Umut Dur

Dur, U., & Zhang, Y. (2023). Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 109. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102907

Afacan, M. O., & Dur, U. (2023, April 7). Strategy-proof size improvement: is it possible? SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12515

Dur, U., Pathak, P. A., Song, F., & Sonmez, T. (2022). Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS, 14(1), 164–185. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180386

Dur, U., Morrill, T., & Phan, W. (2022). Family ties: School assignment with siblings. THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 17(1), 89–120. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4086

Dur, U., & Xie, Y. (2022, July 29). Responsiveness to priority-based affirmative action policy in school choice. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY. https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12605

Afacan, M. O., Dur, U., & Harris, W. (2021). School Choice with Hybrid Schedules. GAMES, 12(2). https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020037

Dur, U., Hammond, R. G., & Kesten, O. (2021). Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 198. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105344

Afacan, M. O., & Dur, U. M. (2020). Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 55(3), 477–494. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01252-4

Dur, U., Pathak, P. A., & Sonmez, T. (2020). Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.1049960022

Dur, U., Gitmez, A. A., & Yilmaz, O. (2019). School choice under partial fairness. THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 14(4), 1309–1346. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2482

Dur, U. M., & Wiseman, T. (2019). School choice with neighbors. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 83, 101–109. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.001

Dur, U., & Kesten, O. (2019). Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications. ECONOMIC THEORY, 68(2), 251–283. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1133-9

Dur, U., Hammond, R. G., & Morrill, T. (2019). The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 22(4), 918–953. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9594-z

Dur, U. M. (2019). The modified Boston mechanism. MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES, 101, 31–40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.004

Dur, U. M., & Unver, M. U. (2019). Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 127(3), 1156–1177. https://doi.org/10.1086/701358

Dur, U., & Morrill, T. (2018). Competitive equilibria in school assignment. Games and Economic Behavior, 108, 269–274. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.003

Dur, U., Mennle, T., & Seuken, S. (2018). First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms. ACM EC'18: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, pp. 251–268. https://doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219201

Dur, U., Hammond, R. G., & Morrill, T. (2018). Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms. AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY, 10(1), 187–213. https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20160132

Dur, U., Kominers, S. D., Pathak, P. A., & Sonmez, T. (2018). Reserve Design: Unintended Consequences and the Demise of Boston's Walk Zones. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 126(6), 2457–2479. https://doi.org/10.1086/699974

Afacan, M. O., & Dur, U. M. (2017). Incompatibility between stability and consistency. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 150, 135–137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.022

Afacan, M. O., & Dur, U. M. (2017). When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful? JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 72, 16–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.005

Dur, U., & Ikizler, D. (2016). Many-to-one matchings without substitutability. Economics Letters, 144, 123–126. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.02.005