H75, I21, I28) }, number={1}, journal={AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY}, author={Dur, Umut and Hammond, Robert G. and Morrill, Thayer}, year={2018}, month={Feb}, pages={187–213} }
 @article{hammond_morrill_2016, title={Personality traits and bidding behavior in competing auctions}, volume={57}, ISSN={["1872-7719"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.joep.2016.08.005}, abstractNote={We study strategic behavior in an “alternating recognition” model of English auctions with competing sellers, which mimics a structure that is common in online marketplaces such as eBay. To relate decision making in our experimental setting to individual differences, we measure subjects’ personality with the Big-Five Trait Taxonomy. Our results suggest that personality has meaningful predictive power in explaining bidding behavior but only for female subjects. Further, females also earn more than males and the gender gap in earnings is large and significant. Finally, personality indirectly affects earnings through the choice of strategies but has no direct effect on earnings, controlling for strategies. This is an important result in that it demonstrates the mechanism through which personality matters in our setting.}, journal={JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY}, author={Hammond, Robert G. and Morrill, Thayer}, year={2016}, month={Dec}, pages={39–55} }
 @article{hammond_2014, title={Profit Leak? Pre-Release File Sharing and the Music Industry}, volume={81}, ISSN={["2325-8012"]}, DOI={10.4284/0038-4038-2013.059}, abstractNote={Using data from an exclusive file‐sharing Web site that allows users to share music files using the BitTorrent protocol, I exploit exogenous variation in the availability of sound recordings in file‐sharing networks to isolate the causal effect of file sharing of an album on its sales. Using within‐album variation in illegal downloads and sales, I find that the effect is essentially zero: The elasticity of sales with respect to illegal downloads is one‐tenth of one percentage point. However, the finding that file sharing is not harmful to individual artists is not inconsistent with the well‐documented fact that file sharing is harmful to the music industry (the fallacy of composition). More important, I find that file sharing benefits more established and popular artists who are signed to major labels, which is consistent with recent industry trends.}, number={2}, journal={SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL}, author={Hammond, Robert G.}, year={2014}, month={Oct}, pages={387–408} }
 @article{hammond_morrill_2014, title={STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST-VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS}, volume={52}, ISSN={["1465-7295"]}, DOI={10.1111/ecin.12078}, abstractNote={By restricting bidders to be qualified dealers, wholesale automobile auctions exclude the bidders who place the highest value on the vehicles: consumers. This article provides an explanation for this puzzling entry restriction by modeling the inventory‐management decisions of a firm. If an automobile dealer has more vehicles in inventory than is optimal, it cannot reduce its inventory by selling directly to consumers without impacting the demand for the automobiles that remain. However, if the dealer sells his/her excess inventory to a competitor, the demand for his/her remaining vehicles increases as the competitor responds by acquiring fewer additional vehicles. We demonstrate that for any market demand function and any cost of the competitor acquiring additional vehicles, a dealer with excess inventory does better by selling a subset of its vehicles to a competitor rather than directly to consumers. We discuss the market for wholesale automobiles in relation to other markets where goods are also auctioned but where entry is not restricted to qualified dealers. Doing so allows us to compare our inventory‐management explanation to common explanations provided by industry practitioners. We find that intuitive alternative stories do not consistently explain practices across markets. (JEL D44, L11, L62)}, number={3}, journal={ECONOMIC INQUIRY}, author={Hammond, Robert G. and Morrill, Thayer}, year={2014}, month={Jul}, pages={1219–1230} }
 @article{hammond_2013, title={A structural model of competing sellers: Auctions and posted prices}, volume={60}, ISSN={["1873-572X"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.01.009}, abstractNote={In an original data set of goods listed for sale online, I observe that both auctions and posted prices are popular with buyers and sellers in the compact-disc market. To explain why these two mechanisms coexist, I estimate a structural model of competing sellers who differ in the value of their outside options. Buyers are allowed to value auctioned and posted-price goods differently but the estimated value distributions suggest that differences across buyers do not explain the mechanism coexistence that I observe. In contrast, differences across sellers' outside options are important: the value of the outside option segments the market with high outside-option sellers choosing to post a fixed price. There are two key forces at work that drive this empirical result. First, competition between sellers favors coexistence over an auction-only or a posted-price-only marketplace because sellers prefer to be in a market with fewer rivals. Second, sellers with more valuable outside options prefer the posted-price mechanism because posted-price goods sell less often than auctioned goods but at a higher price. As a result, a larger outside option reduces the loss from not selling and favors the posted-price mechanism.}, journal={EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW}, author={Hammond, Robert G.}, year={2013}, month={May}, pages={52–68} }
