@article{carroll_carter_2005, title={An  unstable eliminativism}, volume={86}, number={1}, journal={Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, author={Carroll, J. W. and Carter, W. R.}, year={2005}, pages={17-} }
 @misc{carter_2004, title={A Materialist metaphysics of the human person}, volume={68}, number={3}, journal={Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, author={Carter, W. R.}, year={2004}, pages={713–723} }
 @article{hestevold_carter_2002, title={On presentism, endurance, and change}, volume={32}, number={4}, journal={Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, author={Hestevold, H. S. and Carter, W. R.}, year={2002}, pages={491–510} }
 @article{carter_1999, title={Will I be a dead person? (Further discussion of Eric Olsen's biological view of personal identity)}, volume={59}, ISSN={["0031-8205"]}, DOI={10.2307/2653464}, abstractNote={In a recent paper "Was I Ever a Fetus?", Eric T. Olson argues convincingly that the Standard View of personal identity cannot resolve the 'fetus problem' and so should be rejected. I shall show that Olson's favored Biological View of personal identity is in much the same boat with respect to what I'll call the dead person problem. Friends of the Biological View (BV hereafter) hold that we continue for so long, but only so long, as our lives continue. The dead person who lay in state after John Kennedy's assassination was not JFK, by the lights of BV theorists, since JFK no longer existed after he died. That leaves us with the question: how was it with this dead person (the dead person who was ceremonially buried in Arlington National Cemetery shortly after JFK's death) prior to JFK's assassination? I do not believe that fans of BV can plausibly respond to the question. As we shall see, the brief for this is much the same as the case Olson makes for judging that friends of SV (the Standard View) cannot plausibly respond to questions concerning the future of fetal individuals. Let Flam be an ordinary (midlife) person, Flem be the fetal individual that emerges from (as we normally would say) Flam's conception, and Flan be the dead person who is buried when (as many would say) Flam is buried. Identity questions present themselves. Is Flem Flam? And is Flan Flam? SV}, number={1}, journal={PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH}, author={Carter, WR}, year={1999}, month={Mar}, pages={167–171} }
 @article{carter_1998, title={How not to preserve Kripke's fundamental insight}, volume={17}, number={1}, journal={Theorema}, author={Carter, W. R.}, year={1998}, pages={99–108} }
 @article{carter_bahde_1998, title={Magical antirealism (Ontology, mind)}, volume={35}, number={4}, journal={American Philosophical Quarterly}, author={Carter, W. R. and Bahde, J. E.}, year={1998}, pages={305–325} }
 @book{carter_1998, title={The way things are: Basic readings in metaphysics}, ISBN={0070101981}, publisher={Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill}, author={Carter, W. R.}, year={1998} }
 @article{carter_1997, title={Dion's left foot (and the price of Burkean economy)}, volume={57}, ISSN={["0031-8205"]}, DOI={10.2307/2953723}, abstractNote={Two recent papers by Michael Burke bearing upon the persistence of people and commonplace things illustrate the fact that the quest for synchronic ontological economy is likely to encourage a disturbing diachronic proliferation of entities. This discussion argues that Burke's promise of ontological economy is seriously compromised by the fact that his proposed metaphysic does violence to standard intuitions concerning the persistence of people and commonplace things. In effect, Burke would have us achieve synchronic economy (rejection of coincident entities) by postulating strongly counterintuitive transtemporal claims of numerical diversity. The argument is made that the price of Burkean economy is too high.}, number={2}, journal={PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH}, author={Carter, WR}, year={1997}, month={Jun}, pages={371–379} }
 @book{carter_1990, title={The elements of metaphysics}, publisher={New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company}, author={Carter, William R.}, year={1990} }