@inbook{boettcher_2024, title={Trust in nuclear nonproliferation negotiations}, url={https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802200942.00018}, DOI={10.4337/9781802200942.00018}, abstractNote={Trust between state parties to nuclear nonproliferation agreements is difficult to generate. The context in which these negotiations occur differs greatly from social, market, or interpersonal interactions. Often the other party is an adversary, with a history of negative interactions and conflicting preferences. The history of U.S. nonproliferation agreements with certain countries—Soviet Union/Russia, North Korea, Iran, China, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, etc.—are rife with examples of broken promises and failed diplomacy. This chapter examines how confidence-building measures, academic exchanges, “Track 1.5 and 2” diplomacy, and lengthy multiparty negotiations create trust between the state parties and their diplomatic personnel. It also examines how the final agreements bridge any remaining gaps in trust with detailed inspection and verification protocols. It then considers how the final agreements/treaties endure domestic political discord and overcome obstacles to ratification. Finally, it discusses potential future opportunities for interdisciplinary collaborative research in this realm.}, author={Boettcher, William A., III}, year={2024}, month={Jan} } @article{boettcher_2020, title={Whose Life Is Worth More? Hierarchies of Risk and Death in Contemporary Wars. By Yagil Levy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019. 328p. $90.00 cloth, $30.00 paper.}, volume={18}, url={https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592720001826}, DOI={10.1017/S1537592720001826}, abstractNote={Yagil Levy’s excellent new book asks a difficult question in a difficult time: Whose life is worth more? The question is posed to policy makers in democratic countries that are engaged in military operations against nonstate actors embedded in civilian populations. How do these leaders alternatively value the lives of their own civilians under threat, the lives of their soldiers, the lives of their adversaries, and the lives of noncombatants caught in the crossfire? As these decisions are made, implemented, and revised, Levy demonstrates how hierarchies of risk and death are constructed through discourse and practice within the “ingrained” structures of a state’s history and culture (p. 43). Most importantly, Levy explores how these hierarchies are dynamically changed as legitimacies of force and sacrifice interact to alter military strategy and battlefield tactics (p. 40). In the background, international humanitarian law (IHL) and international opinion further constrain these states as they pursue military missions. Using case studies tracking a state’s military campaigns over time, Levy can observe risk transfer—from uppermiddle-class soldiers to lower, from a state’s own soldiers to adversaries and noncombatants, and from noncombatants back to one’s own soldiers. The book begins with Levy’s admonition that his work is “more theoretically than empirically motivated” (p. 2). The first three chapters carefully set out the Weberian state-focused perspective on dilemmas that modern democracies (Israel, Britain, and the United States) face as they pursue nonstate actors (Hamas, Hezbollah, Jaysh al Mahdi, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Serbian militias, the Taliban) through expeditionary campaigns in (mostly) urban environments. Policy makers must balance mission requirements with casualty sensitivity at home and the normative and instrumental application of the noncombatant immunity principle (NCIP) in the field. The two core concepts in the book—legitimacies of force and sacrifice— are painstakingly grounded in extant literatures on war, just war, strategic culture, casualty sensitivity, antiwar movements, bereavement discourse, and public opinion. Careful definitions are offered (p. 13 and p. 29) that both emerge from “a socially constructed system of norms, symbols, values, and beliefs” within these societies. These legitimacies are built on an infrastructure of ingrained components but are also subject to dynamic variables— legal and policy, cultural-discursive, and structural. These chapters culminate in a “(middle-range) typological theory” where the author eschews “a strict causal explanation that isolates alternative variables” (p. 40). The third chapter lays out the variation in risk transfer and operationalizes this dynamism by measuring three to four categories of fatality ratios (p. 44). The five case-study chapters cover Israel’s operations in the West Bank and Gaza; British efforts in Iraq, Kosovo, and Afghanistan; and US campaigns in Iraq, Kosovo, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The cases are selected to generate commonalities in certain variables (regime type, adversary, setting, and time period) while providing important variation in others (culture, method of military recruitment, vulnerability of civilian population), thereby approximating the “method of difference” design (p. 41). Levy