@article{puryear_2021, title={Why Leibniz should have agreed with Berkeley about abstract ideas}, volume={29}, ISSN={["1469-3526"]}, url={https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2021.1895066}, DOI={10.1080/09608788.2021.1895066}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Leibniz claims that Berkeley “wrongly or at least pointlessly rejects abstract ideas”. What he fails to realize, however, is that some of his own core views commit him to essentially the same stance. His belief that this is the best (and thus most harmonious) possible world, which itself stems from his Principle of Sufficient Reason, leads him to infer that mind and body must perfectly represent or ‘express’ one another. In the case of abstract thoughts he admits that this can happen only in virtue of thinking of some image that, being essentially a mental copy of a brain state, expresses (and is expressed by) that state. But here he faces a problem. In order for a thought to be genuinely abstract, its representational content must differ from that of any mental image, since the latter can represent only something particular. In that case, however, an exact correspondence between the accompanying mental image and the brain state would not suffice to establish a perfect harmony between mind and body. Even on Leibniz’s own principles, then, it appears that Berkeley was right to dismiss abstract ideas.}, number={6}, journal={BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2021}, month={Nov}, pages={1054–1071} }
 @article{puryear_2020, title={THE LOGIC OF LEIBNIZ'S BORROWED REALITY ARGUMENT}, volume={70}, ISBN={1467-9213}, DOI={10.1093/pq/pqz056}, abstractNote={Leibniz argues that there must be a fundamental level of simple substances because composites borrow their reality from their constituents and not all reality can be borrowed. I contend that the underlying logic of this ‘borrowed reality argument’ has been misunderstood, particularly the rationale for the key premise that not all reality can be borrowed. Contrary to what has been suggested, the rationale turns neither on the alleged viciousness of an unending regress of reality borrowers nor on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but on the idea that composites are phenomena and thus can be real only insofar as they have a foundation in substances, from which they directly ‘borrow’ their reality. The claim that composites are phenomena rests in turn on Leibniz's conceptualism about relations. So understood, what initially looked like a disappointingly simple argument for simples turns out to be a rather rich and sophisticated one.}, number={279}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2020}, month={Apr}, pages={350–370} }
 @article{puryear_2019, title={Consent by Residence: A Defense}, volume={2}, url={http://www.lib.ncsu.edu/resolver/1840.20/36313}, DOI={10.1177/1474885119833009}, abstractNote={The traditional view according to which we adults tacitly consent to a state’s lawful actions just by living within its borders—the residence theory—is now widely rejected by political philosophers. According to the critics, this theory fails because consent must be (i) intentional, (ii) informed, and (iii) voluntary, whereas one’s continued residence within a state is typically none of these things. Few people intend to remain within the state in which they find themselves, and few realize that by remaining they are consenting to the state’s lawful actions. Moreover, the various obstacles standing in the way of us leaving the state render our remaining involuntary. Thus, the critics conclude, few if any people can be considered to have consented through their residence. I argue that these objections fail and that the residence theory remains a viable option, at least for those who are not committed incompatibilists.}, note={annote: Puryear, S. (2019). Consent by Residence: A Defense. European Journal of Political Theory.}, journal={European Journal of Political Theory}, publisher={SAGE Publications}, author={Puryear, S.}, year={2019}, pages={147488511983300} }
 @article{puryear_2019, title={Monads, Composition, and Force. Ariadnean Threads Through Leibniz's Labyrinth}, volume={57}, ISSN={["1538-4586"]}, DOI={10.1353/hph.2019.0087}, abstractNote={Reviewed by: Monads, Composition, and Force. Ariadnean Threads Through Leibniz's Labyrinth by Richard T. W. Arthur Stephen Puryear Richard T. W. Arthur. Monads, Composition, and Force. Ariadnean Threads Through Leibniz's Labyrinth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. xv + 239. Cloth, $80,00. Leibniz describes the problem of the composition of the continuum as one of the two famous labyrinths of the human mind. (The other concerns freedom.) The problem, in brief, is that matter and motion appear to be continuous and thus would seem to be composed of an infinity of spatial or temporal points, which is absurd. Leibniz's strategy for escaping from this labyrinth involves distinguishing the realm of the real or actual from that of the ideal. In the former, there is composition from parts but no continuity: everything is discrete, even though divided to infinity. In the latter, there is genuine continuity but no composition, the whole being prior to the parts. Since the two realms are