@article{soyarslan_2023, title={The power and limits of friendship in Spinoza’s <i>Ethics}, volume={2}, ISSN={0960-8788 1469-3526}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2173137}, DOI={10.1080/09608788.2023.2173137}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT Spinoza’s views on friendship have been a relatively overlooked aspect of his ethical thought. Even though commentators such as Andrew Youpa and Steven Nadler shed significant light on the significance of Spinoza’s views, they do not provide a detailed examination of the possibility of friendship between people who are not similar to one another. In considering to what extent (if at all) a virtuous person can join ordinary people who are dissimilar to her in friendship, my paper attempts to reach a better understanding of the limits, as well as the power, of friendship for Spinoza. First, I show that we can make a meaningful distinction between two kinds of friendship, which I call active friendship and coincidental friendship. Then, I argue that in Spinoza besides these two kinds of friendships, there is also a group of social interactions wherein the virtuous wants to bring the non-virtuous to enlightenment. In examining the nature of these interactions, I conclude that in Spinoza in addition to what we can call the Socratic quest of bringing people to enlightenment, we also find a strategy of insulation, which consists in taking measures so that ordinary people do not pose a threat to the virtuous.}, journal={British Journal for the History of Philosophy}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Soyarslan, Sanem}, year={2023}, month={Feb}, pages={1–18} }
 @article{soyarslan_2021, title={Spinoza's Account of Blessedness Explored through an Aristotelian Lens}, volume={60}, ISSN={0012-2173 1759-0949}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S001221732100010X}, DOI={10.1017/S001221732100010X}, abstractNote={ABSTRACT In this article, I examine whether Spinoza's account of blessedness can be identified with a contemplative ideal in the Aristotelian tradition. I first introduce the main features of the Aristotelian life of contemplation and its difference from the life of practically oriented virtues — a difference that is grounded in Aristotle's distinction between praxis and theoria. In highlighting the commonalities between Spinoza's two kinds of adequate cognition — that is, intuitive knowledge and reason — I show that there is no room for a similar distinction in Spinoza, which will enable us to identify intuitive knowledge and its attendant blessedness exclusively with the theoretical activity.}, number={3}, journal={Dialogue}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Soyarslan, Sanem}, year={2021}, month={Apr}, pages={499–524} }
 @article{soyarslan_2020, title={From humility to envy: Questioning the usefulness of sad passions as a means towards virtue in Spinoza's Ethics}, volume={28}, ISSN={0966-8373 1468-0378}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12422}, DOI={10.1111/ejop.12422}, abstractNote={Abstract In the Ethics , Spinoza defines certain traditional virtues such as humility and repentance as species of sadness and denies that they are virtues. He nonetheless holds that they can turn out to be useful as a means towards virtue —in fact, the greatest virtue of blessedness—in the life of someone who is not guided by reason. In this paper, I examine Spinoza's relatively overlooked claim regarding the usefulness of sad passions as a means towards blessedness. In taking up Spinoza's treatment of humility as my case study, I show that there is a tension between this claim and his other explicit commitments in the Ethics . More specifically, after considering his views regarding the consequences of humility—including, most notably, its susceptibility to envy—and conditions of achieving blessedness, I show that humility cannot effectively be said to bring about cooperation and push “weak‐minded” people in the right direction so that, in the end, they may be free and enjoy blessedness. I conclude by suggesting that if we must rely on passions as a means towards virtue in the Spinozistic universe, we must rely not on debilitating sad passions such as humility, but on joy‐based social passions such as love.}, number={1}, journal={European Journal of Philosophy}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Soyarslan, Sanem}, year={2020}, month={Mar}, pages={33–47} }
 @article{soyarslan_2019, title={Two Ethical Ideals in Spinoza's Ethics: The Free Man and The Wise Man}, volume={5}, ISSN={["2053-4485"]}, DOI={10.1017/apa.2019.19}, abstractNote={Abstract According to Steven Nadler's novel interpretation of Spinoza's much discussed ‘free man’, the free man is not an unattainable ideal. On this reading, the free man represents an ideal condition not because he is passionless, as has often been claimed, but because even though he experiences passions, he ‘never lets those passions determine his actions’. In this paper, I argue that Nadler's interpretation is incorrect in taking the model of the free man to be an attainable ideal within our reach. Furthermore, I show that Spinoza's moral philosophy has room for another ideal yet attainable condition, which is represented by the wise man. On my reading, becoming a wise man consists not in surmounting human bondage, but in understanding ourselves as finite expressions of God's power and, thereby, coming to terms with the ineliminability of bondage for us due to our very human or modal condition in the Spinozistic universe.}, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION}, author={Soyarslan, Sanem}, year={2019}, pages={357–370} }
