@article{sheng_vukina_2023, title={Public Communication as a Mechanism for Collusion in the Broiler Industry}, ISSN={["1573-7160"]}, DOI={10.1007/s11151-023-09929-7}, journal={REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION}, author={Sheng, Qiwen and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2023}, month={Nov} }
 @article{oh_vukina_2022, title={Estimating Parental Demand for Children's Screen Time in a Model of Family Labor Supply}, ISSN={["1573-966X"]}, DOI={10.1007/s11294-022-09854-7}, abstractNote={In a novel approach to model the demand for the children's screen time as the result of a parent's optimal labor-leisure choice, the study used a simple model of parental utility maximization subject to the money and time budget constraints to derive Marshallian parental demand functions for two types of child upbringing activities: time-intensive (violin lesson) and time-saving (video games). After the Slutsky decomposition, parental demand for children's screen time was shown to be similar to a Giffen good. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development data, the wage equation was first estimated based on Heckman’s two-step correction procedure. Then, the total effect of an increase in wage rate on the parental demand for screen time was empirically decomposed into the substitution effect and the income effect. The study findings indicate that the substitution effect is positive, the income effect is negative, and the negative income effect dominates the substitution effect. We add to the existing literature by showing that the empirical findings in the public health and psychology literature can be reconciled with the theoretical predictions of the standard economic labor-leisure trade-off paradigm.}, journal={INTERNATIONAL ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH}, author={Oh, Sohae Eve and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2022}, month={Sep} }
 @article{zheng_vukina_zheng_2021, title={Risk aversion, moral hazard, and gender differences in health care utilization}, volume={46}, ISSN={["1554-9658"]}, DOI={10.1057/s10713-020-00048-x}, abstractNote={This paper uses truncated count model with endogeneity and simulated maximum likelihood estimation technique to estimate gender differences in moral hazard in health care insurance. We use the dataset that consists of invoices for all outpatient services from a regional hospital in Croatia. Our theoretical model predicts that higher risk aversion is associated with smaller ex-post moral hazard effect. If women are more risk averse than men, then the moral hazard effect due to health insurance should be lower in women than in men. After adjusting for the sample selection in the estimation, we found a statistically significant evidence of moral hazard for the general population but statistically insignificant difference in moral hazard between men and women.}, number={1}, journal={GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW}, author={Zheng, Yan and Vukina, Tomislav and Zheng, Xiaoyong}, year={2021}, month={Mar}, pages={35–60} }
 @article{oh_vukina_2021, title={The price of cage-free eggs: Social cost of Proposition 12 in California}, ISSN={["1467-8276"]}, DOI={10.1111/ajae.12279}, abstractNote={Abstract}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Oh, Sohae Eve and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2021}, month={Dec} }
 @article{vukina_nestic_2020, title={Paying for animal welfare? A hedonic analysis of egg prices}, volume={36}, ISSN={["1520-6297"]}, DOI={10.1002/agr.21658}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={4}, journal={AGRIBUSINESS}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Nestic, Danijel}, year={2020}, month={Oct}, pages={613–630} }
 @article{zheng_vukina_zheng_2019, title={Estimating asymmetric information effects in health care with uninsurable costs}, volume={19}, ISSN={["2199-9031"]}, DOI={10.1007/s10754-018-9246-z}, abstractNote={We use a structural approach to separately estimate moral hazard and adverse selection effects in health care utilization using hospital invoices data. Our model explicitly accounts for the heterogeneity in the non-insurable transactions costs associated with hospital visits which increase the individuals' total cost of health care and dampen the moral hazard effect. A measure of moral hazard is derived as the difference between the observed and the counterfactual health care consumption. In the population of patients with non life-threatening diagnoses, our results indicate statistically significant and economically meaningful moral hazard. We also test for the presence of adverse selection by investigating whether patients with different health status sort themselves into different health insurance plans. Adverse selection is confirmed in the data because patients with estimated worse health tend to buy the insurance coverage and patients with estimated better health choose not to buy the insurance coverage.}, number={1}, journal={INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT}, author={Zheng, Yan and Vukina, Tomislav and Zheng, Xiaoyong}, year={2019}, month={Mar}, pages={79–98} }
