@misc{reardon_2019, title={Article Review 122 on “The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters.”}, url={https://issforum.org/articlereviews/122-measuring}, journal={H-Diplo RJISSF}, author={Reardon, R.}, editor={Beckley, MichaelEditor}, year={2019}, month={Jul} }
 @article{avey_markowitz_reardon_2018, title={Do US Troop Withdrawals Cause Instability? Evidence from Two Exogenous Shocks on the Korean Peninsula}, volume={3}, ISSN={["2057-3189"]}, DOI={10.1093/jogss/ogx020}, abstractNote={Does withdrawing forward-deployed U.S. troops increase instability? This question is at the heart of current grand strategy debates, yet endogeneity issues make this very difficult to answer. Put simply, stability may cause the United States to withdraw forces and lead one to incorrectly infer that withdrawals do not lead to greater instability. We suggest a research design to help alleviate this endogeneity problem. By utilizing exogenous crises that cause U.S. troops to "redeploy" out of South Korea, we are able to estimate the causal effect of a withdrawal of U.S. troops on the probability of instability. We examine several exogenous crises after the end of the Korean War that force U.S. policymakers to rapidly redeploy U.S. forces out of South Korea. We then examine the rate of conflict between South Korea and North Korea, and the United States and North Korea. We find that U.S. troop withdrawals do not cause greater conflict but withdrawals are at times associated with other behaviors, such as conventional arming, nuclear proliferation, and diplomatic initiatives that could affect the future likelihood of war.}, number={1}, journal={JOURNAL OF GLOBAL SECURITY STUDIES}, author={Avey, Paul C. and Markowitz, Jonathan N. and Reardon, Robert J.}, year={2018}, month={Jan}, pages={72–92} }
 @article{reardon_2017, title={Threat inflation and the Iranian nuclear program}, volume={24}, ISSN={["2214-6326"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.016}, abstractNote={Abstract Much of the debate over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program reached in 2015 between the P5 + 1 and Iran–has centered on whether the limits the plan imposes on Iran's nuclear program are sufficient to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear “breakout” in a year or less. However, “breakout time” is misleading: it involves implausible worst-case assumptions and ignores important factors influencing Iran's nuclear path. It also overlooks important elements of the agreement such as safeguards and transparency measures that likely do the most to prevent Iran from getting a weapon. Why, then has breakout time occupied such a central position in the debate? This paper argues this case is an example of how the over-reliance on technical threat estimates biases policy debates. Technical assessments are critical to understanding threats, but when removed from the political and strategic context can fuel worst-case estimates. Moreover,they create an illusion of precision and certainty that leads policy makers and the public to overlook important areas of uncertainty and factors that can impact policy outcomes that are difficult to measure or are not easily quantified.}, journal={ENERGY RESEARCH & SOCIAL SCIENCE}, author={Reardon, Robert J.}, year={2017}, month={Feb}, pages={36–41} }
 @inproceedings{reardon_mattingly_2016, title={What Is the Strategic Utility of Reactor-Grade Plutonium?}, booktitle={American Nuclear Society, Advances in Nuclear Nonproliferation Technology & Policy Conference}, author={Reardon, R. and Mattingly, J.}, year={2016} }
 @book{reardon_orletsky_henry_molander_ratner_peterson_dogo_hart_saum-manning_2015, place={Santa Monica, CA}, title={Confronting Emergent Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries: Prospects for Neutralization, Strategies for Escalation Management, with Forrest Morgan}, institution={RAND Corporation}, author={Reardon, Robert and Orletsky, David and Henry, Ryan and Molander, Roger and Ratner, Ely and Peterson, Heather and Dogo, Harun and Hart, Jessica and Saum-Manning, Lisa}, year={2015} }
 @inbook{improving u.s.-iran relations and overcoming perceptual biases_2014, ISBN={9781623569273 9781623569365 9781623565350 9781623568429 9781501302336}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781501302336.ch-008}, DOI={10.5040/9781501302336.ch-008}, booktitle={U.S.-Iran Misperceptions: A Dialogue}, publisher={Bloomsbury Academic}, year={2014}, month={Oct} }