is clear that the goal of this project is to “provide conceptual clarification for a broader research” (p. 41). Theory is developed, and concepts are defined and articulated, but the cases serve to probe the plausibility of the model, rather than engage in explicit hypothesis development and testing. Levy fully embraces the qualitative nature of his work. Opportunities for formalization and quantification are rejected or ignored, and the construction of the fatality ratios is the only time statistics are offered. Given the recency of the cases selected, secondary sources provide the bulk of the empirical evidence: memoirs, after-action reports, military histories, NGO and IGO reports, contemporary news reporting, and datasets on casualties. In the Israeli cases, the legitimacy of force is generally high (pp. 55–56), but the legitimacy of sacrifice declined after the First Lebanon War (p. 61). In Jenin risk was transferred to lower-class and religious recruits, while reservists were spared. In Gaza, initial efforts to reduce noncombatant casualties were subsumed by efforts to reduce Israeli casualties. This involved transferring risk to Gaza residents and reimagining Gaza as a “frontier,” rather than a “ghetto” (p. 227)—a place where liberal fire policies and noncombatant casualties were more acceptable. In the British cases, the battlefields were farther afield, and the missions ranged from humanitarian intervention to counterinsurgency. In Kosovo, the NATO air campaign, using stand-off weapons launched from high altitudes, demonstrates the strategic transfer of risk to noncombatants on both sides (Serbs and Kosovar Albanians), because the legitimacy of sacrifice was low for the United States and United Kingdom. British efforts to manage Basra in 2006–7 took place in a post-9/11 world where legitimacies of force and sacrifice had been heavily altered. By 2006 both legitimacies had waned, but the British were still willing to risk their own soldiers in Operation Sinbad and avoid transferring risk to the noncombatant population in the city (pp. 77–84). The US cases offer the highest variation in risk transfer. Initial post–9/11 US military operations enjoyed an extraordinary level of both legitimacies. However, as Iraq was reinterpreted as a “war of choice” and efforts to promote}, number={3}, journal={Perspectives on Politics}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Boettcher, William A., III}, year={2020}, month={Sep}, pages={996–997} } @inproceedings{boettcher_2018, title={Building an Interdisciplinary Graduate Certificate in Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Policy at North Carolina State University}, booktitle={Advances in Nuclear Nonproliferation Technology & Policy Conference: Bridging the Gaps in Nuclear Nonproliferation}, author={Boettcher, W.A.}, year={2018}, month={Nov} } @article{nance_boettcher_2017, title={Conflict, cooperation, and change in the politics of energy interdependence: An introduction}, volume={24}, ISSN={2214-6296}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/J.ERSS.2016.12.020}, DOI={10.1016/J.ERSS.2016.12.020}, abstractNote={This article lays out the core insights of the group of papers included in this special issue. It lays out the logic of the project and highlights how an energy and security approach to energy policy—as opposed to one emphasizing “energy security through energy independence”–shifts our perspective on likely energy policy.}, journal={Energy Research & Social Science}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Nance, Mark T. and Boettcher, William A., III}, year={2017}, month={Feb}, pages={1–5} } @article{boettcher_2017, title={Resolving potential energy conflicts among allies: The 2015 United States-Republic of Korea nuclear cooperation agreement}, volume={24}, ISSN={2214-6296}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/J.ERSS.2016.12.013}, DOI={10.1016/J.ERSS.2016.12.013}, abstractNote={After four years of sometimes contentious negotiations (that at one point required a two-year extension from the U.S. Congress), the United States and Republic of Korea signed a new nuclear cooperation agreement in the summer of 2015. These negotiations caused strain in one of the closest bilateral relationships the U.S. has in Asia – a regional priority for the foreign policy of the Obama administration. This paper examines energy conflict within the confines of an otherwise cooperative and productive partnership. It examines the strategic, technical, economic, and political factors that extended the negotiation period and the creative compromises that led to a final agreement. It then considers the potential pitfalls in implementing the agreement and the implications, in terms of process and substance, for future negotiations regarding civilian nuclear cooperation.