 @article{wang_vukina_2019, title={Sorting into Contests: Evidence from Production Contracts}, volume={19}, ISSN={["1935-1682"]}, DOI={10.1515/bejeap-2018-0049}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={1}, journal={B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY}, author={Wang, Zhen and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2019}, month={Jan} }
 @article{wang_vukina_2017, title={Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments}, volume={120}, ISSN={["1617-7134"]}, DOI={10.1007/s00712-016-0516-2}, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS}, author={Wang, Zhen and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2017}, month={Apr}, pages={219–249} }
 @article{dubois_vukina_2016, title={Incentives to Invest in Short-Term vs Long-Term Contracts: Theory and Evidence}, volume={16}, ISSN={["1935-1682"]}, DOI={10.1515/bejeap-2016-0026}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={3}, journal={B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY}, author={Dubois, Pierre and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2016}, month={Jul}, pages={1239–1272} }
 @article{kandilov_vukina_2016, title={SALARIES OR PIECE RATES: ON THE ENDOGENOUS MATCHING OF HARVEST WORKERS AND CROPS}, volume={54}, ISSN={["1465-7295"]}, DOI={10.1111/ecin.12231}, abstractNote={The objective of this paper is to determine whether the choice of payment schemes (hourly vs. piece rates) is systematically related to the workers' risk aversion and ability. We derive the equilibrium relationship between agents' risk aversion and ability and the power of incentives (payment scheme) in a market where many heterogeneous principals and agents are endogenously matched. The equilibrium matching between principals and agents depends on the traits and is critical in determining the contract choice. Using confidential data from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS), we find evidence of matching between agricultural workers and the riskiness of their jobs (crops they harvest) based on workers' risk aversion and no matching based on ability. When controlling for matching, we find strong evidence that high risk‐averse workers choose hourly rates and low risk‐averse workers choose piece rates. We also found that high ability types choose piece rates and low ability types choose hourly rates but the evidence is weaker. (JEL J33, D82, Q12)}, number={1}, journal={ECONOMIC INQUIRY}, author={Kandilov, Ivan and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2016}, month={Jan}, pages={76–99} }
 @article{vukina_nestic_2015, title={Do people drive safer when accidents are more expensive: Testing for moral hazard in experience rating schemes}, volume={71}, DOI={10.1016/j.tra.2014.10.024}, abstractNote={Using individual policies and claims data from the Croatian mandatory motor insurance we test the theoretical proposition that under moral hazard, experience rated pricing scheme should generate the negative state dependence in claims, i.e. that drivers should drive more safely after they had an accident. The empirical challenge in these tests is to disentangle the state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity. We propose a simple approach based on the explicit reliance on the cost of future accidents function which is used to filter out the pure incentives effect, whereas the bonus-malus scale is used to control for pure heterogeneity. Our results confirm the existence of negative dependence in claims indicating the presence of significant moral hazard effect. Increasing a 3-year cost of having an accident by approximately US$20 decreases the probability of having an accident by 6.5%.}, journal={Transportation Research Part A-Policy and Practice}, author={Vukina, T. and Nestic, D.}, year={2015}, pages={46–58} }
 @article{weng_vukina_zheng_2015, title={Productivity or Demand: Determinants of Plant Survival and Ownership Change in the US Poultry Industry}, volume={37}, ISSN={["2040-5804"]}, DOI={10.1093/aepp/ppu024}, abstractNote={We study the productivity‐survival link in the U.S. poultry processing industry using longitudinal data constructed from 5 censuses of manufactures between 1987 and 2007. First, we study the effects of physical productivity and demand‐specific factors on plant survival and ownership change. Second, we analyze the determinants of the firm‐level expansion. The results show that higher demand‐specific factors decrease the probability of exit and increase the probability of ownership change. The effect of physical productivity on the probability of exit or ownership change is generally insignificant. Also, firms with higher demand‐specific factors have higher probability to expand, whereas average firm‐level physical productivity turns out to be an insignificant determinant of firm expansion. Since demand specific factors all favor large companies, this could expedite industry concentration process already well under way and could raise new concerns over contract growers' income and consumers' welfare.}, number={1}, journal={APPLIED ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY}, author={Weng, Tengying and Vukina, Tomislav and Zheng, Xiaoyong}, year={2015}, month={Mar}, pages={151–175} }