 @inbook{reardon_2014, title={Russia, Iran, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime}, ISBN={9780820347882 0820347884 9780820347295}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1757554.12}, DOI={10.2307/j.ctt1757554.12}, booktitle={State Behavior and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime}, publisher={University of Georgia Press}, author={Reardon, Robert J.}, year={2014}, month={Oct}, pages={190–217} }
 @article{fikenscher_reardon_2014, title={The Fool's Errand for a Perfect Deal with Iran}, volume={37}, ISSN={["1530-9177"]}, DOI={10.1080/0163660x.2014.978436}, abstractNote={After months of optimistic statements from negotiators, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and Iran still have not achieved a comprehensive agreement to resolve the nuclear dispute. However, the interim Joint Plan of Action (JPA) is—at this writing— still in force and both sides maintain that a comprehensive deal remains within}, number={3}, journal={WASHINGTON QUARTERLY}, author={Fikenscher, Sven-Eric and Reardon, Robert J.}, year={2014}, month={Jul}, pages={61–75} }
 @article{fikenscher_reardon_2014, title={Why There Won’t Be a Nuclear Grand Bargain with Iran}, journal={The National Interest}, author={Fikenscher, Sven-Erik and Reardon, Robert}, year={2014}, month={Jul} }
 @inproceedings{reardon_2013, place={Lanham, MD}, title={Containing Iran: Why the Taboo Policies of Engagement and Containment Are the Right Ones}, ISBN={9781442225077}, booktitle={Project on Nuclear Issues: A Collection of Papers from the 2012 Conference Series}, publisher={Center for Strategic & International Studies / Rowman and Littlefield}, author={Reardon, Robert}, editor={Spies, Stephanie and Weiner, SarahEditors}, year={2013}, month={Jun}, pages={107–119} }
 @inbook{reardon_2013, place={Seattle, WA}, series={Strategic Asia}, title={Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Motivations, Trajectory, and Global Implications}, ISBN={9781939131287}, booktitle={Asia in the Second Nuclear Age}, publisher={National Bureau of Asian Research}, author={Reardon, Robert}, editor={Tellis, Ashley and Denmark, Abraham and Tanner, TravisEditors}, year={2013}, pages={201–232}, collection={Strategic Asia} }
 @article{pillar_reardon_sebenius_singh_2013, title={Nuclear Negotiations with Iran}, volume={38}, ISSN={0162-2889 1531-4804}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_c_00130}, DOI={10.1162/isec_c_00130}, abstractNote={James Sebenius and Michael Singh are to be commended for advocating rigor in the analysis of international negotiations such as the one involving Iran’s nuclear program.1 Although they describe their offering as a neutral framework for analyzing any negotiation, they are not at all neutral regarding the negotiations with Iran; and they present conclusions that derive directly from speciac substantive assumptions, especially about Iranian objectives. The authors repeatedly describe their assumptions as “mainstream,” implying that they are uncontroversial and that any differing ones are too extreme to be worth considering. For an assumption to reside within the mainstream of popular and political discourse about Iran, however, does not make it correct. Sebenius and Singh do something similar with assumptions about U.S. interests, while sliding silently between the descriptive and the prescriptive in a way that fails to contrast actual policies with possible ones that would be consistent with those interests. Many readers’ principal takeaway from their article will be that a zone of possible agreement probably did not exist as of the time of their writing and probably will not exist unless the United States takes steps toward going to war with Iran. That answer, however, given the questionable assumptions on which it is based, is very likely wrong.}, number={1}, journal={International Security}, publisher={MIT Press - Journals}, author={Pillar, Paul R. and Reardon, Robert and Sebenius, James K. and Singh, Michael K.}, year={2013}, month={Jul}, pages={174–192} }
 @book{reardon_2012, place={Santa Monica, Calif}, title={Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge}, ISBN={9780833076311}, publisher={RAND Corporation}, author={Reardon, Robert}, year={2012} }