disjoint, there is never any continuum composed of points. Leibniz maintains that this solution requires us to think very differently about the nature of space, time, bodies, and substances, and, in particular, to posit an infinity of simple substances or monads. The main aim of this historically rich and interpretively provocative book is to explain why Leibniz says such things by examining his purported solution and how he arrived at it. Each of the book's seven chapters focuses on a different "Ariadnean thread" that supposedly helped Leibniz find his way out of the labyrinth. They concern the themes of "composition, aggregation, atoms, forms, motion, substance, and continuation in existence" (6). A central theme of the book is that Leibniz should be viewed as a realist about bodies, rather than an idealist. On Arthur's reading, bodies are (in themselves) phenomena in both a synchronic (or Democritean) sense, according to which they lack true unity at any given moment, and a diachronic (or Platonic) sense, according to which no body remains precisely the same being for more than a moment. But they are not phenomena in the sense of having their being in perceptions: to the contrary, they have a real, extramental existence. Every body either is an organic body or is composed of organic bodies. Each organic body in turn has a substantial form or dominant monad, which makes it actual, though without unifying its parts into a substantial whole at any one time. The composites of these two—organic body and dominant monad—are identified as corporeal substances and, on Arthur's view, Leibniz steadfastly affirms their existence throughout his mature period. As to why Leibniz's solution to the problem of the composition of the continuum requires positing monads, Arthur offers two reasons. As I understand them, both hinge on the claim that matter and motion, being real, must be actually divided into parts, this being what makes them discrete rather than continuous. Leibniz holds that the actual divisions in matter must result from different motions within it. These motions, in turn, presuppose motive forces and ultimately what he calls primitive active force, which can be found only in simple substances. So the actual divisions in matter presuppose monads. Furthermore, it is because of the discrete or actually divided nature of matter and motion that bodies do not strictly speaking persist for more than a moment, and thus that accounting for the enduring nature of corporeal substance requires positing some indivisible (i.e. simple) principle of diachronic unity, some principle that "constitutes a [corporeal] substance as the same substance through time despite the fact that its body is not precisely the same body from one moment to another" (69). Arthur criticizes the idealist reading for being unable to explain why Leibniz's solution to the continuum problem requires monads. One might wonder, however, why a suitably nuanced version of the idealist view could not readily accommodate something like Arthur's own explanation. Even if bodies have their being only within perceivers, they could still be actually divided into parts by different motions within them. These motions could still be caused by motive forces that likewise have their being in perceivers. And these phenomenal forces...}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2019}, month={Oct}, pages={761–762} }
 @misc{puryear_bruers_erdos_2017, title={On a Failed Defense of Factory Farming}, volume={30}, ISSN={["1573-322X"]}, DOI={10.1007/s10806-017-9666-7}, abstractNote={Timothy Hsiao attempts to defend industrial animal farming by arguing that it is not inherently cruel. We raise three main objections to his defense. First, his argument rests on a misunderstanding of the nature of cruelty. Second, his conclusion, though technically true, is so weak as to be of virtually no moral significance or interest. Third, his contention that animals lack moral standing, and thus that mistreating them is wrong only insofar as it makes one more disposed to mistreat other humans, is untenable on both philosophical and biological grounds.}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Puryear, Stephen and Bruers, Stijn and Erdos, Laszlo}, year={2017}, month={Apr}, pages={311–323} }
 @article{puryear_2017, title={Schopenhauer on the Rights of Animals}, volume={25}, ISSN={["1468-0378"]}, DOI={10.1111/ejop.12237}, abstractNote={I argue that Schopenhauer’s ascription of (moral) rights to animals flows naturally from his distinctive analysis of the concept of a right. In contrast to those who regard rights as fundamental and then cast wrongdoing as a matter of violating rights, he takes wrong (Unrecht) to be the more fundamental notion and defines the concept of a right (Recht) in its terms. He then offers an account of wrongdoing which makes it plausible to suppose that at least many animals can be wronged and thus, by extension, have rights. The result, I argue, is a perspective on the nature of moral rights in general, and the idea of animal rights in particular, that constitutes an important and plausible alternative to the more familiar views advanced by philosophers in recent decades.}, number={2}, journal={EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2017}, month={Jun}, pages={250–269} }
