@article{hinton_2024, title={Nominalism, materialism, and history}, ISSN={["1461-734X"]}, DOI={10.1177/01914537241234692}, abstractNote={This article addresses two explanatory gaps in Althusser’s late work. One has to do with the relation between nominalism and materialism; the other engages the relation between Althusser’s later materialism and a broadly materialist approach to history. In the first part of the article, I develop a response to the problem of nominalism that makes use of Hobbes’s nominalism and Deleuze’s concept of the plane of immanence. In the second part, I address the problem of history by explaining the concept of an aleatory causal chain, and showing how such chains could be at work in human history. I also make use of Hobbes’s materialist account of causation, applying it to social relations, social collectivities, and historical events.}, journal={PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL CRITICISM}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2024}, month={Feb} }
 @article{hinton_2021, title={Closing Arguments for the Defence}, volume={102}, ISSN={["1741-2005"]}, DOI={10.1111/nbfr.12625}, abstractNote={Abstract Howard Robinson believes, and would have the rest of us believe, that Gareth Moore was the equivalent of an atheist. To which I say, once again: there is not a single good reason to believe that Gareth was any such thing. I begin with a reminder about our duty to think of Gareth as innocent until proven guilty. I then argue that Gareth's insistence that there is no such thing as an invisible person named ‘God’ did not commit him to atheism. I show that people such as Herbert McCabe, whose orthodoxy is unimpeachable, say the same sort of thing. I then demonstrate that Gareth said nothing that would imply that, on his view, ‘God’ is not a referring expression. I end by explaining that Gareth embraced a theory of truth fully consistent with moderate expressivism.}, number={1097}, journal={NEW BLACKFRIARS}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2021}, month={Jan}, pages={30–40} }
 @article{hinton_2021, title={The Integrity of Gareth Moore's Believing in God}, volume={102}, ISSN={["1741-2005"]}, DOI={10.1111/nbfr.12582}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={1097}, journal={NEW BLACKFRIARS}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2021}, month={Jan}, pages={6–21} }
 @article{hinton_2019, title={IS TAXATION FORCED LABOUR?}, volume={18}, ISSN={["1755-1196"]}, DOI={10.1017/S1477175618000313}, abstractNote={Libertarians frequently complain that when a government taxes some of its citizens in order to help others, it is forcing them to behave altruistically. And obviously, we are meant to think, that use of force is morally objectionable. But what exactly makes taxation objectionable? One answer that many libertarians supply is that forcing some people to benefit others is wrong because it involves forced labour. The underlying thought seems to be that there is something morally troubling about making some people work for others. In this article I scrutinize this thought. After describing two different kinds of taxation, I show how the libertarian argument about taxes depends on a distinction between posing a threat to other people and failing to help them. This brings us to the moral bedrock of the argument that taxation is forced labour, namely the idea that no one has a right to force you to do something unless you pose a threat to other people. The bulk of my article is devoted to showing (1) that this idea cannot deliver the conclusion that libertarians want because it conflicts with other things that libertarians believe; and (2) once you give up on that idea, it turns out that taxation to benefit others is not necessarily wrong by libertarian standards.}, number={51}, journal={THINK-PHILOSOPHY FOR EVERYONE}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2019}, pages={11–23} }
 @article{hinton_2015, title={Introduction: the original position and The Original Position - an overview}, DOI={10.1017/cbo9781107375321.001}, abstractNote={John Rawls's idea of the original position – arguably the centerpiece of his theory of justice – has proved to have enduring philosophical significance for at least three reasons. First, it offered a fresh way of thinking about problems of justification and objectivity in political philosophy. At the heart of these difficulties is the need to find an objective point of view from which to deliberate about matters of basic justice. Here “objective” implies “not mired in partiality” and “not biased by one's particular position in the social world.” The original position is a hypothetical contractual situation in which parties who are ignorant about crucial features of themselves (such as how wealthy or talented they are, and what their vision of the best way to live is) are to select the principles of justice to regulate the basic institutions of their society. In selecting those principles, the parties are thought of as entering into an agreement that binds them to honor whichever principles they choose. By specifying that the parties are ignorant of matters that would allow them to favor themselves, Rawls vividly and unforgettably captures a widely shared sense that principles of justice cannot be justified by appealing to morally irrelevant considerations. The original position is important in the second place because of the many interesting philosophical questions it raises. As soon as Rawls's argument had been fully digested, many philosophers felt that something was amiss with it. Questions abound. How could the fact that I would have agreed to certain principles in a special situation of choice give those principles binding authority over me? Is it true that Rawls's two principles in particular are the most rational choice that could be made in the original position? Are the assumptions needed to get the device off the ground really as weak and untroubling as Rawls seems to have thought? Finally, the original position is significant because of its evident traction: it has inspired other philosophers to take up alternative positions, to rethink it, and to conceptualize afresh the philosophical problems to which the idea was initially addressed. The vast literature on Rawls's idea – and the use he himself made of it in his subsequent work – are testament to its capacity to inspire further philosophical reflection.}, journal={Original position}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2015}, pages={1-} }