 @article{vukina_anderson_muth_2014, title={Economic effects of proposed changes in living conditions for laying hens under the National Organic Program}, volume={23}, ISSN={["1537-0437"]}, DOI={10.3382/japr.2013-00834}, abstractNote={Abstract In this paper, we estimate the costs and benefits of implementing the proposed National Organic Program for laying hens compared with alternatives. For the regulatory proposals under option 2, the regulatory cost will be zero because most producers are already in compliance with the proposed regulation. The anticipated benefits of this regulation will be zero as well, because the current market prices already reflect consumers’ willingness to pay for the existing animal welfare conditions. For the regulatory proposals under option 3, before market adjustments, the average regulatory burden for the entire organic egg industry will amount to $0.09 per dozen eggs, with extreme variations between $0 for small operations and $2.30 per dozen for large operations. If we rely on the average price of organic eggs, $2.69 per dozen, and assume a maximum estimated benefit associated with improved animal welfare conditions, that consumers would be willing to pay of about 30% above the current market price, the estimated benefit of regulation amounts to $0.81 per dozen eggs. Based on the findings, we conclude that option 2 is welfare neutral and could be easily adopted because it already has been adopted by representative producers. For option 3, the benefit-cost ratio is larger than 1, which indicates that the proposal passes the benefit-cost ratio test. The obtained result, however, has to be interpreted with serious reservation because of the differential effect that the proposed regulation would have on different industry participants. Under option 3, the effect of the proposed changes on small organic egg producers is negligible because most small producers are operating under conditions similar to the proposed living standards. However, costs will increase substantially for large organic egg producers and likely cause a substantial number of producers to exit organic production and switch to conventional production, which would cause a substantial decline in the prices of conventional eggs and organic feed in the short run.}, number={1}, journal={JOURNAL OF APPLIED POULTRY RESEARCH}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Anderson, Kenneth and Muth, Mary K.}, year={2014}, month={Mar}, pages={80–93} }
 @article{vukina_anderson_muth_2014, title={Proposed changes in living conditions for broilers under the National Organic Program will have limited economic effects}, volume={23}, ISSN={1056-6171}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.3382/japr.2013-00896}, DOI={10.3382/japr.2013-00896}, abstractNote={Abstract In the current paper, we estimate the costs and benefits of implementing the proposed rule for changes in living conditions for organic broilers. In contrast to the effects of the proposed rule for changes in living conditions for laying hens, the effects of the rule on organic broilers is anticipated to be relatively limited. All producers are already in compliance with option 2 of the rule, and changes required under option 3 are minimal for most producers. Using the per-farm estimated regulatory costs and the estimates of production volumes and actual prices, the total estimated annual industry cost under option 3 is $2.4 million, which represents 0.1% of total industry revenue. The estimated benefits associated with this type of perceived animal welfare improvement are high enough to cover the anticipated cost, and the proposed option easily passes the benefit-to-cost ratio test.}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Applied Poultry Research}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Anderson, Kenneth and Muth, Mary K.}, year={2014}, month={Jun}, pages={233–243} }
 @article{liu_nestic_vukina_2012, title={ESTIMATING ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD EFFECTS WITH HOSPITAL INVOICES DATA IN A GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED HEALTHCARE SYSTEM}, volume={21}, ISSN={["1057-9230"]}, DOI={10.1002/hec.1756}, abstractNote={SUMMARY}, number={8}, journal={HEALTH ECONOMICS}, author={Liu, Xiangping and Nestic, Danijel and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2012}, month={Aug}, pages={883–901} }
 @article{vukina_zheng_2011, title={Homogenous and Heterogenous Contestants in Piece Rate Tournaments: Theory and Empirical Analysis}, volume={29}, ISSN={["1537-2707"]}, DOI={10.1198/jbes.2010.08345}, abstractNote={In this article we show that sorting different ability contestants in piece rate tournaments into more homogenous groups alters agents’ incentives to exert effort. We propose a method for structurally estimating the piece rate tournament game with heterogenous players and apply it to the payroll data from a broiler production contract. Our counterfactual analysis shows that under reasonable assumptions, both the principal and the growers can gain when the tournament groups are heterogenized. This business strategy could be difficult to implement in real-life settings, however. This article has supplementary material online.}, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & ECONOMIC STATISTICS}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Zheng, Xiaoyong}, year={2011}, month={Oct}, pages={506–517} }