 @article{puryear_2016, title={Finitism, Divisibilty, and the Beginning of the Universe: Replies to Loke and Dumsday}, volume={94}, ISSN={["1471-6828"]}, DOI={10.1080/00048402.2016.1194443}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Some philosophers contend that the past must be finite in duration, because otherwise reaching the present would have involved the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events, which they regard as impossible. I recently developed a new objection to this finitist argument, to which Andrew Ter Ern Loke and Travis Dumsday have replied. Here I respond to the three main points raised in their replies.}, number={4}, journal={AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2016}, month={Dec}, pages={808–813} }
 @article{leibnizian bodies: phenomena, aggregates of monads, or both?_2016, volume={26}, DOI={10.5840/leibniz2016265}, abstractNote={I propose a straightforward reconciliation of Leibniz’s conception of bodies as aggregates of simple substances (i.e., monads) with his doctrine that bodies are the phenomena of perceivers, without in the process saddling him with any equivocations. The reconciliation relies on the familiar idea that in Leibniz’s idiolect, an aggregate of F s is that which immediately presupposes those F s, or in other words, has those F s as immediate requisites. But I take this idea in a new direction. I argue that a phenomenon having its being in one perceiving substance (monad) can plausibly be understood to presuppose other perceiving substances (monads) in the requisite sense. Accordingly, a phenomenon in one monad can indeed be an aggregate of other monads, in Leibniz’s technical sense, just as the latter monads can be constituents of the phenomenon. So understood, the two conceptions of body are perfectly compatible, just as Leibniz seems to think.}, journal={Leibniz Review}, publisher={Philosophy Documentation Center}, year={2016}, pages={99–127} }
 @misc{puryear_2016, title={Sentience, Rationality, and Moral Status: A Further Reply to Hsiao}, volume={29}, ISSN={["1573-322X"]}, DOI={10.1007/s10806-016-9618-7}, abstractNote={Timothy Hsiao argues that animals lack moral status because they lack the sort of higher-level rationality required for membership in the moral community. Stijn Bruers and László Erdős have already raised a number of objections to this argument, to which Hsiao has replied with some success. But I think a stronger critique can be made. Here I raise further objections to three aspects of Hsiao’s view: his conception of the moral community, his idea of root capacities grounded in one’s nature, and his explanation of why cruelty is wrong. I also argue that sentience is a more plausible candidate for the morally salient capacity than rationality.}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2016}, month={Aug}, pages={697–704} }
 @article{puryear_2014, title={Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe}, volume={92}, ISSN={["1471-6828"]}, DOI={10.1080/00048402.2014.949804}, abstractNote={Many philosophers have argued that the past must be finite in duration because otherwise reaching the present moment would have involved something impossible, namely, the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events. In reply, some philosophers have objected that there can be nothing amiss in such an occurrence, since actually infinite sequences are ‘traversed’ all the time in nature, for example, whenever an object moves from one location in space to another. This essay focuses on one of the two available replies to this objection, namely, the claim that actual infinities are not traversed in nature because space, time, and other continuous wholes divide into parts only in so far as we divide them in thought, and thus divide into only a finite number of parts. I grant that this reply succeeds in blunting the anti-finitist objection, but I argue that it also subverts the very argument against an eternal past that it was intended to save.}, number={4}, journal={AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2014}, month={Oct}, pages={619–629} }
 @misc{puryear_2014, title={Leibniz and cryptography: An account on the occasion of the initial exhibition of the reconstruction of Leibniz's cipher machine}, volume={67}, number={4}, journal={Review of Metaphysics}, author={Puryear, S.}, year={2014}, pages={882–884} }
 @article{puryear_2013, title={Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language}, volume={63}, ISSN={["0031-8094"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00103.x}, abstractNote={Frege supposedly believes that vague predicates have no referent or Bedeutung. But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed to the suspect nihilism.}, number={250}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY}, publisher={Oxford University Press (OUP)}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2013}, month={Jan}, pages={120–140} }
 @article{puryear_2013, title={Idealism and scepticism: A reply to Brueckner}, volume={79}, number={4}, journal={Theoria-A Swedish Journal of Philosophy}, author={Puryear, S.}, year={2013}, pages={290–293} }