 @article{hinton_2015, title={Liberals, radicals, and the original position}, DOI={10.1017/cbo9781107375321.009}, abstractNote={Although political philosophy has been dominated by liberalism ever since the publication of TJ, this hegemony has not gone unchallenged by radicals. For the most part, the disputes between liberals and radicals have focused on matters of principle, including deep disagreements over how best to understand the central values of liberty and equality. As significant as these substantive disagreements are, there are equally important methodological differences between liberals and radicals that have not been the focus of as much philosophical attention.}, journal={Original position}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2015}, pages={159–178} }
 @article{hinton_2013, title={Equality, Self-Ownership, and Individual Sovereignty}, volume={44}, ISSN={["0031-806X"]}, DOI={10.1111/phil.12009}, abstractNote={The Philosophical ForumVolume 44, Issue 2 p. 165-178 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Equality, Self-Ownership, and Individual Sovereignty Timothy Hinton, Timothy Hinton North Carolina State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Timothy Hinton, Timothy Hinton North Carolina State UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 18 April 2013 https://doi.org/10.1111/phil.12009Citations: 2Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume44, Issue2Summer 2013Pages 165-178 RelatedInformation}, number={2}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2013}, pages={165–178} }
 @article{hinton_2012, title={Distributive Justice in the State of Nature: An Egalitarian View}, volume={31}, ISSN={["0258-0136"]}, DOI={10.1080/02580136.2012.10751791}, abstractNote={Abstract This paper proposes a novel egalitarian answer to the question: what initial distribution of the world’s resources could possibly count as just? Like many writers in the natural rights tradition, I take for granted that distributive justice consists in conformity to pre-political principles that apply to property regimes. Against the background of that assumption, the paper distinguishes between broadly Lockean and broadly Grotian conceptions of distributive justice in the state of nature. After an extended critique of various versions of the Lockean approach, it argues for a particular, egalitarian version of the Grotian view. My position is based on what I call the common ownership formula, which says: each human being, as an equal co-owner of the world’s resources, may use those resources provided that the terms of their use are in conformity with principles that no co-owner could reasonably reject as the basis of an informed, unforced general agreement between all of the world’s co-owners who sought to find equitable principles of resource division. Using this principle, I suggest how an unequivocally egalitarian view of pre-political entitlement can be justified without recourse to any alleged duty to ameliorate the effects of brute bad luck on people’s lives.}, number={3}, journal={SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2012}, pages={517–540} }
 @article{hinton_2009, title={Rights, Duties and the Separateness of Persons}, volume={38}, ISSN={["0556-8641"]}, DOI={10.1080/05568640902933478}, abstractNote={Let the fact of the separateness of persons be that we are separate individuals, each with his or her own life to lead. This is to be distinguished from the doctrine of the separateness of persons: the claim that the fact of our separateness is especially deep and important, morally speaking. In this paper, I argue that we ought to reject this doctrine. I focus most of my attention on the suggestion that the separateness of persons best explains the importance we attach to moral rights. After criticizing Nozick's use of the doctrine, I formulate an alternative account of the significance of rights. I then show how proponents of the doctrine of separateness have no principled way of distinguishing between egoism and moral libertarianism. I suggest that rejecting the doctrine of our separateness for the reasons I propose ensures that we need have no fear of having to embrace consequentialism as a result.}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2009}, pages={73–91} }
 @misc{hinton_2005, title={Libertarianism without inequality}, volume={114}, number={1}, journal={Philosophical Review}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2005}, pages={142–144} }
 @article{hinton_2002, title={Kant and Aquinas on the priority of the Good}, volume={55}, number={4}, journal={Review of Metaphysics}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2002}, pages={825–846} }
 @article{hinton_2001, title={Must egalitarians choose between fairness and respect?}, volume={30}, ISSN={["0048-3915"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1088-4963.2001.00072.x}, abstractNote={Refutation de la position de J. Wolff selon laquelle les egalitaristes sont obliges de choisir entre les valeurs de justice et de respect. Rejetant la distinction entre la chance et le choix qui caracterise l'egalitarisme selon J. Wolff, et defendant le principe de difference de J. Rawls comme instrument normatif, l'A. propose une nouvelle definition de la justice en termes d'egalite de statut au sein des relations socio-economiques.}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS}, author={Hinton, T}, year={2001}, pages={72–87} }
 @article{hinton_2001, title={Sandel on tolerance}, volume={61}, DOI={10.1093/analys/61.4.327}, abstractNote={Journal Article Sandel on tolerance Get access Timothy Hinton Timothy Hinton Campus Box 8103, NC State University Raleigh, NC 27695-8103, USAtim_hinton@ncsu.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 61, Issue 4, October 2001, Pages 327–333, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/61.4.327 Published: 01 October 2001}, number={4}, journal={Analysis [Oxford, England]}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2001}, pages={327–333} }
 @article{hinton_2001, title={The perfectionist liberalism of T. H. Green}, volume={27}, DOI={10.5840/soctheorpract20012736}, abstractNote={La penseee ethique de T.H.Green, philosophe idealiste anglais du XIXeme siecle, est presentee. L'accent est mis sur la combinaison qu'on y trouve entre perfectionnisme et liberalisme}, number={3}, journal={Social Theory and Practice}, author={Hinton, T. J.}, year={2001}, pages={473–499} }
 @misc{hinton_1998, title={Morality, mortality, vol 2, Rights, duties and status}, volume={107}, number={2}, journal={Philosophical Review}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={1998}, pages={289–291} }