 @article{vukina_zheng_2010, title={Bargaining, Search, and Price Dispersion: Evidence from the Live Hogs Market}, volume={39}, ISSN={1068-2805 2372-2614}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1068280500007498}, DOI={10.1017/S1068280500007498}, abstractNote={Using unique panel data on individual transactions between buyers and sellers in the spot market for live hogs, we found a large degree of intra-day price dispersion. Motivated by this empirical puzzle, we offer an explanation which is rooted in the bargaining with search theory. We formulate three hypotheses involving the role of farmers’ search cost, bargaining parties’ patience, and asymmetric information that we believe can explain the observed phenomenon. Empirical analysis shows strong support for all three of the stated theoretical predictions, indicating that the bargaining with search theory explains at least 31 percent of the observed intra-day price variation in this market.}, number={3}, journal={Agricultural and Resource Economics Review}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Zheng, Xiaoyong}, year={2010}, month={Oct}, pages={534–546} }
 @article{zheng_vukina_2009, title={Do Alternative Marketing Arrangements Increase Pork Packers' Market Power ?}, volume={91}, ISSN={["1467-8276"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1467-8276.2008.01185.x}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={1}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Zheng, Xiaoyong and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2009}, month={Feb}, pages={250–263} }
 @article{dubois_vukina_2009, title={Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents: Evidence from production contracts data}, volume={27}, ISSN={["1873-7986"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.01.001}, abstractNote={The objective of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for the estimation of parameters of a structural model of an incentive contract under moral hazard, taking into account agents heterogeneity. We show that allowing the principal to strategically distribute the production inputs across heterogenous agents as part of the contract design, the principal is able to change what appears to be a uniform contract into individualized contracts tailored to fit agents' preferences or characteristics. Using micro level data on swine production contract settlements, we find that contracting farmers are heterogenous with respect to their risk aversion or the costs of effort and that this heterogeneity affects the principal's allocation of production inputs across farmers. Relying on the identifying assumption that contracts are optimal, we obtain the estimates of a lower and an upper bound of agents' reservation utilities. We show that farmers with higher risk aversion have lower outside opportunities and hence lower reservation utilities.}, number={4}, journal={INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION}, author={Dubois, Pierre and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2009}, month={Jul}, pages={489–500} }
 @article{vukina_zheng_marra_levy_2008, title={Do farmers value the environment? Evidence from a conservation reserve program auction}, volume={26}, ISSN={["0167-7187"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.01.001}, abstractNote={The paper uses data from one Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auction to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove chosen plots of land from agricultural production and put them to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of this auction is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. Using decision theoretic approach to model this auction we show that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they value environmental benefits, especially those that increase future soil productivity of their land.}, number={6}, journal={INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Zheng, Xiaoyong and Marra, Michele and Levy, Amando}, year={2008}, month={Nov}, pages={1323–1332} }
 @article{zheng_vukina_2007, title={Efficiency gains from organizational innovation: Comparing ordinal and cardinal tournament games in broiler contracts}, volume={25}, ISSN={["0167-7187"]}, DOI={10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.001}, abstractNote={We analyze the contract settlement data of a poultry company who contracts the production of broiler chickens with a group of independent growers. The company originally used rank-order (ordinal) tournaments to compensate their contract growers and later switched to cardinal tournaments. Based on the observed payment mechanism we construct an empirical model of a rank-order tournament game and estimate structural parameters of the symmetric Nash equilibrium and then simulate growers' performance under the observed cardinal tournament contract. We found that the model with risk-averse agents fits the data better than the model with risk-neutral agents and that switching from a rank-order tournament to a cardinal tournament, while keeping the growers' ex-ante expected utility constant, improved efficiency. The principal (company) gains from the switch, whereas some of the agents (growers) gain and others lose depending on their realized productivity shocks.}, number={4}, journal={INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION}, author={Zheng, Xiaoyong and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2007}, month={Aug}, pages={843–859} }