}, journal={Energy Research & Social Science}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Boettcher, William A., III}, year={2017}, month={Feb}, pages={86–93} } @article{boettcher_cobb_2009, title={“Don’t let them die in vain”: Casualty frames and public tolerance for escalating commitment in Iraq}, volume={53}, ISSN={0022-0027 1552-8766}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002709339047}, DOI={10.1177/0022002709339047}, abstractNote={This article builds on past framing research to probe the impact of casualty frames on the public’s willingness to expend additional “blood and treasure” in an ongoing war. The rhetoric of “sunk costs” (often described as “sacrifices”) that must be redeemed through further conflict is a well-known, yet irrational, trope. Utilizing an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey on attitudes about Iraq, we find that “investment frames” increase support for the war among individuals who believe the U.S. “did the right thing in Iraq,” but decrease support for the war among those who feel the U.S. “should have stayed out.” We also find, however, that framing effects are inconsistent when the frames are attributed to sources. These latter results demonstrate the importance of including unattributed frames to evaluate source effects in framing research.}, number={5}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications}, author={Boettcher, William A., III and Cobb, Michael D.}, year={2009}, month={Jul}, pages={677–697} } @article{cobb_boettcher_2007, title={Ambivalent Sexism and Misogynistic Rap Music: Does Exposure to Eminem Increase Sexism?}, volume={37}, ISSN={0021-9029 1559-1816}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2007.00292.x}, DOI={10.1111/j.1559-1816.2007.00292.x}, abstractNote={We evaluate the oft‐repeated but typically untested claim that rap music encourages sexism. We randomly assigned participants to 1 of 3 conditions: no music, misogynistic rap music, and nonmisogynistic rap music. The first study (treated as a pilot; N = 232) weakly demonstrated the differential impact of exposure on male and female participants, but our measures of sexism were unreliable. We then conducted a second study (N = 175) employing well‐validated (and more subtle) measures taken from the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI). While we replicated the weak differential impact of participants' sex, we also find that sexism increased after listening to nonmisogynistic rap music, especially among males. Implications for the debate about labeling and censoring rap music are discussed.}, number={12}, journal={Journal of Applied Social Psychology}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Cobb, Michael D. and Boettcher, William A.}, year={2007}, month={Dec}, pages={3025–3042} } @article{boettcher_2007, title={Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics}, volume={5}, ISSN={1537-5927 1541-0986}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707072714}, DOI={10.1017/S1537592707072714}, abstractNote={Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics. By Dominic D. P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 345p. $35.00. One inevitable result of the recent U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq has been renewed scholarly interest in the determinants of wartime public opinion. In a recent influential article, Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, and Jason Reifler (“Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq,” International Security 30 [Winter 2005/6]: 7–46) argue that casualty tolerance is primarily shaped by prospective beliefs about likely success and retrospective judgments regarding the “rightness” of the decision to initiate the conflict. This rationalist account of wartime public opinion suggests that the mass public will accept the costs of war if they are exceeded by attainable and important benefits.}, number={04}, journal={Perspectives on Politics}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Boettcher, William A.}, year={2007}, month={Nov} } @article{boettcher_cobb_2006, title={Echoes of Vietnam?: Casualty framing and public perceptions of success and failure in Iraq}, volume={50}, ISSN={0022-0027 1552-8766}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002706293665}, DOI={10.1177/0022002706293665}, abstractNote={ In the early stages of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, military leaders resisted the release of body count and “casualty ratio” data. However, in the spring of 2004, the U.S. military (and American media) began to focus on the “limited” American casualties in specific operations versus the “significant” number of insurgents killed. This article examines the extent to which body count/casualty ratio “frames” and individual casualty tolerance influence public perceptions about the war and the success or failure of U.S. military operations. Two experiments were conducted pitting alternative casualty frames against one another to measure their relative impact. The results demonstrate the influence of framing effects on public perceptions and clarify understanding of the determinants and impact of casualty tolerance. }, number={6}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications}, author={Boettcher, William A., III and Cobb, Michael D.