 @article{hammond_zheng_2013, title={Heterogeneity in tournaments with incomplete information: An experimental analysis}, volume={31}, DOI={10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.11.005}, abstractNote={We focus on the relationship between a player's effort provision and tournament heterogeneity in a setting where players only know the distribution of their opponents' abilities. By isolating whether increases in heterogeneity influence optimal effort provision in cardinal, ordinal, and piece rate tournaments, we show that a model in which ability and effort are complements can be empirically distinguished from a model in which ability and effort are neither complements nor substitutes. To discriminate between the two models, we conduct a laboratory experiment where subjects participate in a real effort task and are paid based on performance relative to a group of opponents that may be relatively homogeneous or relatively heterogeneous. In these laboratory data, the level of effort provision is independent of tournament heterogeneity, lending support to the model in which ability and effort are neither complements nor substitutes.}, number={3}, journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization}, author={Hammond, R. G. and Zheng, X. Y.}, year={2013}, pages={248–260} }
 @article{craig_hammond_2013, title={Nutrition and signaling in slave markets: a new look at a puzzle within the antebellum puzzle}, volume={7}, ISSN={["1863-2505"]}, DOI={10.1007/s11698-012-0086-7}, number={2}, journal={CLIOMETRICA}, author={Craig, Lee A. and Hammond, Robert G.}, year={2013}, month={May}, pages={189–206} }
 @article{hammond_2013, title={Quantifying Consumer Perception of a Financially Distressed Company}, volume={31}, ISSN={["1537-2707"]}, DOI={10.1080/07350015.2013.799998}, abstractNote={To measure how consumers respond to negative information about the financial health of a durable-goods producer, I use the prices at which vehicles sell in secondary markets to quantify consumer perception of the Chrysler Corporation during the period surrounding the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act of 1979. I focus on Chrysler’s July 31, 1979 announcement of financial distress and request for assistance from the U.S. government. The trend in the prices of used Chrysler vehicles relative to those of its American competitors provides strong support for the claim that consumers reduce their willingness to pay for the goods of a financially distressed company.}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & ECONOMIC STATISTICS}, author={Hammond, Robert G.}, year={2013}, month={Oct}, pages={398–411} }
 @article{hammond_2013, title={SUDDEN UNINTENDED USED-PRICE DECELERATION? THE 2009-2010 TOYOTA RECALLS}, volume={22}, ISSN={["1530-9134"]}, DOI={10.1111/jems.12001}, abstractNote={Using data from the vehicle resale market, I test consumer responsiveness to large‐scale product recalls that are caused by safety problems. The used‐vehicle prices of Toyotas are compared to the used‐vehicle prices of the other major domestic and foreign manufacturers. The results quantify the losses suffered by Toyota vehicle owners in secondary markets due to the 2009–2010 safety recalls of more than 9 million Toyota Motors vehicles. The treatment effect of a recall is measured using panel data with a difference‐in‐differences estimation approach that allows for time‐varying treatment effects and serial correlation. I find that this recall episode had negative effects in the resale market for automobiles that were quantitatively small (less than 2% of the vehicle’s resale value), statistically indistinguishable from zero, and short lived (did not persist beyond December 2009). A comparison with Audi’s recalls in the 1980s of vehicles with sudden unintended acceleration suggests that the extent to which a company’s reputation is established is more important than whether or not a company has a reputation for producing high‐quality products.}, number={1}, journal={JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY}, author={Hammond, Robert G.}, year={2013}, pages={78–100} }
 @article{hammond_2011, title={Auctioning to buyers with correlated values}, volume={18}, ISSN={["1350-4851"]}, DOI={10.1080/13504851003724275}, abstractNote={In a laboratory setting, a monopolistic auctioneer sells to buyers as the level and nature of demand changes. I ask whether sellers correctly recognize the role played by correlation among buyers' values. The prices set by subjects closely match the risk-neutral benchmark predictions when demand follows the independent-private-values framework. In contrast, subjects fail to correctly account for correlation among buyers' values once the independence assumption is dropped. I offer two new models of pricing in a correlated-values environment. The model that suggests sellers ignore correlation outperforms both the benchmark and the model that suggests sellers incorrectly account for correlation.}, number={5}, journal={APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS}, author={Hammond, Robert G.}, year={2011}, pages={405–409} }
 @article{hammond_2010, title={Comparing revenue from auctions and posted prices}, volume={28}, ISSN={["0167-7187"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.06.002}, abstractNote={I analyze the market for compact discs using an original data set of items listed for sale online. Over 5000 listings of both new and used compact discs were collected from eBay (which provides sellers a choice between two mechanisms: auction or posted price) and its subsidiary, Half.com (which features only posted prices). Despite the often cited revenue-dominance property of auctions, many sellers choose to post a fixed price. To explain this anomaly, I examine empirically the determinants of the revenue earned by sellers in this market. I find that posted-price goods sell for higher prices, while auctioned goods sell with a higher probability. Further results suggest that the size of a seller's inventory is the key factor in the choice between selling in an auction and posting a fixed price. In particular, sellers with large inventories are more likely to use the posted-price mechanism.}, number={1}, journal={INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION}, author={Hammond, Robert G.}, year={2010}, month={Jan}, pages={1–9} }