 @article{soyarslan_2018, title={SPINOZA'S CRITIQUE OF HUMILITY IN THE ETHICS}, volume={56}, ISSN={["2041-6962"]}, DOI={10.1111/sjp.12292}, abstractNote={Abstract In the Ethics Spinoza denies that humility is a virtue on the grounds that it arises from a reflection on our lack of power, rather than a rational understanding of our power (Part IV, Proposition 53, Demonstration). He suggests that humility, to the extent that it involves a consideration of our weakness, indicates a lack of self‐understanding. However, in a brief remark in the same demonstration he also allows that conceiving our lack of power can be conducive to self‐understanding and an increase in power, on the condition that we “conceive [it] because [we] understand [ intelligit ] something more powerful than [ourselves].” Unfortunately, Spinoza does not flesh out this remark, nor does he specify the name of the affect that arises from thus conceiving our weakness. Commentators have not been much help in this regard either. What does it mean, in the Spinozistic framework, to conceive our weakness because we understand something more powerful than ourselves? And what exactly is the difference between this instance of conceiving our lack of power and the one that is involved in humility? This paper will examine the nature of this difference by analyzing its metaphysical and epistemological underpinnings, as well as its ethical implications within Spinoza’s Ethics . In doing so, it will highlight the ethical importance and epistemological conditions of recognizing our weakness in the Spinozistic universe. Abraham Wolf takes Spinoza’s denial of humility’s virtue in the Ethics to imply that “the rational man should think of what he can do, not of what he cannot do.” While I agree with Wolf’s remark, my reading in this paper will show that as the rational person thinks of her power and what she can do, she never loses sight of her ineliminable weakness as a finite mode.}, number={3}, journal={SOUTHERN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Soyarslan, Sanem}, year={2018}, month={Sep}, pages={342–364} }
 @article{soyarslan_2016, title={The Distinction between Reason and Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza's Ethics}, volume={24}, ISSN={["1468-0378"]}, DOI={10.1111/ejop.12052}, abstractNote={While both intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva) and reason (ratio) are adequate ways of knowing for Spinoza, they are not equal. Intuitive knowledge, which Spinoza describes as the ‘greatest virtue of mind’, is superior to reason. The nature of this superiority has been the subject of some controversy due to Spinoza's notoriously parsimonious treatment of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge in the Ethics. In this paper, I argue that intuitive knowledge differs from reason not only in terms of its method of cognition—but also in terms of its content. More specifically, I maintain that there is something that is known by intuition, namely the unique essences of things, that is not known by reason. My argument is supported by an examination of Spinoza's account of essences in the Ethics, which reveals that he is committed to both unique and shared essences. Based on this dual commitment, I argue that whereas for Spinoza both reason and intuition can be said to reach adequate knowledge of the shared essence of a thing, the unique essence of a singular thing, which is nothing but its actual essence, can only be known through intuitive knowledge.}, number={1}, journal={EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Soyarslan, Sanem}, year={2016}, month={Mar}, pages={27–54} }
 @misc{soyarslan_2014, title={From Ordinary Life to Blessedness}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657537.003.0013}, DOI={10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199657537.003.0013}, abstractNote={This essay elucidates the sense in which the affective power of the third and highest kind of knowledge, scientia intuitiva, is central to Spinoza’s conception of the ethical life. To achieve a comprehensive understanding of the ethics of the Ethics, the key, Soyarslan contends, is to understand that the path to the good life takes the form of a transformative ascent. This transformative ascent, a theory of human development, contains three stages that are at once cognitive and affective in nature. Indeed, each of Spinoza’s three kinds of cognition is, on the interpretation Soyarslan defends, accompanied by a corresponding kind of love.}, journal={Essays on Spinoza's Ethical Theory}, publisher={Oxford University Press}, author={Soyarslan, Sanem}, year={2014}, month={Apr}, pages={236–257} }
 @article{soyarslan_2014, title={The Susceptibility of Intuitive Knowledge to Akrasia in Spinoza's Ethical Thought}, volume={22}, ISSN={["1469-3526"]}, DOI={10.1080/09608788.2014.954520}, abstractNote={Spinoza unequivocally states in the Ethics that intuitive knowledge is more powerful than reason. Nonetheless, it is not clear what exactly this greater power promises in the face of the passions. Does this mean that intuitive knowledge is not liable to akrasia? Ronald Sandler offers what, to my knowledge, is the only explicit answer to this question in recent Spinoza scholarship. According to Sandler, intuitive knowledge, unlike reason, is not susceptible to akrasia. This is because, intuitive knowledge enables the knower to greater power over the passions due to its immediacy, its foundation and because it engenders the boundlessly powerful intellectual love of God. In this paper, I consider to what extent (if at all) intuitive knowledge is liable to akrasia by exploring whether Sandler's claim can justifiably be attributed to Spinoza. I argue that, given our modal status, it is not plausible to claim that akrasia would never apply to intuitive knowledge. Since intuitive ideas are the ideas of a finite mind actually existing as a part of Nature, even the intellectual love of God accompanying these ideas cannot provide a boundless power guaranteeing that the power of these ideas will not be overridden by passionate ideas.}, number={4}, journal={BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Soyarslan, Sanem}, year={2014}, month={Jul}, pages={725–747} }
 @book{balibar_2004, place={Istanbul}, title={Spinoza ve Siyaset = Spinoza et la Politique}, publisher={Otonom Publishing}, author={Balibar, Etienne}, editor={Soyarslan, S.Editor}, year={2004} }