}, year={2006}, month={Dec}, pages={831–854} } @article{boettcher_2005, title={International Relations Under Risk: Framing State Choice}, volume={3}, ISSN={1537-5927 1541-0986}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1537592705770493}, DOI={10.1017/S1537592705770493}, abstractNote={International Relations Under Risk: Framing State Choice. By Jeffrey D. Berejikian. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. 152p. $40.00. This book challenges the rational choice assumptions that undergird much of the extant international relations literature on deterrence, bargaining, cooperation, economic behavior, and the exercise of power. In an ambitious extension of his previous work, Jeffrey D. Berejikian attempts to construct “a new set of theoretical propositions about international politics securely anchored to empirical research in cognitive psychology” (p. 2). In the tradition of Graham T. Allison's (1971) Essence of Decision, Berejikian meticulously demonstrates the degree to which behavioral expectations regarding strategic interaction are tied to underlying conceptual models of decision making. He substitutes prospect theory's empirically grounded observations regarding framing effects and loss aversion for rational choice assumptions regarding invariance and net asset valuation. The result is a comprehensive cognitive model of state interaction that is capable of explaining preference reversals, risk acceptance, and nonmaximizing choice. The boldness of this enterprise more than compensates for minor flaws in execution.}, number={04}, journal={Perspectives on Politics}, publisher={Cambridge University Press (CUP)}, author={Boettcher, William A.}, year={2005}, month={Nov} } @book{boettcher_2005, place={New York}, title={Presidential risk behavior in foreign policy: Prudence or peril}, publisher={Palgrave Macmillan}, author={Boettcher, W.A.}, year={2005} } @article{boettcher_2004, title={Military intervention decisions regarding humanitarian crises: Framing induced risk behavior}, volume={48}, ISSN={0022-0027 1552-8766}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002704264271}, DOI={10.1177/0022002704264271}, abstractNote={Factors that may affect public support or opposition to U.S. military intervention in humanitarian crises around the world are examined to determine the impact of foreign policy frames on individual risk propensity. The source of the foreign policy frames, type of humanitarian crisis, location of the crisis and race/ethnicity/religion of the endangered population, tolerable ratios of U.S. lives saved/lost to foreign citizens saved/lost, and probability of casualty-free success are also investigated.}, number={3}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications}, author={Boettcher, William A., III}, year={2004}, month={Jun}, pages={331–355} } @article{boettcher_2004, title={The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion}, volume={25}, ISSN={0162-895X 1467-9221}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00375.x}, DOI={10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00375.x}, abstractNote={International relations theorists have tried to adapt prospect theory to make it relevant to the study of real‐world decision‐making and testable beyond the constraints of the laboratory. Three experiments with undergraduate samples were conducted in an effort to clarify the advantages and limitations of prospect theory as adapted to explain political behavior. The first experiment tested hypotheses regarding the impact of prospect framing on group polarization, but these were only weakly supported. The second and third experiments examined alternative adaptations of the concept of framing; the results suggest that the political science expansion of the concept of framing may, under certain conditions, produce clear and robust preference reversals.}, number={3}, journal={Political Psychology}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Boettcher, William A.}, year={2004}, month={Jun}, pages={331–362} } @article{boettcher_1995, title={Context, methods, numbers, and words: Prospect theory in international relations}, volume={39}, ISSN={0022-0027 1552-8766}, url={http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002795039003008}, DOI={10.1177/0022002795039003008}, abstractNote={In this article, recent attempts to apply prospect theory to the study of international relations are reviewed and evaluated. The review of this literature leads to a number of theoretical and methodological critiques that are highlighted by an experiment that demonstrates the difficulties inherent in attempting to transport this theory across disciplinary boundaries. Of special importance is the introduction of verbal probability expressions into the experimental design. The results of the experiment provide some support for prospect theory, but differences in the results obtained for different verbal probability sets indicate that decision theorists need to be more concerned with the manner in which probabilistic information is conveyed to (and discussed by) decision makers.}, number={3}, journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution}, publisher={SAGE Publications}, author={Boettcher, William A., III}, year={1995}, month={Sep}, pages={561–583} }