@article{endicott_2024, title={Inner speech and the body error theory}, volume={15}, ISSN={["1664-1078"]}, DOI={10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1360699}, abstractNote={Inner speech is commonly understood as the conscious experience of a voice within the mind. One recurrent theme in the scientific literature is that the phenomenon involves a representation of overt speech, for example, a representation of phonetic properties that result from a copy of speech instructions that were ultimately suppressed. I propose a larger picture that involves some embodied objects and their misperception. I call it "the Body Error Theory," or BET for short. BET is a form of illusionism, but the particular version I favor is a cross-modal illusion. Newly described here, my hypothesis is that the experience of inner speech arises from a mix of interoception and audition. Specifically, there is the detection of slight but well-confirmed activities in the speech musculature that occur during inner speech, which helps to transform representations of normal but quiet nonverbal sounds that inevitably occur during inner speech, from breathing to background noise, into a mistaken perception of inner speech. Simply put, activities in the speech musculature mix with sounds to create the appearance of speech sounds, which thus explains the "voice within the mind." I also show how BET's cross-modal system fits with standard information processing accounts for speech monitoring and how it accommodates the central insights of leading theories of inner speech. In addition, I show how BET is supported by data from experience-sampling surveys and how it can be empirically tested against its rivals.}, journal={FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY}, author={Endicott, Ronald P.}, year={2024}, month={Mar} }
 @misc{endicott_2017, title={The counter-revolution over multiple realization}, volume={26}, ISSN={0815-0796 1467-9981}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/S11016-017-0202-1}, DOI={10.1007/S11016-017-0202-1}, number={2}, journal={Metascience}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Endicott, Ronald}, year={2017}, month={May}, pages={229–232} }
 @article{endicott_2016, title={Developing the explanatory dimensions of part-whole realization}, volume={173}, ISSN={["1573-0883"]}, DOI={10.1007/s11098-016-0674-7}, abstractNote={I use Carl Gillett’s much heralded dimensioned theory of realization as a platform to develop a plausible part–whole theory. I begin with some basic desiderata for a theory of realization that its key terms should be defined and that it should be explanatory. I then argue that Gillett’s original theory violates these conditions because its explanatory force rests upon an unspecified “in virtue of” relation. I then examine Gillett’s later version that appeals instead to theoretical terms tied to “mechanisms.” Yet I argue that it too violates the desiderata, since it defines realization for mechanisms in terms of two undefined ideas whose explanatory credentials have not been established—“implementation” and “grounds.” Thus I drop those ideas in favor of an explicit constraint that the parts and properties provide a mechanistic explanation. I also distinguish a special mechanistic theory from a preferred general theory that incorporates other kinds of part–whole explanations that target causal powers or capacities. The result is a theory that has the explanatory virtues of mechanistic theories as well as a broader scope desired by Gillett. I also compare the result to a similar idea from Robert Cummins that has been neglected in recent discussions of realization, namely, his general property analysis rather than his functional analysis. Finally, I defend the preferred general theory against possible objections that attempt to show a conflict between metaphysical demands on a theory of realization versus facts about good scientific explanation.}, number={12}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES}, author={Endicott, Ronald}, year={2016}, month={Dec}, pages={3347–3368} }
 @article{endicott_2016, title={Functionalism, superduperfunctionalism, and physicalism: lessons from supervenience}, volume={193}, ISSN={["1573-0964"]}, DOI={10.1007/s11229-015-0839-5}, abstractNote={Philosophers almost universally believe that concepts of supervenience fail to satisfy the standards for physicalism because they offer mere property correlations that are left unexplained. They are thus compatible with non-physicalist accounts of those relations. Moreover, many philosophers not only prefer some kind of functional-role theory as a physically acceptable account of mind-body and other inter-level relations, but they use it as a form of “superdupervenience” to explain supervenience in a physically acceptable way. But I reject a central part of this common narrative. I argue that functional-role theories fail by the same standards for physicalism because they merely state without explaining how a physical property plays or occupies a functional role. They are thus compatible with non-physicalist accounts of that role-occupying relation. I also argue that one cannot redeploy functional-role theory at a deeper level to explain role occupation, specifically by iterating the role-occupant scheme. Instead, one must use part-whole structural and mechanistic explanations that differ from functional-role theory in important ways. These explanations represent a form of “superduperfunctionalism” that stand to functional-role theory as concepts of superdupervenience stand to concepts of supervenience.}, number={7}, journal={SYNTHESE}, author={Endicott, Ronald}, year={2016}, month={Jul}, pages={2205–2235} }