 @article{vukina_zheng_2007, title={Structural estimation of rank-order tournament games with private information}, volume={89}, ISSN={["1467-8276"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01008.x}, abstractNote={In this article we propose and solve a game‐theoretic model of a rank‐order tournament with private information. Using the contract settlement data from a poultry company, we estimate a fully structural model of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of this game. We show that growers' equilibrium effort depends on four factors: the spread in piece rates between the performance brackets, the number of players in each tournament, the number of performance brackets used, and the density of growers' private shocks. We use estimates to simulate how changes in the tournament characteristics affecting equilibrium effort impact the growers' and the integrator's welfare.}, number={3}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Zheng, Xiaoyong}, year={2007}, month={Aug}, pages={651–664} }
 @article{vukina_leegomonchai_2006, title={Oligopsony power, asset specificity, and hold-up: Evidence from the broiler industry}, volume={88}, ISSN={["1467-8276"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1467-8276.2006.00881.x}, abstractNote={In this article we look for empirical evidence of hold‐up in broiler industry production contracts by using the cross‐sectional national survey of broiler growers. First, we focus on the problem of under‐investment and hypothesize that the degree of agent's (grower's) under‐investment systematically depends on the principal's (integrator's) market power and the level of asset specificity. Second, we provide an indirect test of hold‐up by looking at the grower contract payoffs as a function of the frequency of the housing facilities upgrade requests and the principal's market power. The results show moderate empirical support for the presence of hold‐up.}, number={3}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Leegomonchai, Porametr}, year={2006}, month={Aug}, pages={589–605} }
 @article{vukina_leegomonchai_2006, title={Political economy of regulation of broiler contracts}, volume={88}, ISSN={["0002-9092"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1467-8276.2006.00942.x}, abstractNote={In this paper we present a brief history of regulation of broiler contracts whose main characteristic has been that virtually all regulatory attempts on either federal or state levels have failed. We identify two possible sources of market failure that may justify regulation: asymmetric bargaining power between integrators and contract growers and imperfect information. We search for the explanation for this outcome by comparing the public interest theory of regulation with the interest group theory (Posner 1974). Based on the existing literature on possible market failures in broiler contracts, we found that empirical evidence in support of those is rather weak. This may or may not explain the existing lax regulatory environment in which poultry processors operate from the public interest theory’s point of view. However, we can build a more compelling case for the lack of regulation resorting to the interest group theory’s main arguments as formulated by Becker (1983).}, number={5}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Vukina, Tomislav and Leegomonchai, Porametr}, year={2006}, month={Dec}, pages={1258–1265} }
 @article{inoue_vukina_2006, title={Testing for the principal's monopsony power in agency contracts}, volume={31}, ISSN={["0377-7332"]}, DOI={10.1007/s00181-005-0041-6}, number={3}, journal={EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS}, author={Inoue, Atsushi and Vukina, Tomislav}, year={2006}, month={Sep}, pages={717–734} }
 @article{leegomonchai_vukina_2005, title={Dynamic incentives and agent discrimination in broiler production tournaments}, volume={14}, ISSN={["1530-9134"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00085.x}, abstractNote={ The objective of this paper is to test whether broiler processors, after observing their contract growers' abilities in the sequences of repeated short‐term contracts, strategically allocate production inputs of varying quality. The strategy can either consist of providing high‐ability agents with high‐quality inputs or providing low‐ability agents with high‐quality inputs. The first strategy would stimulate the career concerns type of response on the part of the growers, whereas the second strategy would generate a ratchet effect. We test these hypotheses by using the broiler contract production data. The results show no significant input discrimination based on grower abilities that would lead to either career concerns or ratchet effect type of dynamic incentives. }, number={4}, journal={JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY}, author={Leegomonchai, P and Vukina, T}, year={2005}, pages={849–877} }