 @article{puryear_2013, title={Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color}, volume={86}, ISSN={["1933-1592"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00503.x}, abstractNote={Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities.}, number={2}, journal={PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH}, publisher={Wiley-Blackwell}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2013}, month={Mar}, pages={319–346} }
 @article{puryear_north america_2013, title={The Leibniz-De Volder Correspondence, with Selections from the Correspondence Between Leibniz and Johann Bernoulli, ed. P. Lodge}, volume={23}, DOI={10.5840/leibniz20132312}, journal={Leibniz Society Review}, publisher={Philosophy Documentation Center}, author={Puryear, Stephen and North America, The Leibniz Society}, editor={Hartz, Glenn A.Editor}, year={2013}, pages={165–169} }
 @article{puryear_2012, title={Idealism and Scepticism: A Reply to Brueckner}, volume={10}, DOI={10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01145.x}, abstractNote={Anthony Brueckner argues that Berkeleyan idealism lacks anti-sceptical force because of the way Berkeley draws the appearance/reality distinction. But Brueckner's case rests on a misunderstanding of Berkeley's view. Properly understood, Berkeleyan idealism does indeed have anti-sceptical force.}, journal={Theoria}, publisher={Wiley-Blackwell}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2012}, month={Oct}, pages={n/a-n/a} }
 @article{puryear_2012, title={Motion in Leibniz’s Middle Years: A Compatibilist Approach}, DOI={10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659593.003.0005}, abstractNote={One bone of contention among Leibniz scholars concerns the status of the corporeal world in the philosophy of Leibniz’s ‘middle years’ (roughly, the 1680s and 1690s). According to one prominent tradition, Leibniz espoused essentially the same perspective during this period that we find expressed more overtly in such later writings as the Monadology and the correspondences with De Volder and Des Bosses. That is, he was a kind of phenomenalist, in that he accorded to bodies the status of phenomena or appearances, and an idealist, in that he proposed to reduce the whole of the corporeal realm to immaterial substances and their states. Of late, however, an increasing number of scholars have raised doubts about this traditional reading. On their view, it was not immaterial souls or monads but rather corporeal substances, understood in Aristotelian fashion as composites of form and matter, which the Leibniz of the middle years placed at the foundation of his ontology; and so as one who embraced the existence}, journal={Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy Volume VI}, publisher={Oxford University Press}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2012}, month={Nov}, pages={135–170} }
 @article{puryear_2010, title={Monadic Interaction}, volume={18}, DOI={10.1080/09608788.2010.524756}, abstractNote={Leibniz has almost universally been represented as denying that created substances, including human minds and the souls of animals, can causally interact either with one another or with bodies. Yet he frequently claims that such substances are capable of interacting in the special sense of what he calls ‘ideal’ interaction. In order to reconcile these claims with their favored interpretation, proponents of the traditional reading often suppose that ideal action is not in fact a genuine form of causation but instead a merely apparent influence which serves to ‘save the appearances.’ I argue that this traditional reading distorts Leibniz's thought and that he actually considers ideal action a genuine (though non-standard) form of causation.}, number={5}, journal={British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, year={2010}, pages={763–796} }
 @inbook{puryear_2008, place={Berlin}, title={Leibniz on Concepts and Their Relation to the Senses}, booktitle={Sehen und Begreifen: Wahrnehmungstheorien in der Frühen Neuzeit}, publisher={de Gruyter}, author={Puryear, Stephen}, editor={Perler, D. and Wild, M.Editors}, year={2008}, pages={235–264} }
 @article{puryear_north america_2005, title={Was Leibniz Confused about Confusion?}, volume={15}, DOI={10.5840/leibniz2005153}, abstractNote={Leibniz's physicalism about colors and other sensible qualities commits him to two theses about our knowledge of those qualities: first, that we can acquire ideas of sensible qualities apart from any direct acquaintance with the qualities themselves; second, that we can acquire distinct (i.e., non-confused) ideas of such qualities through the development of physical-theoretical accounts. According to some commentators, however, Leibniz frequently denies both claims. His views on the subject are muddled and incoherent, they say, both because he is ambivalent about the nature of sensible qualities, and because he gets confused about confusion, losing sight of his own distinction between the confusion proper to perceptions and that proper to ideas. In opposition to this, I argue that the critics have misunderstood Leibniz's views, which are both consistent over time and coherent. The key to understanding his position is to appreciate what he characterizes as a kind of redundancy in our ideas of sensible qualities, a crucial feature of his view overlooked by the critics. 