 @article{endicott_2012, title={Resolving arguments by different conceptual traditions of realization}, volume={159}, ISSN={["0031-8116"]}, DOI={10.1007/s11098-010-9686-x}, abstractNote={There is currently a significant amount of interest in understanding and developing theories of realization. Naturally arguments have arisen about the adequacy of some theories over others. Many of these arguments have a point. But some can be resolved by seeing that the theories of realization in question fall under different conceptual traditions with different but compatible goals. The arguments I will discuss fit a general pattern. A philosopher argues that one theory of realization is better than another because it provides a better explanation for a particular range of phenomena, say, accounting for common sense cases, or cases within the sciences, when in fact the theories in question are not genuine competitors. I will first describe three different conceptual traditions that are implicated by the arguments under discussion. I will then examine the arguments, from an older complaint by Norman Malcolm against a familiar functional theory to a recent argument by Thomas Polger against an assortment of theories that traffic in inherited causal powers, showing how they can be resolved by situating the theories under their respective conceptual traditions.}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES}, author={Endicott, Ronald}, year={2012}, month={May}, pages={41–59} }
 @article{endicott_2011, title={FLAT VERSUS DIMENSIONED: THE WHAT AND THE HOW OF FUNCTIONAL REALIZATION}, volume={36}, ISSN={["2153-7984"]}, DOI={10.5840/jpr_2011_13}, abstractNote={I resolve an argument over “flat” versus “dimensioned” theories of realization. The theories concern, in part, whether realized and realizing properties are instantiated by the same individual (the flat theory) or different individuals in a partwhole relationship (the dimensioned theory). Carl Gillett has argued that the two views conflict, and that flat theories should be rejected on grounds that they fail to capture scientific cases involving a dimensioned relation between individuals and their constituent parts. I argue on the contrary that the two types of theory complement one another, even on the same range of scientific cases. I illustrate the point with two popular functionalist versions of flat and dimensioned positions – causal-role functionalism and a functional analysis by decomposition – that combine into a larger picture I call “comprehensive functional realization.” I also respond to some possible objections to this synthesis of functionalist views.}, journal={JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH}, author={Endicott, Ronald P.}, year={2011}, pages={191–208} }
 @article{endicott_2010, title={COMMENTS AND CRITICISM. REALIZATION, REDUCTIOS, AND CATEGORY INCLUSION}, volume={107}, ISSN={["1939-8549"]}, DOI={10.5840/jphil2010107416}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Endicott, Ronald P.}, year={2010}, month={Apr}, pages={213–219} }
 @inbook{endicott_2007, title={Reinforcing the three Rs: Reduction, reception, and replacement}, ISBN={1405144432}, booktitle={The matter of the mind: Philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction}, publisher={Malden, MA: Blackwell}, author={Endicott, R.}, editor={Schouten, M. and Jong, H. LoorenEditors}, year={2007}, pages={146–171} }
 @misc{endicott_2006, title={Natural minds}, volume={19}, number={4}, journal={Philosophical Psychology}, author={Endicott, R.}, year={2006}, pages={539–543} }
 @inbook{endicott_2005, title={Multiple realizability}, ISBN={0028660722}, booktitle={Encyclopedia of philosophy. 2nd ed. Vol. 6}, publisher={New York: Thomson/Gale}, author={Endicott, R.}, editor={D. M. Borchert and Edwards, P.Editors}, year={2005}, pages={427–432} }
 @article{endicott_2001, title={Psychoneural reduction: The new wave}, volume={68}, ISSN={["0031-8248"]}, DOI={10.1086/392890}, abstractNote={In Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave, John Bickle presents his most recent ideas from the "new wave" school of reductive materialism. After presenting Bickle's account of scientific theory reduction, which is a modified structuralist gloss on Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker's general view, I press three main points. First, Bickle's modification seems to lose what was distinctive about the Churchland-Hooker account, so that it becomes a modified structuralist gloss on Kenneth Schaffner's older nonwavish approximate reduction. Second, a familiar problem for classical reductionism resurfaces within this newest wave of thinking, a problem that is exacerbated by Bickle's conciliatory treatment of property plasticity and the subsequent intertheoretic cross-classification of terms. Third, Bickle's interesting response to cross-classification via Hooker's function-to-structure token reduction has virtually nothing to do with token reduction and everything to do with eliminative materialism.}, number={3}, journal={PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE}, author={Endicott, R}, year={2001}, month={Sep}, pages={377–393} }