 @article{dubois_vukina_2004, title={Grower risk aversion and the cost of moral hazard in livestock production contracts}, volume={86}, ISSN={["0002-9092"]}, DOI={10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00634.x}, abstractNote={The use of contracts to vertically coordinate the production and marketing of agricultural commodities has become common practice in many agricultural sectors. To solve the apparent asymmetric information problems between processors and independent farmers that universally plague these relationships, the majority of contracts use high-powered incentives schemes to compensate farmers. In light of the renewed interest and increased pressure on the states and federal government to regulate production contracts, a legitimate question to ask is: How much are the producers going to loose if forced to replace the high-powered incentives schemes that include performance bonuses with some low-powered ones, such as simple piece rates? The answer to this question depends on the size of the cost of moral hazard. The welfare cost of moral hazard emanates from the fact that contract growers are risk averse and face uncertain income streams. The degree of risk aversion generates more or less disutility from uncertainty and plays an important role in the design of the optimal contract form. The literature on the provision of incentives in firms is based on the premise that relating pay to performance increases output, but at the cost of imposing risk on the agents, which is reflected in higher compensations. Grower welfare depends on the type of contract he has signed, the distribution of random factors affecting production, and the shape of his utility function. The objective of this article is to develop an analytical framework for the econometric estimation of the degree of risk aversion of farmers involved in the contract production of hogs and to carry out the empirical estimation of}, number={3}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Dubois, P and Vukina, T}, year={2004}, month={Aug}, pages={835–841} }
 @article{bontems_dubois_vukina_2004, title={Optimal regulation of private production contracts with environmental externalities}, volume={26}, ISSN={["0922-680X"]}, DOI={10.1007/s11149-004-7552-5}, number={3}, journal={JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMICS}, author={Bontems, P and Dubois, P and Vukina, T}, year={2004}, month={Nov}, pages={287–301} }
 @article{levy_vukina_2004, title={The league composition effect in tournaments with heterogeneous players: An empirical analysis of broiler contracts}, volume={22}, ISSN={["1537-5307"]}, DOI={10.1086/381253}, abstractNote={We compare welfare effects of tournaments and piece rates in contracts with heterogeneous ability agents and demonstrate that tournaments that mix players of unequal abilities create a league composition effect. When leagues are fixed and the time horizon sufficiently long, piece rates improve welfare over tournaments. Using contract production data for broiler chickens, we estimate the variances of growers’ abilities, common production shock, and grower’s idiosyncratic shock. Growers' abilities are heterogeneous, and common production shocks are significant. Leagues in broiler tournaments disintegrate rapidly over time, suggesting that tournament contracts offer more welfare than piece rates.}, number={2}, journal={JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS}, author={Levy, A and Vukina, T}, year={2004}, month={Apr}, pages={353–377} }
 @article{vukina_2003, title={The relationship between contracting and livestock waste pollution}, volume={25}, ISSN={["1058-7195"]}, DOI={10.1111/1467-9353.00046}, abstractNote={This paper investigates factors and mechanisms that influence the relationship between contracting and animal waste pollution. The questions raised are whether contracting worsens livestock waste management problems and how to apportion the burden of regulation between the contracting parties in a socially optimal way. The paper shows that the potential linkages between contracting and animal waste depend on scale, specialization, and concentration of animal units, as well as on division of inputs and contract settlement rules. The long-run apportioning of an increase in costs of environmental compliance depends on the integrator's market power for grower services. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.}, number={1}, journal={REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Vukina, T}, year={2003}, pages={66–88} }
 @article{levy_vukina_2002, title={Optimal linear contracts with heterogeneous agents}, volume={29}, ISSN={["0165-1587"]}, DOI={10.1093/eurrag/29.2.205}, abstractNote={This paper examines the class of linear contracts in a simple principal--agent model in which agents are heterogeneous in their abilities to perform a task for the principal. We show that in the absence of transaction costs, the optimal linear contract is a set of individualised contracts. The fact that individualised contracts are rarely observed may be explained by the presence of transaction costs. The equilibrium that emerges depends on the costs of screening relative to the heterogeneity in agents' abilities. In the monopsony case, the dynamic incentives of the agents preclude individualised contracts even if transaction costs are not significant. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.}, number={2}, journal={EUROPEAN REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Levy, A and Vukina, T}, year={2002}, month={Jun}, pages={205–217} }
