@article{hinton_2021, title={Closing Arguments for the Defence}, volume={102}, ISSN={["1741-2005"]}, DOI={10.1111/nbfr.12625}, number={1097}, journal={NEW BLACKFRIARS}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2021}, month={Jan}, pages={30–40} }
 @article{hinton_2021, title={The Integrity of Gareth Moore's Believing in God}, volume={102}, ISSN={["1741-2005"]}, DOI={10.1111/nbfr.12582}, number={1097}, journal={NEW BLACKFRIARS}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2021}, month={Jan}, pages={6–21} }
 @article{hinton_2019, title={IS TAXATION FORCED LABOUR?}, volume={18}, ISSN={["1755-1196"]}, DOI={10.1017/S1477175618000313}, abstractNote={Libertarians frequently complain that when a government taxes some of its citizens in order to help others, it is forcing them to behave altruistically. And obviously, we are meant to think, that use of force is morally objectionable. But what exactly makes taxation objectionable? One answer that many libertarians supply is that forcing some people to benefit others is wrong because it involves forced labour . The underlying thought seems to be that there is something morally troubling about making some people work for others. In this article I scrutinize this thought. After describing two different kinds of taxation, I show how the libertarian argument about taxes depends on a distinction between posing a threat to other people and failing to help them. This brings us to the moral bedrock of the argument that taxation is forced labour, namely the idea that no one has a right to force you to do something unless you pose a threat to other people. The bulk of my article is devoted to showing (1) that this idea cannot deliver the conclusion that libertarians want because it conflicts with other things that libertarians believe; and (2) once you give up on that idea, it turns out that taxation to benefit others is not necessarily wrong by libertarian standards.}, number={51}, journal={THINK-PHILOSOPHY FOR EVERYONE}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2019}, pages={11–23} }
 @article{hinton_2015, title={Introduction: the original position and The Original Position - an overview}, DOI={10.1017/cbo9781107375321.001}, journal={Original position}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2015}, pages={1-} }
 @article{hinton_2015, title={Liberals, radicals, and the original position}, DOI={10.1017/cbo9781107375321.009}, journal={Original position}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2015}, pages={159–178} }
 @article{hinton_2013, title={Equality, Self-Ownership, and Individual Sovereignty}, volume={44}, ISSN={["0031-806X"]}, DOI={10.1111/phil.12009}, number={2}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2013}, pages={165–178} }
 @article{hinton_2012, title={Distributive Justice in the State of Nature: An Egalitarian View}, volume={31}, ISSN={["0258-0136"]}, DOI={10.1080/02580136.2012.10751791}, abstractNote={This paper proposes a novel egalitarian answer to the question: what initial distribution of the world’s resources could possibly count as just? Like many writers in the natural rights tradition, I take for granted that distributive justice consists in conformity to pre-political principles that apply to property regimes. Against the background of that assumption, the paper distinguishes between broadly Lockean and broadly Grotian conceptions of distributive justice in the state of nature. After an extended critique of various versions of the Lockean approach, it argues for a particular, egalitarian version of the Grotian view. My position is based on what I call the common ownership formula, which says: each human being, as an equal co-owner of the world’s resources, may use those resources provided that the terms of their use are in conformity with principles that no co-owner could reasonably reject as the basis of an informed, unforced general agreement between all of the world’s co-owners who sought to find equitable principles of resource division. Using this principle, I suggest how an unequivocally egalitarian view of pre-political entitlement can be justified without recourse to any alleged duty to ameliorate the effects of brute bad luck on people’s lives.}, number={3}, journal={SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2012}, pages={517–540} }
 @article{hinton_2009, title={Rights, Duties and the Separateness of Persons}, volume={38}, ISSN={["0556-8641"]}, DOI={10.1080/05568640902933478}, abstractNote={Let the fact of the separateness of persons be that we are separate individuals, each with his or her own life to lead. This is to be distinguished from the doctrine of the separateness of persons: the claim that the fact of our separateness is especially deep and important, morally speaking. In this paper, I argue that we ought to reject this doctrine. I focus most of my attention on the suggestion that the separateness of persons best explains the importance we attach to moral rights. After criticizing Nozick's use of the doctrine, I formulate an alternative account of the significance of rights. I then show how proponents of the doctrine of separateness have no principled way of distinguishing between egoism and moral libertarianism. I suggest that rejecting the doctrine of our separateness for the reasons I propose ensures that we need have no fear of having to embrace consequentialism as a result.}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS}, author={Hinton, Timothy}, year={2009}, pages={73–91} }
 @misc{hinton_2005, title={Libertarianism without inequality}, volume={114}, number={1}, journal={Philosophical Review}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2005}, pages={142–144} }
 @article{hinton_2002, title={Kant and Aquinas on the priority of the Good}, volume={55}, number={4}, journal={Review of Metaphysics}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2002}, pages={825–846} }
 @article{hinton_2001, title={Must egalitarians choose between fairness and respect?}, volume={30}, ISSN={["0048-3915"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1088-4963.2001.00072.x}, abstractNote={Refutation de la position de J. Wolff selon laquelle les egalitaristes sont obliges de choisir entre les valeurs de justice et de respect. Rejetant la distinction entre la chance et le choix qui caracterise l'egalitarisme selon J. Wolff, et defendant le principe de difference de J. Rawls comme instrument normatif, l'A. propose une nouvelle definition de la justice en termes d'egalite de statut au sein des relations socio-economiques.}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS}, author={Hinton, T}, year={2001}, pages={72–87} }
 @article{hinton_2001, title={Sandel on tolerance}, volume={61}, DOI={10.1093/analys/61.4.327}, number={4}, journal={Analysis [Oxford, England]}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={2001}, pages={327–333} }
 @article{hinton_2001, title={The perfectionist liberalism of T. H. Green}, volume={27}, DOI={10.5840/soctheorpract20012736}, abstractNote={La penseee ethique de T.H.Green, philosophe idealiste anglais du XIXeme siecle, est presentee. L'accent est mis sur la combinaison qu'on y trouve entre perfectionnisme et liberalisme}, number={3}, journal={Social Theory and Practice}, author={Hinton, T. J.}, year={2001}, pages={473–499} }
 @misc{hinton_1998, title={Morality, mortality, vol 2, Rights, duties and status}, volume={107}, number={2}, journal={Philosophical Review}, author={Hinton, T.}, year={1998}, pages={289–291} }