 @article{endicott_1998, title={Collapse of the new wave}, volume={95}, ISSN={["0022-362X"]}, DOI={10.2307/2564571}, abstractNote={Critique du mouvement new wave de la philosophie de l'esprit qui propose une nouvelle approche de la theorie de la reduction en science. Examinant le role des lois de pontage (brigde laws) dans les contructions, les deductions et les planifications intertheoriques proposees par P. Churchland et C. Hooker, l'A. montre que le modele new wave a des consequences ontologiques qui le font retomber dans la theorie classique de l'empirisme logique et en font la proie de l'argument antireductionniste standard}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Endicott, RP}, year={1998}, month={Feb}, pages={53–72} }
 @article{endicott_1998, title={Many-many mapping and world structure}, volume={35}, number={3}, journal={American Philosophical Quarterly}, author={Endicott, R.}, year={1998}, pages={267–280} }
 @article{endicott_1996, title={Searle, syntax, and observer relativity}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/00455091.1996.10717446}, abstractNote={In his bookThe Rediscovery of the Mind(hereafter RM), John Searle attacks computational psychology with a number of new and boldly provocative claims. Specifically, in the penultimate chapter entitled ‘The Critique of Cognitive Reason,’ Searle targets what he calls ‘cognitivism,’ according to which our brains are digital computers that process a mental syntax. And Searle denies this view on grounds thatthe attribution of syntaxisobserver relative.A syntactic property is arbitrarily assigned to a physical system, he thinks, with the result that syntactic states ‘do not even exist except in the eyes of the beholder’(RM,215). This unabashed anti-realism differs significantly from Searle's earlier work. The Chinese room argument, for example, was intended to show that syntactic properties will not suffice for semantics, where the syntax was realistically construed. But now Searle claims that physical properties will not suffice to determine a system's syntactic properties.}, number={1}, journal={Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, author={Endicott, R.}, year={1996}, pages={101–122} }
 @article{endicott_1995, title={THE REFUTATION BY ANALOGOUS ECTOQUALIA}, volume={33}, ISSN={["0038-4283"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00728.x}, abstractNote={L'A. etudie l'argument de la connaissance developpe par F. Jackson contre le physicalisme et rejette la refutation par analogie que lui oppose P. Churchland. Au-dela des difficultes logiques ou techniques inherentes aux differentes formes de l'argumentation, il s'agit de conclure que les proprietes physiques et ectoplasmiques ne resument pas toutes' les proprietes qui ont rapport aux sensations}, number={1}, journal={SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={ENDICOTT, RP}, year={1995}, pages={19–30} }
 @article{endicott_1994, title={CONSTRUCTIVAL PLASTICITY}, volume={74}, ISSN={["0031-8116"]}, DOI={10.1007/bf00989639}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES}, author={ENDICOTT, RP}, year={1994}, month={Apr}, pages={51–75} }
 @article{endicott_1993, title={Species-specific properties and more narrow reductive strategies}, volume={38}, DOI={10.1007/bf01128233}, abstractNote={Dans le contexte des variations et permutations de la theorie de type-identite, l'A. examine les problemes poses par la strategie restreinte de reduction actuelle, problemes qui, dans une large mesure, ont ete peu ou quasiment pas percus}, number={3}, journal={Erkenntnis (Dordrecht, Netherlands)}, author={Endicott, R.}, year={1993}, pages={303–321} }
 @article{endicott_1989, title={On physical multiple realization}, volume={70}, DOI={10.1111/j.1468-0114.1989.tb00379.x}, abstractNote={Pacific Philosophical QuarterlyVolume 70, Issue 3 p. 212-224 Article ON PHYSICAL MULTIPLE REALIZATION Ronald P. Endicott, Ronald P. Endicott University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MichiganSearch for more papers by this author Ronald P. Endicott, Ronald P. Endicott University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MichiganSearch for more papers by this author First published: September 1989 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1989.tb00379.xCitations: 4AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume70, Issue3September 1989Pages 212-224 RelatedInformation}, number={3}, journal={Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, author={Endicott, R.}, year={1989}, pages={212–224} }