 @article{vukina_hilmer_lueck_2001, title={A Hotelling-Faustmann explanation of the structure of Christmas tree prices}, volume={83}, ISSN={["1467-8276"]}, DOI={10.1111/0002-9092.00174}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={3}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Vukina, T and Hilmer, CE and Lueck, D}, year={2001}, month={Aug}, pages={513–525} }
 @article{tsoulouhas_vukina_2001, title={Regulating broiler contracts: Tournaments versus fixed performance standards}, volume={83}, ISSN={["0002-9092"]}, DOI={10.1111/0002-9092.00230}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={4}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Tsoulouhas, T and Vukina, T}, year={2001}, month={Nov}, pages={1062–1073} }
 @article{vukina_wossink_2000, title={Environmental policies and agricultural land values: Evidence from the Dutch nutrient quota system}, volume={76}, ISSN={["0023-7639"]}, DOI={10.2307/3147038}, abstractNote={The paper analyzes the impact of the phosphate-based animal production rights on agricultural land values in the Netherlands. We claim that the existence of mandatory production control program with regional restriction on trading causes a disproportional increase in land prices in the surplus region where the quota is binding, relative to the deficit region where the quota is not binding, and that the increase in the cost of environmental compliance should generate an eroding effect on the existing gap in land prices. The parameters of an inverse land demand model estimated with panel data support both hypotheses.}, number={3}, journal={LAND ECONOMICS}, author={Vukina, T and Wossink, A}, year={2000}, month={Aug}, pages={413–429} }
 @article{tsoulouhas_vukina_1999, title={Integrator contracts with many agents and bankruptcy}, volume={81}, ISSN={["0002-9092"]}, DOI={10.2307/1244450}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={1}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Tsoulouhas, T and Vukina, T}, year={1999}, month={Feb}, pages={61–74} }
 @article{li_vukina_1998, title={Effectiveness of dual hedging with price and yield futures}, volume={18}, ISSN={["1096-9934"]}, DOI={10.1002/(SICI)1096-9934(199808)18:5<541::AID-FUT3>3.0.CO;2-B}, abstractNote={Futures price contracts and options on price futures have been used for quite some time to manage price risk. However, similar market-based instruments for managing yield risk have not been available. Instead, fed­ eral agricultural support programs such as deficiency payments and non­ recourse loan programs along with subsidized crop yield insurance pro­ grams have served as alternatives to market-based risk management mechanisms. On 2 June 1995, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) launched an interesting innovation into the agricultural markets, namely the quantity-based crop yield futures and options contracts. The first listed for trading was the Iowa Corn Yield Insurance Futures and Options contract, which started with fairly modest volume and open interest. Then, surprisingly, on 19 January 1996, the CBOT added a U.S. contract plus four additional state corn yield contracts for Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Nebraska, thereby further diluting the already thin market in the existing Iowa contract. The idea behind the move was that the low cor-}, number={5}, journal={JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS}, author={Li, DF and Vukina, T}, year={1998}, month={Aug}, pages={541–561} }
 @article{vukina_barnes_solakoglu_1998, title={Intervention decision model to prevent spiking mortality of turkeys}, volume={77}, ISSN={["0032-5791"]}, DOI={10.1093/ps/77.7.950}, abstractNote={
 Abstract
 
 Based on the daily records on turkeys' mortalities for the series of flocks placed on different farms in a relatively compact geographical area for the period of approximately 2 yr and other relevant explanatory variables, the goal of the research was to design a decision model to determine whether or not to use the fluorquinolone antibiotic, sarafloxacin, to prevent spiking mortality of turkeys. The core of the designed decision model is the forecasting model that attempts to ex-ante predict the cumulative flock mortality for the period between 8 and 28 d of age. Forecasts were generated with the parameters of the linear regression model where continuous values of daily mortalities served as a dependent variable. The decision variable is a binary (yes/no) choice variable, where “yes” means “go ahead with treatment” and “no” means “do nothing”. If the predicted cumulative mortality for the period between 8 and 28 d of age exceeds 9% of the total initial placement, the model generates a “yes” signal. If the predicted cumulative mortality for the same period is below 9% of the total initial placement, the model generates a “no” signal. The results indicate a reasonable accuracy of the prediction model where the number of correct prediction increases and the number of incorrect predictions falls very fast as the forecasting window shortens. The intervention decision model could help veterinarians in making decisions on whether or not to treat the suspect flocks.