1. Two Inconsistencies I n his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume identifies as the fundamental principle of the modern philosophy "the opinion concerning colors, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, derived from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects" (I, iv, §4). This opinion, or something very like it, can be found explicitly in the writings of such early modern luminaries as Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and many others.! It is therefore testimony to the distinctiveness ofLeibniz's thought that he rejects this "fundamental principle" in its entirety. In the first place, he insists that our sensations (and ideas) of sensible qualities do resemble the qualities of external objects. Reviewing Franc;ois Lamy's De La Connoissance de Soi-meme, he explains: I do not agree with the opinion accepted by many today, and followed by our author, that there is no resemblance or relation between our sensations and}, journal={Leibniz Society Review}, publisher={Philosophy Documentation Center}, author={Puryear, Stephen M. and North America, The Leibniz Society}, editor={Hartz, Glenn A.Editor}, year={2005}, pages={95–124} }
 @misc{adefinitedescription_r/science, title={AMA Announcement: Monday 11/14 12PM ET - Stephen Puryear (North Carolina State) on history of philosophy, metaphysics and ethics}, DOI={10.15200/winn.147879.96638}, abstractNote={As previously announced, /r/philosophy is hosting an AMA series this fall semester which kicked off with AMAs by Caspar Hare (MIT), Kevin Scharp, Kenneth Ehrenberg, Geoff Pynn and the Wi-Phi: Wireless Philosophy team. Check out our series announcement post to see all the upcoming AMAs this semester. We continue our series this upcoming Monday with an AMA by Stephen Puryear (NCSU). Hear it from him: Stephen Puryear I am an assistant professor of philosophy and affiliate of the Classical Studies program at NC State. Before arriving in Raleigh in 2008, I earned my Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh (2006) and spent two years as a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University. My research interests include early modern philosophy and the German philosophical tradition, especially Leibniz, Kant, and Schopenhauer, as well as historical and contemporary work in metaphysics, ethics, and political philosophy. Much of my published work concerns the philosophy of Leibniz, but I have also written about Berkeley's idealism, Schopenhauer's moral philosophy, Frege's philosophy of language, and the metaphysics of space and time. My main project at present is a book on Leibniz. Besides that, I continue to think about various topics in Schopenhauer's philosophy, especially his ethics; in moral and political philosophy (obligation, consent, rights, normative theories, animal ethics, etc.); and in metaphysics (infinity, continuity, space, time, etc.). Much of my published work concerns the philosophy of Leibniz, but I have also written about Berkeley's idealism, Schopenhauer's moral philosophy, Frege's philosophy of language, and the metaphysics of space and time. My main project at present is a book on Leibniz. Besides that, I continue to think about various topics in Schopenhauer's philosophy, especially his ethics; moral and political philosophy (obligation, consent, rights, normative theories, animal ethics, etc.); and metaphysics (infinity, continuity, space, time, etc.). For more on my published work, see my publications page. Some published papers: "Schopenhauer on the Rights of Animals" "Finitism and the Beginning of the Universe" "Finitism, Divisibility, and the Beginning of the Universe: Replies to Loke and Dumsday" "Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color" "Frege on Vagueness and Ordinary Language" "Monadic Interaction" AMA Professor Puryear will join us Monday for a couple hours of live Q&A on their research interests on Monday at noon. Please feel free to post questions for him here. He will look at this thread before they start and begin with some questions from here while the initial questions in the new thread come in. Please join me in welcoming Professor Puryear to our community!}, journal={The Winnower}, publisher={Authorea, Inc.}, author={ADefiniteDescription and r/Science} }
 @article{consent by residence: a defense, journal={European Journal of Political Theory} }
 @misc{smpuryear_r/science, title={I'm Stephen Puryear (NC State) and I'm here to answer your questions about philosophy (and whatever else). AMA}, DOI={10.15200/winn.147914.45869}, abstractNote={Hi Reddit! I’m Stephen Puryear, assistant professor of philosophy at NC State University. I’m interested in the history of philosophy (esp. early modern philosophy and the German philosophical tradition, Leibniz and Schopenhauer above all), and in metaphysics and ethics. I’ve written a number of articles in these areas, which you can download for free from my PhilPapers page. I’m also working on a book on Leibniz’s idealism and a number of articles, including one on the idea of a moral law and another on consent theories of political obligation. I’m looking forward to this, so let’s get started. Go ahead, ask me anything! Proof pic}, journal={The Winnower}, publisher={Authorea, Inc.}, author={smpuryear and r/Science} }