 
}, number={7}, journal={POULTRY SCIENCE}, author={Vukina, T and Barnes, HJ and Solakoglu, MN}, year={1998}, month={Jul}, pages={950–955} }
 @article{vukina_1997, title={Are more optimal grower contracts feasible?}, volume={60}, number={3}, journal={Broiler Industry}, author={Vukina, T.}, year={1997}, pages={22} }
 @article{palmquist_roka_vukina_1997, title={Hog operations, environmental effects, and residential property values}, volume={73}, ISSN={["0023-7639"]}, DOI={10.2307/3147081}, abstractNote={A hedonic study of rural residential house sales in southeastern North Carolina was conducted to determine the effect of large-scale hog operations on surrounding property values. An index of hog manure production at different distances from the houses was developed. It was found that proximity caused a statistically significant reduction in house prices of up to 9 percent depending on the number of hogs and their distance from the house. The effect on the price of a house from opening a new operation depended on the number of hogs already in the area.}, number={1}, journal={LAND ECONOMICS}, author={Palmquist, RB and Roka, FM and Vukina, T}, year={1997}, month={Feb}, pages={114–124} }
 @article{vukina_foster_1996, title={Efficiency gains in broiler production through contract parameter fine tuning}, volume={75}, ISSN={["0032-5791"]}, DOI={10.3382/ps.0751351}, abstractNote={This paper reports on an analysis of existing broiler production contracts, with an attempt to establish the degree of efficiency gains possible from contract alteration. With the use of settlement cost and farm level data, an assessment is made of optimal grower input decisions given contract specifications. Using this analytical framework, alternative contract designs are simulated by searching over possible contract parameter values. The foci of the analysis are three contract parameters: base payment, bonus factor, and the utilities cost allocation factor. In the first two cases, the simulation generated ambiguous results. In the third case, results seem to indicate that switching part of the electricity cost from the grower's cost into the settlement cost may result in a mutual welfare gain.}, number={11}, journal={POULTRY SCIENCE}, author={Vukina, T and Foster, WE}, year={1996}, month={Nov}, pages={1351–1358} }
 @article{vukina_li_holthausen_1996, title={Hedging with crop yield futures: A mean-variance analysis}, volume={78}, ISSN={["0002-9092"]}, DOI={10.2307/1243857}, abstractNote={Abstract}, number={4}, journal={AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS}, author={Vukina, T and Li, DF and Holthausen, DM}, year={1996}, month={Nov}, pages={1015–1025} }
 @article{vukina_roka_carter_1995, title={Economic impact of poultry industry: The case study of North Carolina}, volume={4}, DOI={10.1093/japr/4.3.319}, abstractNote={Abstract The objective of this study is to quantify the economic importance of the poultry industry to the economy of North Carolina. As a first step, an industry survey was conducted to collect production and marketing statistics at the farm and processing levels. In addition, total industry employment, number of contract growers and contract payments, and the intra- and inter- industry flows of goods and services were recorded. Using the survey results, region input/output analysis was performed to estimate the economic impact of the North Carolina poultry industry on total state production, income, and employment. Results show that the poultry industry as a whole supports almost 52,000 jobs and generates almost $1.6 billion in state income. Stated alternatively, the study shows that for every dollar of income earned by poultry processing firms, three dollars are generated across the state's economy, and for every person hired by a poultry processing facility, employment across the state increases by 2.92 persons.}, number={3}, journal={Journal of Applied Poultry Research}, author={Vukina, T. and Roka, F. and Carter, T.}, year={1995}, pages={319} }
 @book{vukina_roka_carter_brandt_zering_1995, title={Impact of the poultry industry on the economy of North Carolina}, number={307}, journal={Impact of the poultry industry on the economy of North Carolina}, publisher={Raleigh, NC : North Carolina Agricultural Research Service, North Carolina State University}, author={Vukina, T. and Roka, F. and Carter, T. and Brandt, J. and Zering, K.}, year={1995}, pages={23} }
 @article{vukina_anderson_1994, title={An adaptive model of perishable inventory dissipation in a nonstationary price environment}, volume={23}, DOI={10.1017/s1068280500000356}, abstractNote={The paper develops an adaptive model of perishable commodity dissipation based on the individual's price expectations and risk perception. A two-step, state-space procedure for modeling nonstationary time series is presented. The method combines an impulse response model for estimating deterministic components with an innovations model for the remaining stationary stochastic noise. Combined parameters are used to generate forecasts and to derive a measure of risk in a nonstationary price environment. Defined as the variance (covariance) of out-of-sample forecast error, the measure of risk is the difference between the historical estimate of the stationary noise auto-covariance and the variance (covariance) of out-of-sample forecasts. The optimal marketing strategy for a hypothetical salmon processor who sells to Japanese wholesalers is developed to illustrate the model. The solution is obtained using quadratic programming algorithm.}, number={1}, journal={Agricultural and Resource Economics Review}, author={Vukina, T. and Anderson, J. L.}, year={1994}, pages={1} }